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The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848–1914. By J. W. Burrow.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xviⳭ271. $29.95.
Although The Crisis of Reason is a part of a projected multivolume Yale Intellectual
History of the West, its author, the well-known British historian J. W. Burrow (who is
also one of the editors of the series), prefaces his work by disclaiming any intention to
produce a comprehensive survey of intellectual life in Europe, much less the “West,”
between the 1848 revolutions and World War I. His aim, more modest but still ambitious enough, is to provide a selective, even “impressionistic,” reconstruction of the
“conversations” among northern European intellectuals (British, German, French, and
selectively invited Russians) that were considered significant by the educated readerships of the period. Such conversations are not viewed as rigorously exclusive limiting
and enabling discourses, of either a linguistic or disciplinary nature, but as relatively
porous, overlapping “circles” organized around certain themes and topics and associated with each other through intellectual transfers and analogues. Although Burrow
rejects the possibility of reconstructing an overall cultural or temporal coherence as we
eavesdrop with his guidance on these past conversations, he certainly suggests that we
will discern in them the formation of that tradition of modernism which continues to
define the intellectual conversations of the present in the “West.” Despite the destructive, revolutionary ambitions of postmodernism, he concludes, we remain entangled in
mere glosses and variations of the modernism, and the ongoing “crisis of reason” with
which it seems to be synonymous, that we have inherited from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Although Burrow begins his first chapter with an account of the emergence of a new
consciousness of historical change that led each generation of European intellectuals
to imagine its worlds and its projects as distinct from those of their fathers, he organizes
his study thematically rather than chronologically. Each of the six central chapters is
centered around a problem-oriented conversational circle as it evolves through four or
five topical and temporal stages over the course of the whole period. The participation
of many intellectuals in more than one conversational circle and the overlaps among
the circles produced by ideational transfers and analogues produce some repetition in
Burrow’s accounts. This, however, is not necessarily a fault in a work that surveys a
wide array of thinkers whose names are no longer familiar and that makes an admirable
effort to recognize nuance and complexity in individual arguments.
The first two chapters reconstruct conversational circles centered around the project
conventionally referred to as scientific positivism, that is, the search for a uniform,
objective order in nature and culture by means of a reductionist scientific method
through which the apparently chaotic flux of empirical phenomena is brought into focus
as a coherent systematic, impersonal pattern of relations among analytically identifiable
physical objects and processes. In Burrow’s account the impetus of this conversation
as it relates to the phenomena of nature seems to move from a fatalistic, passive conception of scientific theory as a disenchanted, transparent reproduction of impersonal
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laws to a more activist and self-limiting notion of science as the creation of adaptive,
pragmatic, or even transformative fictions and models imposed on a phenomenal world
that ultimately evades the desire for total rational coherence. Burrow finds the “stories”
of the positivist project somewhat paradoxical, as the pursuit of a demystified, impersonal order creates its own fantasies of totalizing coherence that eventually collapse
under the weight of their own contradictions into a new pattern of demystifying critique
(see pp. 66–67). One might imagine that the following chapter on development of a
science of culture would evolve according to the same pattern—from the discoveries
of the laws of social evolution in Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer to Max Weber’s
interpretive fictions or ideal types, but Burrow chooses to conclude this conversational
circle in the company of social Darwinists, race theorists, and eugenicists. The social
activism of some of these theorists suggests vague parallels to the previous chapter,
but the decision to end with Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, whose major work was published at the beginning rather than the end of Burrow’s temporal frame, is odd and
somewhat confusing.
The third chapter, entitled “Community and Modernity,” refocuses the conversation
among social theorists around problems of content rather than method—on the disintegration and potential reconstruction of the social bond in the context of expanding
market relations, the growth of a bureaucratic welfare state, and the construction of
national identities. This is certainly one of the more interesting chapters of the book,
with especially incisive sections on corporate social theory and on the remythologization of the conception of community. What is missing here most noticeably—particularly in the differentiated accounts of the conversations about national identity in
Britain, France, and Germany—is closer attention to imperial and colonial projects
and their connections to the internal self-construction of both national communities
and the common identity of the “West.”
In chapters 4 and 5, Burrow moves from conversations about the social bond to the
analysis of selfhood and self-identity. Some of his most interesting stories (and creative
entanglements and juxtapositions of what seem at first to be unlikely participatory
elements in the same conversations) are found in these chapters. Nonetheless, the attempt to divide the conversation about the disintegration of the autonomous ego, which
Burrow describes as the search for an “elusive” identity, center, or ground for the
emancipated self, and the conversation about the possibilities of self-conscious construction of identity, especially in the sphere of aesthetics, seem particularly artificial.
The major conversation about sexual and gender identity is inserted awkwardly and
cryptically into a subsection called “Character” in the chapter on the “elusive” self.
Otto Weininger, whose Sex and Character had such an enormous impact all across
Europe in setting the terms for the discussion of gender, sex, and race, is not mentioned
at all. The logic both of the division of the chapters on the self and of the sequence of
topical subsections within these chapters is often difficult to follow. Juxtaposing Weber’s and Thomas Mann’s conceptions of scientific and aesthetic vocations as a chosen
life-form with a representation of self-definition through criminal deed in Dostoyevsky’s literary character Raskolnikov, and intimating that the latter has some relation to
the terrorist acts leading to world war in 1914, might be described as brilliantly suggestive—but they are hardly reconstructions of historical conversations, and they leave
the reader either puzzling over what meanings the author might attach to such associations or trying to work out a set of associations of his own.
Although Burrow eschews any claim to a coherent overview or totalizing narrative
for the textual materials he considers, the prologue and epilogue to the book do suggest
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an implicit general story within which he has inserted and organized his individual
accounts. The prologue sets the stage for Burrow’s conversational reconstructions with
a swift overview of a number of responses to the failure of various revolutionary
projects of 1848 that suggest a general “Disillusionment of the Intellectuals.” Disillusionment with what? Although the various parts of this prologue are not easy to integrate, the claim seems to be that 1848 marked a decisive turning point in an already
evolving disintegration of faith in an imminent and immanent epochal cultural transformation that would create an integration of autonomous selfhood, communal solidarity, and religious or mythical meaning in the wake of the destructive and emancipatory processes of the previous century. The intellectual conversations of the second
half of the nineteenth century are, accordingly, seen as attempts to come to terms with
the growing recognition that historical experience could not sustain a belief in historical
redemption. This process builds to a climax in Burrow’s sixth chapter in a discussion
of the problem of transcendence of historical existence after the death of the old gods;
it culminates in the epilogue’s account of the problematic oscillation among participants
of the modernist avant-garde between surrender to the unstructured, irrational, sheer
flux of experience and escape into self-consciously, artificially constructed order. This
polarization of meaningless experience and artificial order, Burrow suggests, is still
with us. The incarnate divinity of objectively meaningful experience, based on a secure
metaphysical ground and articulated in an overarching narrative coherence for individual identities, remains beyond our grasp.
It is impossible to do justice in a short summary to the complex, sometimes brilliant,
and often cryptic individual reconstructions, paraphrases, and analyses that come together in this story of the intellectual formation of modernism as the general intellectual
context for conversational circles in the “West” during the twentieth century. One
should, however, note the absence of three dimensions in this story which are related
to aspects of that arrogantly and falsely named postmodernism which Burrow clearly
sees as a series of variants of the modernist project. Most striking, since he is a scholar
known to be a student of historiography and historical philosophy, is that Burrow does
not treat the issue of historicism and its various permutations as an organizing center
of intellectual conversation in its own right. Moreover, discussions of identity construction on both the individual and collective levels leave aside the pervasive nineteenthcentury obsessions with both gender relations and imperial/colonial relations that have
been rediscovered and reanimated in the last twenty years. Burrow’s detachment from
what he seems to consider an excessive present-consciousness in such (new historicist,
postcolonial, and feminist) conversational circles among self-styled postmodern intellectuals has closed off his own historical reconstructions to important elements in the
conversations of the past, and thus it has diminished the possibilities for a creative
conversational encounter between past and present.
JOHN E. TOEWS
University of Washington
Religion und Kultur: Europa, 1500–1800. By Kaspar von Greyerz.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000. Pp. 395. DM 58.
Kaspar von Greyerz’s survey of religion in early modern Europe aims to expose a
broad German-speaking audience to the latest developments in religious history. Von
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Greyerz emphasizes developments in religiosity, popular religion, and unofficial religion and stresses the ways in which anthropological and sociological methods have
broadened the study of religion. He states explicitly that he is committed to historical
anthropology and a “newer history of mentalities” (p. 17) and, accordingly, draws
extensively on local studies and “microhistories.” The result is a study that emphasizes
the dynamic nature of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish experience while openly downplaying theology, institutions, and politics. This is a refreshing perspective from an
established German scholar.
Von Greyerz is well placed to produce a study that transcends the concerns both of
historians writing in German and of historians of Germany. He has an American Ph.D.;
has taught and worked in England, Germany, and Switzerland; and has published extensively in both German and English. This volume is based on an impressively wide
reading in German, English, and French and will certainly bring new perspectives to
an educated reading public. Von Greyerz moves easily from, for example, a discussion
of pietism in Germany to an analysis of Puritanism in England, and from a discussion
of developments within Catholicism in Germany to a survey of religion in France.
At the same time, this volume demonstrates many of the strengths of German historical scholarship. The methodological and theoretical discussion in the introduction
goes far beyond what most English-speaking authors would produce in such a survey
volume. Von Greyerz presents valuable definitions and brief but illuminating discussions of important concepts—such as religion, culture, and the ever-problematic Volk
(people)—as well as key pairings such as religion/magic and religion/science. Von
Greyerz’s discussion of all these issues is informed and nuanced, and he emphasizes
that such a scholarly overview must engage large-scale structures and broad developments, even as it draws on microhistorical studies for its basic information.
Religion und Kultur is organized thematically in three parts. The first part is entitled
“Upheaval and Renewal” and focuses on the impact of the Protestant Reformation and
the Counter-Reformation. Here the German obsession with the “confessionalization
thesis,” which emphasizes the close cooperation of church and state in promoting and
enforcing religious loyalty, is analyzed and critiqued. On the one hand, von Greyerz
expresses skepticism about the vast claims made for this thesis. The eminent historian
Heinz Schilling, for example, contends that confessionalization should “expand on and
modify, if not completely replace, the theory of civilizing, as developed by Norbert
Elias” (p. 67). Von Greyerz sensibly points out that when confessionalization is viewed
“from the perspective of daily piety and the religious practice of the common people,
one comes to a differentiated interpretation of the confessionalizing process, which is
more in tune with the experiences of the affected groups of people” (pp. 67–68). On
the other hand, von Greyerz concedes the value of grand interpretations: “large Fragenkomplexe [clusters of questions; he explicitly mentions the theories of Elias and
Max Weber along with confessionalization] must and should continue to concern us”
(p. 66).
This first part of the book also emphasizes the variety of responses to the crisis of
the Reformation in Protestant and Catholic Europe. While the diversity of Protestantism
is well known, Catholicism was also far from monolithic. Von Greyerz compares, for
example, the development of a fairly austere and royalist Catholicism in France with
the baroque Catholicism of Italy and southern Germany. He also argues that the Catholic renewal initiated in the late sixteenth century by the Council of Trent ran out of
steam after several decades in much of Europe, an important corrective to the traditional
focus of church historians on Tridentine reform.
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The diversity of the religious experience in Europe is further emphasized by a discussion of the important “sectarian” or “radical” movements that challenged the increasingly bureaucratized established churches. Von Greyerz examines pietism, Jansenism, Puritanism, and Methodism, all of which sought alternatives to established
churches and attracted large numbers of followers. Obviously, studies of official
churches cannot encompass the range of religious experiences in this period.
The second part of the book is entitled “The Integrated, the Expelled, the Chosen.”
Here von Greyerz examines the role of religion in the community and the family,
highlighting the central role of religion in all aspects of everyday life. Von Greyerz is
careful not to romanticize communities, pointing, for example, to the witch-hunts and
to the Jewish experience to demonstrate how badly religious communities could treat
those considered outsiders. Nevertheless, religion for most people was a series of collective rituals closely linked to the rhythms of agricultural life. Catholicism, with its
pilgrimages, cults of saints, and use of sacramentals to bless people, livestock, and
fields, was somewhat better adapted to this world. Protestants also expected God to
intervene in daily life, and they even turned Luther into a kind of saint. Von Greyerz,
following the lead of the late Bob Scribner, emphasizes the continuum that ran from
officially sanctioned religious practices all the way to illegal magical rites, performed
in secret on the edges of public life. Even educated Europeans, although less fearful
of imminent agricultural catastrophe, frequently turned to astrology and various other
magical practices in an effort to control aspects of their world.
Part 3 of the book analyzes the “fragmentation” of religiosity in the eighteenth century. Von Greyerz engages another theme, secularization, which has concerned German
scholars since the days of Max Weber. The emphasis here is on the privatization of
religion, especially after 1750, rather than the collapse of Christianity, or déchristianisation as it is known in French historiography. While not denying the importance of
the Enlightenment in challenging the place of religion in Europe, here again von Greyerz highlights the different paces and styles of secularization and privatization in
France, Germany, and England.
This is a dense and carefully written book. Like any such survey, it reflects the
author’s interests and expertise. The focus is certainly on Germany, England, and
France, with only occasional excursions to Italy and Spain, and none to Eastern Europe.
The discussion of Jewish history is not very original. Not surprisingly, given the German-speaking audience, issues such as confessionalization and the Weber thesis, which
especially concern historians in the German-speaking world, get special attention. Generally, though, von Greyerz has made important and intelligent choices in an effort to
maintain coherence, and the book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars. Most
importantly, Religion und Kultur should bring anthropological and sociological perspectives on the history of religion to a broad German-speaking audience. Perhaps
English and French-speaking scholars will find less that is novel or surprising about
these approaches, but they are only slowly working their way into the mainstream of
German scholarship. This book is an indication of the progress that is being made in
the study of early modern religion in the land of the Reformation.
MARC R. FORSTER
Connecticut College
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Speaking of Slavery: Color, Ethnicity, and Human Bondage in Italy. By Steven
A. Epstein. Conjunctions of Religion and Power in the Medieval Past. Edited by
Barbara H. Rosenwein.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. xivⳭ215. $32.50.
Histoires d’esclaves dans la péninsule ibérique. By Alessandro Stella. Recherche
d’histoire et de sciences sociales, volume 92.
Paris: Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2000. Pp. 215.
The history of modern slavery, especially in the Americas, cannot be understood without a knowledge of that institution as it flourished in Europe and Africa before and
after Columbus. To be sure, the subject has not been ignored. Quite apart from recent
work on Africans’ historical enslaving of Africans, a substantial literature exists on
medieval and early modern slaving in southern Europe, in the Atlantic Ocean, and in
the Mediterranean and Black Seas, inaccessible as this work often is to anglophones.
Steven Epstein means to provide that English-language audience with an overview of
medieval Italian slavery, insignificant as has been “the Italian contribution to slavery
in global terms” (p. 196). The work of Alessandro Stella, coming to us from this
author’s research perch in Andalusia, provides another type of overview of preabolition
slavery in southern Spain and Portugal.
According to Epstein, the subject of his book is how the language of Italian slavery
began and endured. The stated purposes of the work are, first, to explain how slavery
and racism changed over time, especially as regards color and ethnicity; second, to
show that the old language of slavery still affects the way today’s Italians think about
race; and, third, to place American slavery in a broader context. Ultimately, this is
meant as a book for Americans. Epstein introduces his work with a fascinating description of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Italian thought on slavery and race.
He then proceeds in chapter 1 to study “The Language of Slavery”; in chapter 2, “The
Language of the Law”; in chapter 3, “The Human Behavior of Slavery”; and in chapter
4, what he calls “The Language of the Great Economy”—that is, exchange discourse.
A short conclusion introduces the reader to a mosaic in Rome showing Jesus probably
freeing a white and a black slave, then restates the book’s premises.
This work is not without merit. Epstein can be subtle and is always engaged. He has
read widely and exploits a variety of mainly Genoese and Palermitan sources. He
recognizes that slavery needs to be studied together with poverty as subsets of social
dependence. And he does not hesitate to follow recent American historiography and
raise questions about the costs and savings involved in slavery. Epstein provides many
facts about slaves in Italy: the kinds of names the slaveholders gave them; that Christians could not enslave Christians in Siena; the sentiments of Christians enslaved abroad
begging for help from relatives back home; and the predominance of female slaves in
Italy. He is enlightening on how slaving contracts became increasingly complex from
1160 into the fourteenth century. And, in his third chapter, “The Human [as against
animal?] Behavior of Slavery,” the author devotes fleeting paragraphs to slavers’ descriptions of slave bodies, to the law regarding slave flight, to wet-nursing, and finally
to the defense of slavery from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas to Bartolomeo Spatafora.
(Obviously, Epstein examines slavery largely through the lens of the slave owners.)
Yet, as a whole, the work is mediocre. Though the author’s dustcover advertises it
as “the first history of Italian slavery ever published,” it is not a history at all. The
work adds little to Italianists’ knowledge and is the opposite of systematic: it is characterized instead by shotgun attention to many subjects, the sum of which is not greater
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than the individual parts, leaving the general reader unable to gain any sequential and
overall sense of the topic. Perhaps most lamentable, this unfocused book does not
achieve its stated purposes. Certainly, Epstein notes that slavery rose again in the central
Middle Ages and then slowly declined in the modern age, as is generally known. But
anyone reading this book to discover, as advertised, how the language of Italian slavery
changed will be disappointed. For while the author does show race entering the slavery
discourse essentially at the time of the institution’s medieval revival, not once does he
address shifts in the meaning of words in that discourse. In this book on words, the
author (fleetingly) cites just two Latin dictionaries (of the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, respectively) and nowhere a single Italian one, historical or otherwise. The subject matter mentioned in the book’s subtitle—color and ethnicity—also receives only
glancing attention. Finally, the book is badly organized. As noted, Augustine’s and
Thomas Aquinas’s defenses of slavery are located not in a chapter about thought but
in one supposedly about behavior, and at the end of the work rather than at its beginning. The discussion of modern Italians’ attitudes toward slavery and race recurs at the
end of chapter 1 after being featured in the introduction, with Epstein consigning authors of the early twentieth century to the introduction, and those of the mid-nineteenth
century to later pages.
Thus I doubt that this book will satisfy many American or Italian readers. A historian
in a hurry, Epstein here took on too large a subject for the intellectual capital he was
willing to invest. Early on, the author opines that “the study of medieval and modern
slavery must reach forward to connect with modern slavery, or else we are left with
fragmentary scholarship that means nothing” (p. 18). Not only is this statement senseless (how does “the study of . . . modern slavery . . . connect with modern slavery”?);
it is also absurdly emblematic of haste. Obviously, if it is to be understood, medieval
slavery must look to its past (language is nothing if not the past), and not to its yet
wordless future.
Alessandro Stella’s outstanding Histoires d’esclaves (Slave histories) is a book rooted
in two different methodologies, the narrative and the serial. The former consists in the
compiling of life experiences narrated by slaves and ex-slaves themselves, through the
mediation of a notary. Before various types of mainly ecclesiastical courts across southern Iberia, Moors and black Africans, Bosnians and even subcontinental Indians, intent
on gaining some judicial end—the effectuation of a promised liberation or marriage,
an end to torture, assurance of the testamentary passage of property, whatever—recounted their amazingly varied life stories, irreducible, the author insists, to one uniform description (p. 28). Stella assembles these sometimes fragmentary accounts into
narrative wholes, liberally citing his subjects’ firsthand language, and places these
“microhistories” at the head of chapters that correspond to central biographical events
in the slaves’ or ex-slaves’ lives. One learns how and when these persons were enslaved
(usually, it seems, as children) and by what route they reached Iberia (for example, via
Africa to the Americas, whence to the subcontinent, thence to Andalusia), what different persons had owned them and the treatment they experienced while enslaved,
what their statuses were in Europe as they were at once excluded from Iberian social
structures (marriage, for instance) and integrated into them (for example, black regiments and confraternities), how these slaves and ex-slaves built affective bonds in
friendships and marriages of an often transcendent complexity, what their strategies
were to achieve freedom, and, finally, the special life dynamics of those of mixed-race
status. At the end, the author asks what happened to the “disappeared Africans” one
might have expected to find in today’s mostly Caucasian Iberia.
Beneath this seductive and rich biographical detail, however, there is another work,
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a quantitative study of slave and ex-slave experiences as they emerge from the same
curial and demographic sources. I say “beneath” advisedly. For by beginning each
chapter with the vivid experiences of some six or seven persons who in their depositions
refer in turn to an expansive community of friends and relatives usually of similar
ethnicity, the author easily convinces us that the abstract numeric in the quantitative
effort that follows in each chapter rests upon the sentiently human rather than the other
way around. And, indeed, in the telling, many of these slaves emerge as powerful
persons, a point Stella drives home with an index of named slaves. In this way Stella
achieves what was one of his primary goals, making this overview of slave life in
southern Iberia before the abolitions readable by a broad public.
The work has a great deal to offer the professional historian as well. First, Stella
paraphrases the results of much recent Iberian article and dissertation literature not
widely known abroad; obviously, there has been an awakening among young historians
anxious to plumb the history of homeland slavery. When combined with the author’s
own extensive research in curial archives, this results in a work that is fresh and consequent—and one that is relevant to students of American slavery, who can, for instance, view the fates of women and children who went to Iberia as the flip side of
their more muscular brothers, husbands, and fathers who were shipped to the New
World.
Not at all negligible in terms of its contribution to social production, this population
of slaves and ex-slaves, Stella finds, could amount in the early modern period to 10
percent or more of urban populations in southern Iberia. Those among them who appealed to ecclesiastical courts were—and this is an important finding of the work—a
quite mobile social group, even if, leaving behind a limited progeny, they have not
reproduced themselves in modern Spain or Portugal and even if, as Stella cautions,
most slaves left “not even a mass in their memory” (p. 42). The majority of the slaves
and ex-slaves who did take legal action were also persons of limited means, but they
obviously struggled to find love and friendships, to marry, possibly to own their hovel,
and to leave a little something, if only a scrap of clothing, to survivors. The reader is
fortunate indeed to be an heir of such treasured stories.
Significantly, among a wealth of authoritative determinations—age at marriage, the
occupations of all those friends and relatives witnessing judicial acts, proportions of
slave to free marriages, et cetera, et cetera—the author concludes that the slave trade
into the Iberian peninsula rarely involved adults but, rather, usually children and adolescents; indeed, the average age of sale of a slave in Valencia and Seville, including
of course all those mature slaves being resold, was only twenty years. The obvious
preference for adult males across the Atlantic does not exhaust the significance of this
fact, because, as recent research in medieval work records and on the overseas exportation of children in postabolition European and American societies makes increasingly
apparent, slavery once viewed through the lens of age can appear but one form of the
still more fundamental historic exploitation of children down to and including our own
day.
Spread unresolved across the whole of this impressive work, as over the work of
Steven Epstein, lies the problem of the moral contortions that allowed slave owners—
including, of course, former slaves as well as so-called men of God—to own slaves.
And there still are books to be written on the linguistic dynamics of slavish subservience
through which many societies are still ordered. But, for now, we are fortunate indeed
to have a study of the structure, clarity, and humanity of Alessandro Stella’s.
RICHARD C. TREXLER
State University of New York at Binghamton
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The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815–1914.
By Allan Mitchell.
New York: Berghahn Books, 2000. Pp. xvⳭ328. $59.50.
Allan Mitchell’s book has taken up a doubly challenging task, for railways were probably the single most important economic innovation of the nineteenth century, and the
Franco-German rivalry was also a key element of nineteenth-century European political
history. I think it fair to say that Mitchell’s main concern is with the latter. That is, he
uses railway history mainly as a device for focusing attention on a number of national
political differences. The book does not ignore economic history, but its center of
gravity is clearly political history. I make this point because my review, written by an
economic historian, may not do justice to the author’s own stated aims.
Reduced to its barest essentials, Mitchell’s thesis is that neither the French nor the
German polity succeeded in effectively centralizing state control over their railway
systems before 1914. His explanation? In France a strong liberal political tradition
prevented the state from forcing the principal private railway companies to do its bidding, whereas in Germany it was the strength of political particularism that kept power
over the railways in the hands of the individual German states. Much of the book
concentrates on describing how this worked, and it offers interesting and convincing
documentation of both forms of centripetalism. Taken by itself, however, the argument
contradicts Mitchell’s notion of a “great train race.” He therefore needs and draws on
another factor, a historical event: the strategic role played by railways in Germany’s
defeat of France in the war of 1870–71. This then becomes an important motivating
force in the author’s account of the railway policy of both countries in the years that
followed. It forms, in a sense, the backbone of “the great train race.”
The book’s periodization fits the author’s thesis. The first and second periods, 1815–
70 and 1870–90, are basically defined by the foundation of the German Reich and the
Third French Republic, both fruits of the war of 1870–71. In the first period, entitled
“Launching the Railway Age,” we observe France falling behind Germany in railway
development; it is this deficit that explains the French defeat and marks the transition
to the second period, which the author labels, significantly, “The Signals Are Set.”
This is to suggest, if I read Mitchell correctly, that in this period the French polity
became much more aware of the military and foreign-policy implications of railways.
If that is true, the failure of nationalization of railways in France and the continued
autonomy enjoyed by the private companies offer strong support for Mitchell’s argument stressing the ongoing weight of France’s liberal political tradition. The third
period, however, poses a puzzle. Covering the years 1890–1914 and entitled “Internal
and International Tensions,” it offers no new perspective on “the great train race.” It
hardly prepares us for the author’s conclusion, namely, that by August of 1914 the
French state could fall back on a railway system that was sufficiently developed to
meet the military challenge posed by its German counterpart.
“The Great Train Race” is primarily, but not solely, a political history. Inevitably,
given the nature of its topic, it ventures into the field of economic history as well. It
has much to say, for example, on “the role of the state” in economic development, a
standard topic of German and French economic historians. Mitchell’s comparative approach offers a useful corrective to strictly national assessments. Thus, emphases on
the state’s restraint of private initiatives in the early stages of German railway development are qualified by comparative consideration of railway history in France, where
the centralized state had more leverage vis-à-vis regional economic interests than did
the individual German states. Readers should note, however, that Germany’s better
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performance in early railway development is not attributable to more centralized state
intervention, but to its lesser effectiveness. Readers should also note that this argument
has less force when applied to the Franco-Prussian comparison, since Prussia alone
was a supraregional state like France, though smaller. Indeed, for the 1815–70 period,
a Franco-Prussian comparison might have been more suitable than the Franco-German
one Mitchell offers. For France, we are given a coherent account of the development
of the major companies, which helps us to better understand and appreciate the connections between private enterprise, liberalism, and state policy. For Prussia, such a
description is missing—and it is missing because the author’s agenda forces him to
see German railways primarily in the light of their contribution to interregional integration and to unification.
The point may be generalized. The book touches on many of the standard questions
economic historians have raised about French and German railways, including their
contribution to national economic development, as manifested, for example, in their
role as a “leading sector.” The author’s interpretation, however, is oriented toward
Machtpolitik; he tends to see French and German railways as national resources, as
organizational systems crucial to those nations’ political power, rather than as private
financial investments in systems that supplied that important intermediate good, transportation. This leads him to overstate German economic superiority. I think it likely
that France may have done better relative to Germany in terms of economic welfare
than his account suggests. The statistics he presents (e.g., on total track mileage, freight
volumes, or shipping tonnage) reflect, among other things, France’s relatively slow
population and industrial growth, but not its changing economic welfare—which would
be better captured by real per capita income, a statistic missing here. The author’s
views on the timing of railway and national economic growth also reflect his concern
with Franco-German rivalry. Like many German economic historians, he criticizes the
notion of a “great depression” of the German economy from the mid-seventies to the
mid-nineties; but in interpreting it as a period of “preparation” for a “take-off”—which
he assigns to the 1890–1914 period—he goes beyond anything the literature has suggested. In contrast, he accepts the controversial notion of a “long stagnation” of the
French economy in the seventies and eighties; and though he acknowledges more rapid
growth in the 1890–1914 period, he sees France as falling further behind Germany.
Once again, however, the data and facts presented fail to do justice to the strength of
the French economic position. Repeated references to the north-south European transit
trade are a case in point. However important it may have seemed politically, as an
index of international competitiveness it was surely not a decisive source of French or
German railway revenues.
To sum up: The Great Train Race is a well-researched book, full of useful comparative insights into French and German railway development, and doubtless an important
contribution to the history of Franco-German rivalry before World War One. It would
have benefited from a more selective use of the economic historiography and, in particular, of the distinction between changes in sheer economic size and in economic
welfare. Nevertheless, it may be recommended to economic historians as a study which
shows, in well-balanced comparative perspective, the great importance of their field
for understanding political history.
RICHARD TILLY
University of Münster
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The Political Mobilisation of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class
Cleavage. By Stefano Bartolini. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics.
Edited by Peter Lange.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xxivⳭ637. $69.95.
Stefano Bartolini’s hugely impressive study compares a wide variety of macrofactors
influencing the development of left-wing organizations in Austria, Belgium, Britain,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland between 1880 and 1980. Among those factors extensively discussed
are: the impact of industrialization and urbanization; organizational structure; ideology;
national and social contexts, such as the level of cultural homogeneity (measured
largely by religious and linguistic divisions as well as literacy rates); the impact of war;
the role of the peasantry; the historical development of the franchise; electoral politics;
the integration of the working class into wider society; state repression; alliances with
other political/social organizations; and access to executive responsibility. Identifying
the left largely with a set of ideas/ideologies and political/social organizations, Bartolini
analyzes Social Democracy, Communism, and a variety of third way socialisms. Drawing on Stein Rokkan’s concept of cleavage, Bartolini puts the rise and decline of the
class cleavage into the center of his analysis. It is striking that Bartolini nowhere
problematizes the centrality of class in his story. His book is entirely free of any
poststructuralist doubts about the master narrative of class. In fact, at one point Bartolini
claims that “the development of the class conflict in the middle of the nineteenth century
was natural” (p. 562). Of course, there are good reasons not to share a poststructuralist
platform, and many authors have attempted to defend class in the light of the poststructuralist onslaught. But in a work of this caliber, one would have expected at least some
consideration of the issue. Nevertheless, the outcome of Bartolini’s endeavor is a stunning wealth of comparative insights which shed new light on individual national movements and provide a broad framework for future comparative work on West European
labor movements. The study is particularly rich in the presentation of carefully prepared
comparative data (26 pages of data appendixes plus 141 figures and tables in the main
text), which will prove invaluable for future comparativist scholars.
Sadly, the scholarly sophistication and intellectual rigor of Bartolini’s work is not
matched by an ability to write in accessible language. The work is burdened with
scientist jargon which makes reading the book a painful task. While I am admittedly
a historian and not a political scientist, I feel utterly exhausted after plowing through
page after page of “cognitive stratification,” “over-time containment” (p. 192), “corporate-electoral cross linkage” (p. 245), “corporate-channel organizational consolidation” (p. 295), “configurational and format factors” (p. 381), “institutional integration
syndrome” (p. 408), and “agrarian-structure problem pressure” (p. 469).
Perhaps more importantly, Bartolini makes no effort to relate his own work to the
considerable body of comparative labor studies already in existence. So, for example,
one finds no reference at all to the seminal work of Donald Sassoon, whose work has
a similar scope. Geoff Eley’s important work on the European left as well as a whole
string of landmark case studies, such as the ones by Sheri Berman and Katharina Keller,
also do not feature in Bartolini’s work. The absence of the latter might have something
to do with the express rejection of case-centered comparisons in favor of large-scale
comparisons (pp. 2–3). However, I do not find his argument entirely convincing. The
two types of comparisons seem to fulfill different, but useful, functions. If one asks
the big questions and looks to establish a general comparative framework, as Bartolini
does, then a macro-comparison clearly makes sense. If, however, one wants to falsify
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particular national explanations, or if one wants to criticize the existing typology of
labor movements, then a case-study approach might yield important insights.
As Bartolini expressly criticizes my own case-study comparison of the British and
German labor movements (p. 70), it might be appropriate to respond briefly. Despite
his unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, my book does provide a comparative framework in chapter one, and there is no selective treatment of sources. Instead, an in-depth
case-study comparison, including a good deal of primary archival research, has enabled
me to single out the many shortcomings of any comparative framework that relies on
a dichotomous construction of the British versus the Continental experience. (Incidentally, this is a construction which is also criticized by Bartolini at several places in his
book: see, for example, pp. 246–47, 325, 407.) My own study, however, does not
primarily rely on an analysis of ideology, as Bartolini implies. Rather, I have argued
that “high ideology,” party programs, theoretical debates, and so on were relatively
unimportant for the vast majority of party members and supporters. By contrast, Bartolini’s work starts from perceived ideological differences. This leads him to differentiate between orthodox Marxism (the German model), moderate trade unionism (the
British model), and an eclectic mix of Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism (the French
model). I have argued elsewhere that I find such typologies entirely unhelpful in understanding differences and similarities between European labor movements (Stefan
Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900–1931 [Oxford, 1999], and “European Labour Movements and the European Working Class in
Comparative Perspective,” in The Force of Labour, ed. Stefan Berger and David
Broughton, pp. 245–62).
Surprisingly, Bartolini, after going through the motions of comparative modelbuilding, refuses to commit himself to a “final general typology.” His argument that there
are ultimately too many factors involved and that any change in the primary classification dimension of these factors will lead to a different typology (p. 571) is nothing
short of a cop-out—particularly in view of the fact that, throughout the book, Bartolini
is solely concerned to group the left into ideal types, relate experiences, and come up
with similar and different cases. Ultimately, it seems to me, referring in particular to
table 10.2, that Bartolini’s analysis would broadly support a differentiation into four
types of left: (1) France and Italy; (2) Scandinavia; (3) Austria, Finland, and Germany;
(4) Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Ireland.
Occasionally, Bartolini’s judgments seem open to debate. Thus, for example, he calls
the governmental record of the British Labour Party “modest” (p. 372) and goes on to
argue that only the Scandinavian socialists were able to mold their respective societies
to a significant extent (p. 391). However, a comparative approach in particular would
surely have to emphasize that, although Labour only governed Britain for brief periods
in the twentieth century, few Labour governments in Europe were able to shape their
societies to such an extent as the 1945–50 Labour government in Britain. It also seems
unfair to rule out the Austrian Socialists after 1945 on the basis that their achievements
were part of a coalition strategy. Surely, coalitionism does not equal limited impact.
Furthermore, Bartolini writes that “Liberalism as an organised political expression of
the urban and/or rural middle class and bourgeoisie was nonexistent in Germany and
Austria” (p. 436). For Germany at least, almost two decades of intensive research into
the German middle classes has conclusively demonstrated the opposite. That German
socialists found it difficult, for a variety of reasons, to forge links with organized
liberalism is surely a different matter.
In a work of such magnitude, it says something for the familiarity of the author with
the great diversity of national contexts if a reviewer can only find one basic mistake.
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The first Labour cabinet in Britain did not only last for fourteen days (p. 359): the 1924
MacDonald cabinet lasted from January to November. Furthermore, the 1923 election
did not return just 59 Liberals but 158, enough to ensure a majority for the Labour
government, provided that the Liberals wanted to maintain it. Overall, and despite the
criticisms voiced above, Bartolini’s work is a major landmark in comparative labor
studies which will stand as a tribute to its author for a very long time. It is a must for
anyone interested in comparative labor history.
STEFAN BERGER
University of Glamorgan

Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West.
By Susan Buck-Morss.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. Pp. xviⳭ368. $45.00.
One of the fairy tales of our present day is the idea that societies are changing faster
than ever before. For all the technological innovation and social displacement at the
end of the twentieth century, there has been startlingly little recent political experimentation or utopian daydreaming. Social mechanics appear to have slowed down
dramatically, in marked contrast to the ambitious political projects that accompanied
the beginning of the century. Indeed, the visualization of motion, which so fascinates
observers of technology and seers of globalization today, is itself a historical artifact
belonging to an insistently ideological age in which the markers of transformation
included not simply material things or faster connections but political longings and
social desires. To be sure, many critics have welcomed the passing of grandiose utopian
impulses which ended up leading to Stalinism or Nazism; in Burkean fashion, they
correlate modest political ambition with humane political practice. Susan Buck-Morss
strenuously resists this antiutopian tendency and constructs an alternative history of
the twentieth century from which she wants to recover “the dreamworlds of modernity,”
the desire for “social arrangements that transcend existing forms” (p. xi) and particularly those “mass-utopian projects” that sought a correspondence between a “good
society” and “material happiness” (p. ix). This dreamworld is extremely important to
understand because it is closely connected with catastrophe: “the dream of mass sovereignty has led to world wars of nationalism and to revolutionary terror. The dream
of industrial abundance has enabled the construction of global systems that exploit both
human labor and natural environments. The dream of culture for the masses has created
a panoply of phantasmagoric effects that aestheticize the violence of modernity and
anaesthetize its victims” (p. xi). At the same time, the leftover ruins of the dreamworlds
of the 1920s and 1930s serve Buck-Morss as prompts to think more critically about
the present and its possibilities. This history is nothing less than a self-conscious elaboration of Walter Benjamin’s historical method, which was to undermine self-evident
conclusions with evidence of alternative beginnings. The innovative form of the book,
which includes hypertext, fragments, and an autobiographical exposition of the production of the text itself, imaginatively enables the work of recovery and resistance.
Unfortunately, the stimulating preface is not a faithful guide to the book. Instead of
exploring the ways in which “the historical experiment of socialism” is in fact “deeply
rooted in the Western modernizing tradition” (p. xii) and how both the United States

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

835

and the Soviet Union were profoundly shaped by self-consciously mass democratic
movements, Buck-Morss begins her argument with an analysis of sovereignty, state
power, and political imagination. Utopian politics are introduced only by way of the
fiercesome power structures that mangle them. Despite the interesting things she has
to say about the geopolitical imagination of the nation-state and the temporal imaginary
of the class state, Buck-Morss will madden most readers with the blunt parallels she
draws between East and West. Surely there is a better way to overturn complacencies
about the so-called victors of the Cold War than to lovingly attend to the hysterical
language of U.S. Attorney General Palmer in the 1920s and then turn to the Soviet
Union and conclude about its abstractly tallied “record” of “overt violence” that it “is
hardly more heartening” (p. 4). Far more useful would have been an analysis of the
dreamworlds themselves, including sidebar comparisons with the United States, where,
for example, visitors to the General Motors exhibit at the 1939 New York World’s Fair
were handed a button reading “I Have Seen the Future.” An incisive discussion of the
Russian avant-garde in the 1920s allows Buck-Morss to show resistance to the Communist Party’s transformation of the “revolutionary rupture” into a “permanent present”
(p. 71), but keeps her from analyzing more closely how citizens actively collaborated
with the Soviet system to remake themselves and their society. To be sure, Buck-Morss
argues brilliantly that aesthetic experience can “teach us something new about our
world” and “shock us out of moral complacency and political resignation” (p. 62), yet
in the meantime she has lost the democratic mass that is her avowed subject. In the
end her high-cultural approach makes it harder for readers to plausibly reconstruct for
themselves the desires and dreams of “past experience” (p. 68). Toward the end of the
book, the utopian potential becomes a thinner and thinner reed. The “collective desires”
(p. 209) she wants to rescue are hard to recognize in the simply individual bodily
resistance with which she confronts military discipline and state hegemony. For BuckMorss, the (unsubstantiated) claim that the body “vomits voluntarily at mass executions, loses eliminatory control during the terror of battle,” or “succumbs to feelings
of erotic love for individuals who belong to the category of the enemy” is the trace of
utopian revolt (p. 255). Yet, wasn’t it precisely collective desires in the twentieth
century that considerably reworked the body and disciplined and fashioned its somatic
responses? Ultimately, the dreamworlds of modernity, recovered in the essentialized
corporeality of the single individual, seem pretty flimsy.
They seem pretty flimsy because, in some way, Buck-Morss does not take seriously
the collective desires she wants to reinsert into the story of the present. She strenuously
protects utopia from the monopolistic power of the state and the party. “There is no
reason to believe that these utopian hopes caused history to go wrong,” she writes,
“and every reason, based on evidence of the abuses of power that propelled history
forward, to believe the opposite” (p. 68). But the very transcendence of “existing forms”
(p. xi) also created powerful subjects who believed in their own founding myths and
who therefore exerted new sorts of power. One of the markers of the possibility of
transformation was the evidence of violence: the shattered worlds of custom and tradition; the impress of the machine; and the totality of war itself. Mass movements,
utopian possibility, and the knowledge of violence are perhaps more related than BuckMorss allows; they cannot be tidily separated from one another with phrases like
“abuses of power” (p. 68); Benjamin himself refers to the blasting work of the “destructive character.” For a history of utopia, the example of Nazism is as pertinent as
Bolshevism: both ideas exerted enormous social appeal, both fashioned alternative and
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very consequential worlds, and both self-consciously sought to interrupt the seemingly
progressive continuum of history. There is nothing about mass movements or utopian
potentials that is necessarily progressive. What the ruins of the utopias of the 1920s
and 1930s do indicate, however, is the evidence of political combustion, and that is
why they remain so frightening and so enchanting.
PETER FRITZSCHE
University of Illinois
The Isles: A History. By Norman Davies.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. xliiⳭ1222. $45.00.
This is a very long book, almost 1,300 pages, with an ambitious agenda. It aims to
survey the development of the British Isles from the end of the last Ice Age to the
present, taking account of all the archipelago’s nations and cultures. Readers may
recognize here the influence of the New British History, but the volume is more than
that. It focuses not only on familiar “British” themes like the rise and fall of Britishness,
or state formation and its interaction with identities; it also addresses a perceived crisis
in the modern British state and public perceptions of that crisis.
The author is a professional historian but has no special expertise in British history.
He “presents a very personal view of history” (p. xxii), essaying this general synthesis
by assembling the facts from standard accounts and reference works and relying on
specialist readers for advice on particular chapters. Norman Davies hopes thereby to
bridge the gap between narrowly focused, quasi-scientific, academic history and more
wide-ranging popular histories. Altogether, there are ten chapters, plus a long introduction, with 101 illustrations, 20 maps, and 23 tables, backed by a wide-ranging set of
sixty-three appendixes with yet more maps and tables, dynastic trees, and even political
songs. Each chapter is split into three sections, with an opening “snapshot” of a particular
episode meant to establish the context of the chapter’s main theme(s) and a historiographical conclusion linking each period of history with later perceptions of its significance.
Lengthy quotations from primary sources also offer a flavor of each period.
How far does performance match ambition? Davies offers here a sustained narrative,
written in a witty, lively style, and a clear argument, notwithstanding some complex
analyses of developments. The chronological balance seems about right. Developments
to the Union of the Crowns (1603) are treated in seven chapters and 529 pages; later
events, in three chapters and 529 pages (the later chapters are longer and subdivided).
The first two chapters, to A.D. 43, seemed rather indulgent, but thereafter the author
tackles effectively and at a brisk pace the problems of combining developments in
different countries into a single narrative. The focus of the earlier chapters is high
politics but with regular excursions to address such topics as the development of the
English language or the impact of the Reformation. The author’s desire “to be as precise
as possible about nomenclature” (p. xli) perhaps explains the preference for French and
Celtic forms early on, but there are many inconsistencies: “Shane O’Neill” (p. 482),
for instance, never used the English spelling. The last part is much more rounded,
including sections on literature, sport, and demography. Some of the details are unreliable: for instance, British Railways ran out of steam in 1968, not during the 1970s
(p. 946). For me, however, the survey combined an informative and engaging, frequently thought-provoking, account of some unfamiliar aspects of British history along
with some fresh insights into territory which was more familiar.
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In regard to the four historic peoples, the author’s main concern is to expose the
inconsistencies in traditional English nationalist accounts. He shows how English historians have appropriated a Romano-Celtic past, discounted the Viking-Danish invasions, predated the emergence of an English national community, and marginalized
England’s Continental ties. Inevitably some parts are better than others: the century or
so after 1369 gets short shrift, but there is a good account of Tudor centralization. The
unconventional periodization from 795 to 1603 generally works well, although “The
Englished Isles, 1326 to 1603” initially saw the retreat of English influence, even if
the English language gained ground against French.
The Celtic nations fare rather less well—partly, it seems, because of the narrower
range of secondary literature consulted. There is a sustained discussion of lowland
Scotland but little on the old Gaelic world. Irish influences in early medieval times are
well described, but overreliance on Moody and Martin’s Course of Irish History accounts for the odd remarks about fifteenth-century parliamentary home rule and entrenched resistance to the Henrician Reformation. How on earth Davies decided that
De Valera’s antitreaty faction won the Irish civil war (p. 905) is a mystery. Wales
disappears for long stretches between 1283 and 1536 and again after the Union. Yet
the Welsh language gets three songs in the appendixes, so emphasizing Wales’s modern
choral tradition, whereas Gaelic gets just the one verse—from the Irish national anthem.
More fundamentally, the remarks (pp. 380–81) about the emergence by the fourteenth
century of national identities among the four historic peoples are misleading. There
were English in Ireland and Wales who were not part of the “community of the realm,”
and a century later the “Irish” still included those Gaedhil living in Scotland, at a time
when the bard of the last “lord of the Isles” (dominus insularum/Rı́ Innsı́ Gall—styles
which underline the ambiguities of the book’s title) was extolling his claim to be high
king of Ireland (Ard Rı́ na hÉireann). Only under the impact of the Reformation did
national identities begin to acquire their more modern, geographical connotations.
Essentially, however, the author’s purpose is to discuss the role of the four nations
in the British state, not to treat of their internal histories. The final section offers a
particularly powerful analysis of the problems of the modern British state—not a nation-state, but torn in the aftermath of empire between the European Union and the
United States, the feelings of national decline, the dangers of devolution, the crisis of
identity, even the inability of government to distinguish between concepts of citizenship
and nationality. This section is thematic rather than chronological, and it is also presentcentered: there is no sustained discussion here, for instance, about Britain during World
War II. Finally, the author offers five general propositions about the present state of
the British Isles, the nature of the British and Irish states, nations and identities, and
“the strategic choices that loom ahead,” on the basis of the “long-running trends” (p.
1039) identified earlier in the volume.
In this kind of present-centered history there is, of course, a danger of seeming to
select the facts to suit a political agenda. Yet Davies offers a very fair analysis of
present problems and the range of options available, and he states quite candidly his
belief that “the United Kingdom was established to serve the interests of Empire” and
that its breakup is now imminent because “the loss of Empire has destroyed its raison
d’être” (p. 1053). This is an unconventional but valuable book which raises important
questions about the development—and future—of the British state.
STEVEN G. ELLIS
National University of Ireland, Galway
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Reginald Pole: Prince and Prophet. By Thomas F. Mayer.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvⳭ468. $74.95.
Some men are born great; some achieve greatness; some have greatness thrust upon
them. Cardinal Reginald Pole experienced all three fates. He was born great, a member
of the English aristocracy and a cousin to Henry VIII. He became a major ecclesiastical
figure, internationally respected for his piety and erudition, who came within a single
vote of being elected pope. And the greatest office Pole would ever attain, the archbishopric of Canterbury, was thrust upon him; it was an honor he tried to decline. Yet
despite his obvious importance both in the Catholic Reformation and in Tudor England,
Pole has not received the detailed study that he deserves; the last complete biography
of him was published over fifty years ago.
It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for this relative neglect. Like an octopus,
Pole has hidden behind a cloud of ink. He was a prolific author and an energetic letter
writer whose surviving correspondence numbers more than two thousand items. Records from English, Italian, and other archives flow into this already massive reservoir
of verbiage, swelling it to prodigious proportions. The formidable linguistic, paleographic, and codicological challenges presented by this material have understandably
discouraged investigation and analysis. Pole was also rooted in two distinct cultures,
English and Italian, and this has created additional barriers; Pole’s biographer must be
fluent in at least three languages—English, Italian, and Latin—and be expert as well
in both early modern English and early modern Italian history. Significantly, recent
work on Pole by accomplished scholars such as Dermot Fenlon and R. H. Pogson has
tended to focus exclusively on the English or Italian episodes of Pole’s career.
Thomas Mayer is ideally qualified to overcome such obstacles. This biography is
the capstone of a lifetime of research on Pole. Recent fruits of Mayer’s research include
a study of Pole’s manuscripts and an edition of Pole’s correspondence. Mayer has also
recently published a collection of his articles on Pole that readers of this biography
should consult since, presumably in response to constraints of space, Mayer has not
repeated their contents in his life of the cardinal. As his previously published writings
demonstrate, Mayer is an authority on both English and Italian history. One of the great
achievements of his present book is that it places Pole firmly in the context of the
different cultures he inhabited. Mayer’s versatility goes beyond this; he handles intellectual, cultural, ecclesiastical, and political matters with equal dexterity. If the chapter
on Pole’s nachleben is, at least to this reviewer, the strongest in the book, then the
chapter entitled “Reconstructing the English Church,” a balanced assessment of Pole’s
legatine administration, is very nearly as good. And Mayer’s subtle readings of the
sources, especially his appreciation of Pole’s rhetorical skill in self-fashioning his image through his writings, yields a rich harvest of new insights even from familiar
materials.
But the many virtues of Mayer’s book come at a price: heavy demands are made on
its readers. In his introduction, Mayer insists that his book “is not the definitive life of
Reginald Pole” (p. 11). In fact, Mayer’s book comes closer to being definitive than it
does to being a conventional life of its subject. Mayer begins with an extended discussion of Pole’s first important work De unitate, pitching the reader into the deep end
of the pool before supplying any background on Pole’s earlier life. Mayer is also
reticent on the personal details of Pole’s life. He says little about Pole’s relationships
with his family, although the cardinal seems to have had a lively sense of kinship; his
generosity to his great-nephew, the third earl of Huntingdon, is all the more striking
because the two men were at nearly opposite ends of the religious spectrum. Mayer
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also says little about Pole’s all-important personal relationship with Mary Tudor. Surprisingly, Mayer’s persuasively argued thesis that Pole was a homosexual who was, in
all but name, married to his long-time companion Alvise Priuli, is relegated to the end
of the book. And there are curious gaps in Mayer’s account of Pole’s life; for example,
virtually nothing is said about Pole’s first great administrative responsibility, his governorship of the Patrimonium Petri, the largest of the Papal States, from 1541 to 1547.
Mayer is also reticent on the context of events; because Pole’s life is of interest to
many scholars (including myself) who cannot match Mayer’s knowledge of both England and Italy, this can be frustrating. A minor example: when he comments that the
earl of Wiltshire was “sensitive to the smallest sign of resistance” (p. 57) to Henry VIII’s
divorce from Catherine of Aragon, it would have been convenient if Mayer had mentioned that Wiltshire was Anne Boleyn’s father. Simon Renard is mentioned several
times by Mayer, but he never bothers to explain that Renard was the Imperial ambassador and, more important, one of Mary’s most trusted advisors. Even more important,
Mayer never explains the complexities of an issue crucial to Pole and his plans for the
English church: the restoration of ecclesiastical property appropriated in the reigns of
Henry VIII and Edward VI. And there are other topics—such as Pole’s use, or relative
neglect, of printed propaganda—on which one wishes that Mayer had said more beyond
desultory passages, however stimulating.
Nevertheless, it is a sign of the fundamental merit of a book when a reviewer’s
criticisms are largely of what it does not say. Apart from reservations about Mayer’s
minimizing (at least in my opinion) Pole’s role in the persecution of English Protestants,
I cannot fault anything he does say. Mayer’s book is a large one and yet the reader
wants more—a tribute to both the interest Pole arouses and the insights Mayer offers.
Pole suffered strokes of severe misfortune, among them the election of his nemesis,
Paul IV, to the pontificate and his own sudden death, which may have cost him the
crown of martyrdom he craved. But whatever ill luck the cardinal experienced, he has
been truly fortunate in his biographer.
THOMAS S. FREEMAN
University of Sheffield
Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and Business in the EnglishSpeaking World, 1580–1740. By Richard Grassby. Woodrow Wilson Center
Series.
Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Pp. xixⳭ505. $64.95.
From its early days, the history of the English family attracted scholars eager to connect
apparent changes in the nature of the family with England’s economic transformation
or “modernization.” Richard Grassby’s book on the “business family” (a stand-alone
sequel to his earlier work, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England
[Cambridge, 1995]) seeks to provide both solid data and new analysis regarding the
connection between capitalism and the early modern English family. Grassby’s conclusion that “the family made a positive contribution to economic growth, that it was
an independent and not simply a dependent variable” (p. 416), puts the study of the
family at the very center of the social and economic history of the era. This is a valuable
service to the field of family history, but, in return, scholars will have to rise to the
challenge of reading a book that can only be described as relentlessly empirical, a work
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that deliberately prioritizes description over analysis. In the end, this work is well worth
the effort primarily because of the tremendous amount of archival material that it brings
to bear on so many of the fundamental questions of family history.
After a brief introduction, “Models and Myths,” the book examines the character of
the nuclear family and the relative importance of kin and community connections to
businessmen. The preface and introductory chapter are highly opinionated, and the
more general reader will need to look elsewhere for the historiographic context (see,
e.g., Keith Wrightson, “The Family in Early Modern England,” in Hanoverian Britain
and Empire: Essays in Memory of Philip Lawson, ed. Stephen Taylor et al. [Rochester,
N.Y., 1998], pp. 1–22). It is characteristic of the book as a whole that Grassby dismisses
rather than effectively engages those whom he condemns as producers of “pretentious
rubbish” on the history of the family (p. xviii). But it is also entirely typical of this
book that the polemic against model building and the “virus” of cultural theory is
followed by a very useful and candid discussion of the nature and limits of the source
materials, which are described further in the appendixes.
Grassby uses his relational database of 28,000 London businessmen from 1580 to
1740, along with diaries, collections of correspondence, prescriptive literature, and even
Restoration drama, to assess the nature of businessmen’s marriages in regard to choice
of spouse, marital relations, and widowhood. Marriages were generally endogamous
and locally centered, with a clear priority on the financial interests of all parties. Cultural
norms relating to marital behavior are portrayed as continuously shifting and clearly
subordinate to individual agency, specific context, and (infinitely diverse) personality.
There is a strong demographic component to the book, and Grassby examines mortality
rates of children and adults and remarriages of widowers and widows. There is a wealth
of comparative statistics available from existing secondary literature, though these are
listed rather than integrated into the analysis.
The business family that emerges in part 2 of the book is generally loving and
supportive of its members in all stages of the life cycle, and Grassby’s depiction of
parent-child relations is subtle and sensitive, giving considerable attention to gender.
Although the business family was small, it often included three generations; the discussion of the importance of grandparents here usefully corrects historians’ tendency
to overemphasize the nuclear family. In this era of high mortality, family formation
was a “serial process,” and the business family is presented as a “dynamic hybrid and
a set of relationships that varied with mortality, remarriage and the life cycle” (pp.
187–88). Again, Grassby emphasizes the infinite variety of relationships and experiences, and he dismisses the changes that occurred in public debates as largely irrelevant
to family experience.
The chapter entitled “Kin and Community” makes excellent use of evidence from
wills and correspondence. There was no formal English kinship system, and businessmen’s wives and children always took priority over the extended family, but “the
kinship universe was . . . huge, and families managed to maintain contact with a wide
range of kin over great distances” (p. 263). Civic life, which Grassby depicts as a rival
to the family, was vitally important to businessmen and is explored in some depth. But
by the end of the seventeenth century, men’s participation in guild affairs was declining,
and women went from being marginal to invisible in civic life. Furthermore, the nuclear
family, buoyed by the support of a flexible yet dependable kin network, became more
important even than the “rival institutions” of church and state.
The final section of the book demonstrates that “in preindustrial England the family
was a necessary, if not a sufficient, business institution” (p. 311). It should be noted
that it is really only in this last section that Grassby pays much attention to the broader
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English-speaking world. In both England and its outposts, families were essential in
providing apprenticeships, capital, and networks of contacts. Still, apprenticeship often
occurred outside of the family; family relationships could be troublesome, and recruitment of nonrelatives was essential to the survival of family businesses. Although
Grassby’s point of view is most often that of the businessman, he does explore women’s
lives, showing that wives brought both capital and extended kin contacts to the family
business. Wives were deeply involved in family businesses, often attending to widespread business concerns for their peripatetic husbands. Widows were especially important as lenders and landladies within the business community. This leads Grassby
to puzzle over the question of why so few widows were businesswomen. Because he
perceives of the market as a “neutral arena” (p. 340), the author concludes that widows’
unwillingness to serve in managerial capacities was based more on personal preference
than gender discrimination. This conclusion sits rather oddly in a book that has revealed
women to be disadvantaged at every turn in the business world.
Grassby concludes that, rather than becoming “modern” in the seventeenth century,
the business family was “a hybrid structure in a hybrid society that sustained both a
market and a moral economy” (p. 392). No single model (such as patriarchy) can
explain such a structure because, “like the society in which they moved, [families] were
not rational structures conforming to rules, but chaotic and infinitely diverse aggregations of individuals in motion” (p. 389). Although family businesses faced unique
problems and challenges in this period, they were able to rely on their enduring
strengths and intrinsic flexibility to play a crucial role in economic development. “In
the early modern period kinship and capitalism complemented and reinforced each
other; their relationship was not antagonistic but symbiotic” (p. 417).
This conclusion would be more convincing if the author made a greater effort to
assess change over time throughout the book. Broad differences between period 1
(1580–1659) and period 2 (1660–1740) and among four different cohorts are displayed
in some tables, but they are rarely examined in any depth in the text. The qualitative
evidence is never organized into these periods, so there is a fundamental disjunction
between the two types of evidence. Dates and context are missing from both text and
footnotes for many citations. The reader has to wonder if broader patterns would have
emerged if a diachronic analysis had been attempted in a more systematic fashion.
Moreover, each chapter is chopped into short sections that provide data and many
examples but that generally lack substantive summaries. Not even Grassby’s lively and
very readable prose can entirely compensate for the effect of this style of presentation.
The larger questions and greater relevance of his interests, which are so clear in his
introduction and conclusion, are sometimes submerged beneath the vast weight of his
evidence.
SUSANNAH OTTAWAY
Carleton College
Reading the Skies: A Cultural History of English Weather, 1650–1820. By
Vladimir Jankovic.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Pp. xivⳭ272.
“A change seemed to have come over the climate of England. Rain fell frequently, but
only in fitful gusts, which were no sooner over than they began again. The sun shone,
of course, but it was so girt about with clouds and the air was so saturated with water,
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that its beams were discoloured and purples, oranges, and reds of a dull sort took the
place of the more positive landscapes of the eighteenth century. . . . Thus, stealthily,
and imperceptibly, none marking the exact day or hour of the change, the constitution
of England was altered and nobody knew it. Everywhere the effects were felt.” Thus
Virginia Woolf chronicles the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century
in her fictional biography-cum-novel Orlando, simultaneously a cultural history of
England from Elizabethan times to the 1920s. Woolf anticipates in this passage the
dark, damp, Dickensian climate that would be precipitated by the effects of increasing
industrialization, playfully performing here the characteristically English gesture of
imagining history as a function of the weather. This historiographical quirk belongs to
one of the numerous topics Vladimir Jankovic subjects to inspection in his thoroughly
documented, learned, and careful book Reading the Skies: A Cultural History of English
Weather, 1650–1820.
Jankovic charts the shifts in the study of weather in England over the course of 170
years, raising questions about its intersection with social and political commentary as
well as analyzing its relationship to the changing nature of scientific inquiry. He discerns in the late seventeenth century the rise of what he calls a “meteoric tradition”
that owes much to the writings of Francis Bacon. This meteoric tradition placed emphasis on reportage of uncommon meteorologic occurrences, but—contrary to classical
meteorology—the early modern Baconian science would do away with “antiquities,
citations, and eloquence, and with the old natural histories, whose material on the
‘wanton freaks of nature’ could be a pleasant recreation but valueless for the advance
of knowledge” (pp. 44–45). Grand meteorological events were considered valuable
because nature was deemed therein to speak more clearly. Hence, seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century naturalists were wont to report exceptional weather. The early Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London record “Extraordinary Tides
in the West Isles of Scotland,” “Hail Stones of Unusual Size,” “Surprising Effects of
a Terrible Clap of Thunder,” and other such unusual phenomena.
The affinity that unusual meteorological occurrences had with the popular wondertradition gave rise to tensions between secular and religious uses of the weather. Reports
of storms, earthquakes, fireballs, waterspouts, flying dragons, and northern lights were
interpreted as warnings and disasters of an emblematic nature, divine signs appropriated
for the purposes of moral and ideological instruction. Jankovic closely examines how
the homiletic exploitation of two particular events, the storm of 1703 and the northern
lights of 1716, exerted effects on political argument; these cases underline the gap
between the rational secular endeavors of natural historians and a populace that “continued to live in an emblematic environment and an anthropocentric culture of weather”
(p. 77).
Jankovic subtly analyzes a development in the eighteenth-century study of weather
that emerges but also slightly deviates from the central meteoric tradition. He explores
the rising role in meteorology of provincial naturalists, mainly Anglican clergymen
and members of the gentry. The work of these chorographers, as the etymology of the
term suggests, placed emphasis on local place in the observation and theorization of
weather, giving rise to such regional notions as Cornish storms, Yorkshire echoes, the
salubrity of Norfolk’s air. The autochthonous nature of their enterprise paralleled the
transfer of national identity from loyalty to the monarch to loyalty to the land. Unique
natural events conferred local identity and contributed to a sense of regional history
and culture. From an intellectual-sociological perspective, the country parson had become, by the early eighteenth century, the representative of a new class of natural
historian who seemed to fulfill the roles of both naturalist and historian. The provincial/
cosmopolitan, rural/urban divide this created would tilt in favor of metropolitan meteorology toward the end of the century.
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Owing to a variety of reasons, including the rise of practical agrometeorology and
a new bias toward the chemical investigation of the atmosphere, both the meteoric
tradition and the chorographic impulse would be displaced by the end of the eighteenth
century. Statistical analyses supplanted descriptions and causal explanations of meteors.
Among the early nineteenth-century contributions to the Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society are listed “Abstract of a Register of the Barometer, Thermometer,
and Rain at Lyndon, in Rutland, for the Year 1798,” “On the Effect of Westerly Winds
in Raising the Level of the British Chanell,” “Observations on the Temperature of the
Ocean and Atmosphere, and the Density of Sea Water, Made during a Voyage to
Ceylon.” The localities erstwhile in themselves so important to chorographers now
took on the status of coordinates within a more comprehensive grid. The guild system
of metropolitan chemists further ensured the removal of the study of weather from
disparate country settings to urban laboratories. Meteorology became by the early nineteenth century a centralized undertaking.
Through impressive erudition and meticulous research, spanning primary authors
from Aristotle to Daniel Defoe to the naturalist William Borlase, Jankovic manages to
construct a rich and compelling narrative on the history of British meteorology. Furthermore, through the prism of meteorology, he comments on scientific, political, and
social as well as intellectual historical developments. Yet, the wealth of detail that is
one of the chief strengths of Jankovic’s book is also a weakness. The documents cited
and possible angles suggested can seem overwhelming at times. One wishes that Jankovic could have subsumed more of the detail under fewer and more powerfully asserted conceptual categories, in a more clearly articulated historical narrative that would
allow the reader to digest his key points more effectively as well as ruminate on their
implications in other contexts. Jankovic also sometimes mixes his methodological metaphors. His case study of the northern lights of 1716 employs such terms as “perlocutionary,” “deconstruction,” and “self-fashioning” without attention to their provenance in different traditions of literary analysis and hence, strictly speaking, to their
fundamental inconsistency.
On the whole, Jankovic has written a book that will be of interest to intellectual
historians as well as historians of science, early modern Britain, and the eighteenth
century. His analysis of the georgic tradition will also be useful to literary critics
working on the eighteenth century and the pastoral genre. One looks forward to what
insights he would have to offer on the effects of industrialization and the expansion of
empire on the study of English weather in the nineteenth century.
EMILY SUN
Yale University

The British Periodical Press and the French Revolution, 1789–1799. By Stuart
Andrews.
Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000. Pp. xiⳭ280. $65.00.
Francophilia in English Society, 1748–1815. By Robin Eagles.
Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
Pp. xⳭ229. $69.95.
Locked in a curious though quite important embrace were eighteenth-century France
and England. Although these countries had fought frequently during the past centuries
and had clearly pursued different constitutional paths since the 1600s, each remained
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ambivalent in its view of the other. On the French side, Albion seemed a perfidious
military enemy who, at least in French propaganda, refused to fight fair. Relying on
naval might, England often wreaked havoc but then retreated to its island fortress.
According to this same logic, even in peace, England did not observe the rules of
navigation and tilted matters to its own advantage. Further, its power seemed fundamentally illusory, resting as it did on mercantile interests. Finally, some French commentators believed that the greater involvement of the English population in elections
and a closer reliance on public opinion indicated a disastrous lack of order.
Nevertheless, England’s political system fascinated the French, especially as elites
accepted Enlightenment thinking. The educated in France began to see their rival as
embodying some of their new principles. Occasionally waves of outright Anglophilia
utterly overshadowed the older tradition of hostility. Only with the outbreak of war
during the Revolution did the French return England to a place of enmity.
Likewise the English both loathed and admired things French. Of course, the inimical
political and military relationship infected all areas. Critics cast the French as weak as
the latter failed to keep pace with the British in empire building. Yet the elite continued
to value French luxuries and manners, and the European grand tour involved significant
time in France. Much of the English court continued to speak French as the language
of refinement. And the philosophes were well received in England.
Recent historical works have argued that, despite such ambivalence about France,
the development of English identity depended on its separation from France. In the
eighteenth century, hostility overshadowed empathy. And, indeed, scholars have long
agreed that once the Revolution had become radicalized, popular opinion became Francophobic. Robin Eagles’s Francophilia in English Society, 1748–1815 and Stuart Andrews’s The British Periodical and the French Revolution, 1789–1799 share a contrary
viewpoint, attempting to prove that interest in and sympathy for France were far
stronger than had been supposed.
Although Eagles accepts that the Revolution thoroughly soured the English view of
the French, his main focus on the prerevolutionary period establishes that the cosmopolitan English nobility maintained a positive and influential view of France that resonated even among the middling classes. To argue this point, Eagles contends that
although the political cartoonists satirized the French they still relied on French models
for inspiration. The novel, usually identified with England, depended a great deal on
French predecessors. Other art forms, posits Eagles, owed still more. Eagles also disputes Jeremy Black’s conclusion that foreign relations deteriorated between the two
countries during the eighteenth century. Eagles argues that such contentions are overstated and ignore the real rapprochement between the end of the Seven Years War in
1763 and the beginning of French involvement in 1778 in the American Revolution.
He also emphasizes that the English—merchants as well as aristocrats—traveled and
lived in France quite happily. Such experiences, claims Eagles, raised the English
public perception of their neighbor. The concluding chapter demonstrates that the nobility felt an affinity for French models. Eagles insists that for this elite “France retained
an alchemical superiority which English imitation could never rival” (p. 167). For this
reason and others, the author contends that France was not a negative mirror image
used to construct a positive view of England.
Even without questioning the precise findings presented in Francophilia in England,
some readers might wonder if, in fact, the author has made his general point. Although
elites indubitably held the views ascribed to them, the relative weight of their positive
views is never established. France might have been chic, but in matters of identity only
the negative opinions may have really mattered. Second, the book implies but does not
show how the views of the nobility might have inflected others’ opinions.
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Nonetheless, Eagles provides an interesting work that also takes up a number of
other important subjects, including the permeability of national borders and style and
fashion in eighteenth-century England. More readers would benefit from this work if
it were not such challenging reading. Prior knowledge of the period is required, as
unexplained terms abound. Sentences are overlong; transitions and introductions are
seldom provided.
Stuart Andrews’s book continues Eagles’s theme by showing the continuing popularity of France even into the Revolution. In this case the focus is solely on ideas. Other
scholars, including Eagles for the most part, have insisted that Burke’s hostility to
France and its Revolution carried the day; Andrews turns to the periodical press to
dispute this consensus view. Andrews’s close reading of a large number of newspapers
shows that, from the first, journalists contested Burke’s negative view. Surprisingly,
while other studies indicate that public opinion after the Terror strongly turned against
France, Andrews argues the latter found defenders. Themes struck by both Burke’s
acolytes and his detractors continued to be popular. Indeed, in the late 1790s, The
Analytical inclined toward the French revolutionary religion of theophilanthropy and
attacked British nationalism. Opposed to this paper was The Anti-Jacobin, which
claimed its rival was the “purveyor of ‘irreligious trash’” (p. 165). In sum, Andrews
concludes that the ambivalence toward the French Revolution found in the press reveals
the same attitude in public opinion. In the end, England’s resistance to the Revolution
was not based on ideology and consensus, but on longstanding hostility to France as a
competing power and the relative authority of church and king, two institutions that
fostered anti-French sentiment. But what then was the impact of France’s defenders in
the press? Here the author provides no answers.
Although this book benefits from intensive research and certainly is provocative
regarding the state of English public opinion, some readers will ask for more. The
analysis relies upon a series of descriptions of news and analysis, which requires the
reader’s full attention to divine its themes. Furthermore, this same mode of presentation
seems to ignore the sophisticated scholarship on the press in England and during the
eighteenth century generally. The author fails to employ quantitative content analysis
or to investigate the backgrounds of the personnel or the efforts of the government at
control or manipulation. This book, like that of Eagles, would attract a larger audience
with more attention to larger issues.
These books do chart the English view of France and suggest questions about the
role played by other national images in domestic politics. Eagles even describes an
interest in the development of the national image. This more general question fits the
current interest in historiography that emphasizes studying nation-states in an international context and understanding how societies construct their own identities. Unfortunately, while the authors’ works suggest these larger points, they leave it to others
to relate their studies to such questions.
JACK R. CENSER
George Mason University
England’s Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question. By Bruce L. Kinzer.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pp. xⳭ292. $60.00.
Britain’s nineteenth-century critics like to point out a contradiction in its liberal professions. It was strong in support of European peoples emerging from subjection into
political freedom but made an exception for the people at its own backdoor, its Irish
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subjects. Britain might help the Greeks against the Turks, or the Italians against their
Austrian or Bourbon rulers, but it governed Ireland with a mixture of exasperated
concession and open coercion. Ireland had the unfortunate role of exposing the hollowness of British liberalism. During the famine it was liberal economic theory that provided the rationale for allowing the many thousands who could not emigrate to starve,
and in the 1870s it was the liberal government of Gladstone that departed from economic orthodoxy and religious pluralism by passing the land acts and disestablishing
the Protestant church.
John Stuart Mill is often taken to be the most lucid exponent of Victorian liberalism,
but on the Irish issue he came to agree with its critics. In a notorious pamphlet, England
and Ireland, published in 1868, he wrote ironically: “In any Continental complications,
the sympathies of England would be with Liberalism; while those of Ireland are sure
to be on the same side as the Pope—that is, on the side opposed to modern civilization
and progress, and to the freedom of all except Catholic populations held in subjection
by non-Catholic rulers” (pp. 169–70). At least by the end of his life, Mill had come
to believe that England owed Ireland redress, and in this he contrasts sharply with
liberals such as Robert Lowe, and later H. S. Maine and A. V. Dicey, who thought
orthodox liberalism had been fatally compromised by Gladstone’s policy. Mill supported Gladstone, and though Mill died in 1873, before the home rule controversy, he
was at the end of his life praised by Irish nationalists. How he reached this position is
the subject of Bruce L. Kinzer’s excellent book.
As a young man, Mill followed his father and Bentham in thinking the Irish problem
merely an extreme example of aristocratic rule. Even the issue of Catholic emancipation, which dominated his early manhood, was an aristocratic device to obscure the
real issue. “It is not the power of the Protestant over the Catholic, which has made
Ireland what she is: it is the power of the rich over the poor” (p. 18). The real significance of Daniel O’Connell’s power, the creation of popular Catholic nationalism,
seems to have passed Mill by. With some liberal Tories, he favored the state payment
of Catholic priests not, as the Tories did, to strengthen the Union but on the Malthusian
grounds that priests with regular salaries would not need the fees obtained from performing early marriages—unions that encouraged population growth. After 1834,
O’Connell saw that he gained more for his countrymen by supporting the Whig government of Melbourne than by joining its radical critics; but by the time the Whigs
fell, Mill was disillusioned with political activism and had turned to writing his System
of Logic (1843).
One might expect the Irish famine to have made its mark on Mill’s next great book,
Principles of Political Economy, published in 1848, but Kinzer shows how Mill liked
to keep political polemic out of his scientific treatises. Classical political economy was
against the smallholding peasants. They were vulnerable, inefficient from their inability
to exploit the division of labor or make economies of scale, and their tendency to divide
a property among heirs was retrograde and encouraged overpopulation. Kinzer credits
W. T. Thornton with Mill’s conversion to the view that, on the contrary, the peasant
who owned his own land practiced restraint, and a defense of “peasant proprietorship”
appears in the Principles. But Mill’s solution to the famine was not stated there, but
in forty-three anonymous leaders in the Morning Chronicle between October 1846 and
January 1847. In these he advocated not only that the peasant be granted fixity of tenure
but also that the government buy the 1.5 million acres of cultivable wasteland in Ireland
and distribute it to those who “would undertake to bring their lots into cultivation with
the smallest amount of pecuniary assistance” (p. 63). Nothing less, he thought, neither
soup kitchens nor emigration, would regenerate Ireland and salvage England’s honor.

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

847

Kinzer contrasts Mill’s attitude with that of the chief architect of the government’s
scheme of relief. Charles Trevelyan thought the potato blight a divine visitation, removing at a stroke a mass of objectionable practices whose reform was “beyond the
unassisted powers of man” (p. 83) and freeing Ireland to follow the English model of
progressive agriculture. Mill thought that Ireland’s case was more like India’s: vigorous
intervention was required, for the famine had made Ireland “once more a tabula rasa,
on which we might have inscribed what we pleased” (p. 48).
This taste for what Kinzer calls “convulsive transfigurations” did not preclude a
pragmatic approach to less urgent issues. In his study of Ireland’s land question, Mill
struck up a friendship with J. E. Cairns—and Cairns, thinking that Mill’s return to
Parliament in 1865 made him an important ally in the establishment of Ireland’s university system, sought his help in resisting the Catholic Church’s drive to influence,
even control, the nondenominational queen’s colleges. But Mill, despite his anticlericalism, followed Gladstone’s view that, just as most parents in England preferred a
religious, denominational education for their children, so Irish parents should be
granted the same sort of facility—and Cairns was disappointed. The breach was not
permanent, however. The Fenian outrages excited Mill again, this time to write England
and Ireland, a work that was to make him a favorite authority with nationalists on land
reform. Kinzer patiently shows, however, that the inspiration for Gladstone’s land legislation was not Mill but a former Indian official, George Campbell, whose work The
Irish Land was based (as Mill’s was not) on a firsthand study of Irish practice north
and south.
There is not space in a short review to do justice to the riches in this book. Kinzer’s
work with the team that, under Jack Robson, produced the Collected Works of Mill
has given him an enviable mastery of Mill’s own writings. But he is not uncritical of
Mill’s tendency to oscillate between realistic analysis and explosions of high-minded
righteousness. He has also mastered the extraordinarily complex literature on the history of nineteenth-century Ireland, without which Mill’s contribution could hardly be
understood in context. So, for instance, his fourth chapter—on the Irish university
question—becomes both a close study of Mill’s grappling with a practical political
issue and a contribution to the history of Irish universities. Kinzer himself writes always
with a cool precision, avoiding hasty inferences or facile generalizations. This is a
superb study of an aspect of Mill’s work where economic theory and politics mingle.
W. E. S. THOMAS
Christ Church College, University of Oxford

Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Common Market, 1860–1892. By
Peter T. Marsh.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999. Pp. viiiⳭ246. $30.00.
There are many complaints today from British politicians and citizens that whereas
Britain complies with European Union rules and regulations, its partners inside the EU
do not. The British press also objects that whereas Britain wishes to create a true free
market within Europe, French and German politicians, ever wary of “Anglo-Saxon”
devotion to real competition, are slow to relinquish nontariff barriers that protect their
own goods and services. Perhaps it was ever thus. According to Peter T. Marsh, even
in the nineteenth century Britain’s insistence on sticking to the rules—or, better, the
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ideology of pure free trade—lost it the economic leadership of Europe and forced it to
depend on distinctly second-best imperial markets as outlets for its goods.
Marsh’s account of Britain’s participation in the commercial treaty system of Europe
between 1860 and 1892 is not the first to cover this ground. For example, my London
School of Economics colleague Anthony Howe, in his Free Trade and Liberal England,
1846–1896 (Oxford, 1997), devoted two chapters to the subject, while the Canadian
scholar Jack Gaston has covered much the same area in article form (“Trade and the
Late Victorian Foreign Office,” International History Review 4 [1982]: 317–38, and
“The Free Trade Diplomacy Debate and the Victorian European Common Market Initiative,” Canadian Journal of History 22 [1987]: 59–82). Still, Marsh is the first to
devote an entire book to the subject and thus provides a more substantial narrative as
well as a fresh perspective.
His main points can be summarized as follows. By sticking to the principles of free
trade so dogmatically and reducing tariffs so quickly and so effectively after 1860, the
British, who were embarrassed by keeping any tariff that looked like a protectionist
rather than a revenue-enhancing measure, left themselves with nothing to bargain with
in subsequent negotiations. Worse still, the remaining tariffs proved so necessary for
revenue raising that they could not be used as bargaining instruments either. Finally,
there was the problem of the “most-favoured-nation clause.” Its unconditional application to international trade came to be regarded as the most valuable and most durable
achievement of the nineteenth-century treaty structure. Yet this provision of the 1860s
treaties did not, it became clear, work in a neutral fashion. Leo von Caprivi, the German
chancellor who reshaped the European tariff structure in 1892, used it to give Germany
an advantage over its more free-trading rivals. The result was that “less than 20 percent
of the exports from Britain to the major consuming countries with a two-tier maximum
and minimum tariff benefited from the most-favoured-nation treatment to which Britain
was entitled” (p. 208).
Thus the paradox remained: “Tariff-reducing treaties could not be made without
tariffs” (p. 1). Once the treaty structure of the 1860s, spearheaded by the CobdenChevalier Treaty of 1860, was abandoned by the French, European tariff barriers marginalized British commercial influence. The British could have taken the opportunity
to retaliate, of course, but since to British minds this would simply have meant dearer
food, dearer goods, and more expensive raw materials, such a strategy was never feasible. Indeed, Joseph Chamberlain’s plans for imperial preference and “tariff reform”
would later only serve to lose elections for the Tory party.
In some respects, though, Marsh’s book is rather odd. Although it is an account of
British commercial diplomacy, it fails to use the private papers of Richard Cobden,
William Gladstone, Sir Robert Morier, Sir Louis Mallet, Sir Charles Dilke, and the
earl of Derby—in short, many of the major figures involved in that diplomacy. Equally
strange in a work that purports to be as much about Europe as Britain, it fails to use
any Continental European archives and relies instead on the reports of British diplomats
such as J. A. Crowe. These are good at demonstrating the paradox, already mentioned,
that Britain, although extremely well informed about Continental commercial diplomacy, was powerless to do much about it. Yet it would be fascinating to see the other
side of the coin—for example, the schadenfreude with which this was no doubt reported
in Berlin.
There are yet other oddities about the book. The archives of Bradford’s chamber of
commerce are well exploited to show the influence of worsted and woolen manufacturers. But why neglect other chambers of commerce? Marsh also claims that Sir Jacob
Behrens was the most important influence on British commercial policy for fifty years
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but fails to discuss the claims of various provincial rivals (Sir Joseph Lee of Manchester, for example).
Finally, the greatest oddity of the book perhaps is Marsh’s failure to spell out unambiguously how and when Britain should have changed its policy. If free trade should
have been exchanged for protection, to what extent should this have taken place, and
against whom and at what stage should Britain have retaliated? Some counterfactual
speculation might have bolstered Marsh’s critique of British policy. Nonetheless, his
book must be given a welcome for raising important questions about British Continental
commercial diplomacy at a time when it is once again under critical scrutiny.
ALAN SKED
London School of Economics
An Empire on Display: English, Indian, and Australian Exhibitions from the
Crystal Palace to the Great War. By Peter H. Hoffenberg.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xxviiⳭ418.
$50.00.
In an era when “transnationalism” is all the rage, relatively few historians have either
the methodological apparatus or the archival capability to deliver satisfying historical
accounts of multinational phenomena. Peter Hoffenberg’s An Empire on Display is an
example of the opportunity that the British empire offers scholars to undertake analyses
that move beyond the framework of the nation-state, even as they demonstrate its
indispensability. This study, which examines a variety of imperial and colonial exhibitions from midcentury to the First World War, insists not simply on the performative
power of spectacle to constitute “Britishness” itself but also on its capacity to create
and sustain a transnational imperial public sphere. Focusing on India and Australia as
the chief colonial sites from which the raw materials for such imperial—and imperializing—spectacles were extracted, Hoffenberg argues that exhibitions were “the core
of a participatory system” (p. xiv) whose cultural processes created nothing less than
the Victorian public itself (p. 3).
The book is divided into eight chapters, the first four of which lay out the cast of
characters and the changing structural conditions—social, political, and economic—
that made the rise of the exhibition possible as a paradigmatic expression of Victorian
cultural values. Although the book opens with the claim that exhibitions must be read
as texts that reveal cultural processes in the making (pp. xv, xviii), the first half of
Hoffenberg’s study is a rather conventional history of imperial and colonial bureaucracies, with particular emphasis on the “political economy of imperial federation” (pp.
99–128) that undergirded the development of state-sponsored projects across the nineteenth century. Scholarship on material culture, cultural production, and the aesthetic
imagination in the Victorian period must take account of the Great Exhibition of 1851.
It was, if not the mother of all exhibitions, the crucial point of departure for much of
what followed, as Jeffrey Auerbach’s recent The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation
on Display (New Haven, Conn., 1999) has demonstrated—though Hoffenberg appears
not to have read Auerbach’s work. Happily, he does not allow the Crystal Palace to
dominate his narrative, which weaves discussions of metropolitan, Australian, and Indian contributions to, and debates about, the exhibitionary impulse skillfully throughout
the book. What results is a nicely balanced account of what roles each of these differently colonial “possessions” (the federation of Australia occurred in 1901, while Indian
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independence, of course, came after the end of the Second World War) played in
shaping Britons’ visions of empire and helping to guarantee that such visions would
be circulated back through the discourses and practices of colonial nationalism.
What may surprise readers is how little cultural analysis occurs in the second part
of the book, where chapters like “Terrae Nullius? Australia and India at Overseas
Exhibitions” and “The Imperial Pilgrims’ Progress: Ceremonies, Tourism, and Epic
Theater at the Exhibition” would seem ripe for such an approach. Hoffenberg continues
in a social history mode, anatomizing in great—if rather one-dimensional—detail the
ways in which “Australianness” and “Indianness” in all their complexity were represented to the center by exhibition wallahs, both official and unofficial. Among the
strongest sections of the latter half of the book are those that seek to give some ethnographic thickness to epiphenomena like the display of machines and especially of
imperial and colonial labor in metropolitan exhibitions. Equally compelling is Hoffenberg’s discussion of how “national time” was staged through the representation of
Indian artifacts—performances that reconsolidated the very imperial historicity that
helped to justify British supremacy in the Raj. Such displays are especially important
because they occurred at precisely the historical moment when colonial nationalism
was emerging in the form of the Indian National Congress in India, making the context
of such metropolitan visions (even with their subaltern collaborators, like T. N. Mukharji) more complex than perhaps Hoffenberg allows. Indeed, the larger political landscapes of Britain, India, and Australia—both separately and together, in the context of
what Mrinalini Sinha calls “imperial social formation” (Colonial Masculinity [Manchester, 1995])—are not much in evidence here. This means that the question of what
impact exhibitions had (in a quotidian, rather than an episodic, sense) on geopolitics
writ large for this period remains largely unanswered. Hoffenberg ends a number of
chapters by alluding to the enduring impact of nineteenth-century exhibitions on the
twentieth-century British Commonwealth, but this, like his claim that they helped create
colonial civil society, is asserted rather than proved.
Scholars who are familiar with the fields of material culture, cultural imperialism,
and performance theory will find some of Hoffenberg’s analysis simplistic and almost
belated in terms of the sophistication those literatures have attained in the last decade.
“Artifacts, do, after all, have political meanings and uses, some of which might even
be contradictory,” for example, seems pedestrian, if only compared to the interpretive
possibilities offered by the evidence he himself has unearthed (p. 165). Historians
interested in imperial culture and its transnational implications will find in this study
a thorough and competent examination of a topic whose archival challenges alone might
have daunted a less determined historian. Of particular use are the three substantial
appendixes, which detail the major exhibitions, their commissioners, and government
expenditures from 1851 to 1914. In terms of the questions raised by the new imperial
studies, this book does a great service by grounding cultural material in the context of
political economy, even if the cultural analysis of that material is underdeveloped.
Though Hoffenberg seems torn between emphasizing the political contests set in motion by imperial and colonial display, on the one hand, and the pull of the “master
narrative” (p. 30) of Britain’s imperial destiny, on the other, his book leaves no doubt
that exhibitions were a primary technology of imperial modernity in Britain and beyond.
ANTOINETTE BURTON
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923. By Michael
Laffan.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xviiⳭ512. $69.95.
Accounts of the formation of the Irish state are often embroiled in retrospective idealization and demonization; relevant sources remain underutilized though the release
of archives, a quieter political context, and the development of the Irish historical
profession have enriched the literature in recent years. Now Michael Laffan has produced this study, the product of twenty years’ work, which incisively charts events
obscured by impressionistic vagueness and ideological selectivity. His command of
manuscript sources will amaze anyone familiar with the undercatalogued and underfunded National Library of Ireland; many well-chosen quotations pithily and often
humorously capture the issues at stake. Laffan’s focus is on the political rather than
the military side of the Anglo-Irish conflict. His central themes are tension between
political and military leaders and disputes over how far Sinn Fein could settle for less
than a fully sovereign republic, both coming to a head in the 1922–23 civil war between
supporters and opponents of the dominion settlement granted by the Anglo-Irish Treaty
of December 1921.
Tensions between purists and compromisers were visible in the first Sinn Fein party
founded by Arthur Griffith in 1904. Griffith argued that the Irish Parliamentary Party
led by John Redmond failed by trusting a Westminster system stacked against Ireland.
Griffith advocated abstention from Westminster, nonrecognition of the British administration, and a parallel government supported by passive resistance. Griffith’s advocacy
of dual monarchy on the Austro-Hungarian model as an intermediate step to full republican separatism was criticized by Sinn Feiners associated with the physical-force
Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). As in later divisions, this had much to do with
personalities. Griffith was more journalist than politician, and his autocratic and obsessive leadership contributed to his party’s near collapse.
The tension between military and political leadership emerged in 1913–14 when
nationalists responded to Unionist threats of armed resistance to Home Rule by forming
the Irish Volunteers, despite Redmond’s reluctance. Redmond’s assertion of control
over the Volunteers was resisted by their separatist-inclined leadership, who declared
that military movements were “above politics.” When Redmond supported the British
war effort in 1914 the Volunteers split between a Redmondite majority and a minority
informally dubbed “Sinn Feiners.” An IRB clique within the minority repeated the
pattern of disputed control by planning the 1916 Easter Rising without the knowledge
of their nominal leader, Eoin MacNeill.
Laffan charts in compelling detail how, after the Rising, activists using the Sinn Fein
title successfully opposed the Irish Party in by-elections. Their embryonic organizations
snowballed into the “second” Sinn Fein party, led by Eamon de Valera, which routed
the Redmondites at the 1918 general election, establishing its own parliament (Dail)
and republican government. Laffan shows this was not predetermined. At several points
chance and British repression undermined Redmondism. The political activists were
racked by eccentric personal and ideological disputes. Many Volunteers, who regrouped after the Rising, disliked political involvement; had Sinn Fein been less electorally successful it might have reverted to militarism or disintegrated.
Sinn Fein developed elaborate (and largely inoperative) constitutional structures to
prevent “machining” by “politicians.” There were about 1,300 branches (based on
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Catholic parishes). Volunteers were younger and poorer than political activists and
formed a subculture dominated by unmarried men. After 1918 the party lacked immediate objectives. Many civil functions were annexed by the Dail government, and
many branches lapsed. The underground government was surprisingly effective, but its
successful fund-raising did not benefit the cash-strapped party, since it self-consciously
insulated the administration from the jobbery associated with prewar local authorities
and many Sinn Fein branches.
Meanwhile, local Volunteers attacked crown forces, realizing reprisals would encourage radicalization. Violence (much of it opportunistic) and repression forced the
political apparatus deeper into hibernation. The passivity of the Dail encouraged military contempt for “politicians” (“an organization of old women,” p. 281), reflecting
Sinn Fein’s self-image as a redemptive elite, which Laffan explores in fascinating
detail. After the Anglo-Irish truce of July 1921, party activity revived, while guerrillas
basked in general recognition that the British made concessions to force that they denied
to constitutionalism. Some feared a permanent class of condottieri (p. 303).
Nemesis came when large sections of the party and the military organization, led by
de Valera, refused to accept the Dail’s ratification of the treaty. Treatyite control of
party officer boards was stalemated by republican club-packing at branch level; in the
election of June 1922 much of the electorate voted for third-party protreaty candidates,
associating both wings of Sinn Fein with self-destructive infighting. During the ensuing
civil war the victorious treatyites abandoned Sinn Fein to form Cumann na nGaedheal.
While most Republicans disliked the Sinn Fein title, de Valera persuaded them to claim
continuity with the older organization. In ensuing decades successive fragments (beginning with de Valera’s Fianna Fail in 1926) followed the constitutional path, leaving
handfuls of zealots wedded to revolutionary elitism.
Laffan belongs to the historiographic tradition that celebrates the success of the Irish
state in establishing a stable if socially repressive democracy, avoiding anarchy and
dictatorship. The strengths of this tradition are shown in his dissection of radical writers
who retrospectively equate intransigent nationalism with class-consciousness and uncritically celebrate land rioters who were often inspired by local feuds and attacked
fellow smallholders. Its downside is reluctance to take nonmainstream attitudes seriously. Laffan’s picture of a naturally moderate Irish nationalist community radicalized
by outside events needs qualification. Redmond’s party was weaker and more factionalized, and the Liberals under H. H. Asquith were more openly ambivalent about Home
Rule than Laffan realizes; this, as much as Unionist resistance, stimulated the Volunteers and Sinn Fein. The nationalist images that Laffan traces in Sinn Fein rhetoric—
of British criminal degeneracy and the Irish people as simultaneously noble, pious
Celts and fatally corruptible—have a long historical pedigree and were widespread
among Redmondite activists; this shared discourse helped to produce the massive defections charted by Laffan from the old to the new party. The extent to which Sinn
Fein had explicitly rejected dominion status when put forward by conservative groups
in 1918–19 is also ignored. Nevertheless this formidable work of scholarship takes its
subject to a new level. It is an instant classic.
PATRICK MAUME
Queen’s University, Belfast
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The Vision of Rome in Late Renaissance France. By Margaret M. McGowan.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xivⳭ461. $50.00.
“The sentimentality of ruins, especially Rome’s, is the clearest sign of the awakening
of former times: and in excavations this longing was satisfied.” Nietzsche’s focus on
the extraordinary emotional charge awaiting detonation in the broken bits of Roman
antiquity lies close to the heart of this beautiful book. For no account of what the
Renaissance did to the rest of Europe can avoid the explosive encounter of early moderns with the remains of the city—the same encounter that drove travelers returning
to Hungary, Poland, Germany, England, as well as France, to begin recasting the cultural and political landscapes of their nations, a process that would continue, though
called different things at different times in these different places, through the nineteenth
century. How ruins managed to catalyze such complex feelings has fascinated many
scholars both before and after Nietzsche.
Margaret M. McGowan sticks closely to the story of how the Renaissance came to
France. She explains that although “this is a book about the transmission of visions of
Rome into late Renaissance French culture, it is also about perception, about the impediments which the individual viewer placed in the way of seeing clearly” (p. 2). It
is not a comprehensive story of the Renaissance in France, however. Readers who
expect a full account of the cultural activities of François I or of the making of Fontainebleau will be disappointed. Instead, McGowan offers a study of the media of
transmission through which Frenchmen encountered Rome, and of the specific tropes
of Rome that animate the work of some of the most important French literary figures
of the second half of the sixteenth century. These two lines of inquiry are separated
into two parts. Part 1 looks at the travel books that were read, the objects that migrated,
and the opinions of leading cultural arbiters. (Though many of these are cited in contemporary translations, there is no explicit discussion of literary translation as a key
component of this movement.)
No European gentleman of the time, possessor of a decent education, could see Rome
through innocent eyes: too much basic schooling was conducted by way of Caesar,
Cicero, and Quintilian. Coming to Rome, each young man would have had before his
eyes both the living, ruined city and, as if transposed upon it, the city of his reading.
The more advanced the education the thicker and deeper were the layers of that imagined city.
Today, a traveler can buy a picture book in which reconstructions of the ancient city
on transparent paper can be flipped over photographs of the ruins. McGowan reminds
us that this is no new phenomenon. The antiquaries who studied the broken bits of the
city were also the ones who imagined what it would have looked like whole. Her
discussion of the link between ruins, reconstruction, and imagination, and how they
were held together by “conjecture,” not only makes sense of the connection between
Pirro Ligorio and Étienne Du Pérac but also sheds light on the line that runs from
Ligorio to Giambattista Piranesi and—in one of the book’s especially interesting
asides—the practice of philologists, like Joseph Scaliger, whose business was also
reconstruction and whose methods also included conjecture. Specialists might have
hoped for some new light to be shed on the French expatriate community in Rome,
and on the relations between some of its members, like the engraver Du Pérac, and the
Roman antiquaries so extensively described by McGowan.
The importance of imagination for erudition and the role of ruins as the prompt for
the use of imagination provide the pivot between the two parts of the book. As
McGowan explains, “The incomplete and open character of ruins invites participation
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from the observer who seeks to recognize, and perhaps define, the whole structures of
which the ruins now represent only a part.”
The discussion of the poetry of Petrarch—French, of course, only in a roundabout
sort of way—and of Joachim Du Bellay, which begins part 2, makes perfectly clear
that, once one acknowledges the centrality of imagination to antiquarian pursuits, it is
to poetry first and foremost that one must turn. In this chapter McGowan most successfully captures the relationship of Rome to France, with all its ambiguities. The
discussion of Robert Garnier’s Roman plays also illuminates something of the way in
which Rome invaded the French psyche in the second half of the sixteenth century.
But the chapter on Montaigne reduces Rome to a metaphor for a writing style that
privileges the fragmentary, and the chapter on triumphal entries proves what it presumes—the growing influence of Rome in France and the inevitable Frenchification
of Romanitas. If the first part of the book closely resembles a work of cultural history,
such as the late Francis Haskell’s History and Its Images (strangely not cited), the
second looks more like the work of a historian of literature. These case studies of
individual writers tend to dissipate some of the intellectual energy on display in the
book’s opening half.
Not so long ago Fernand Braudel wrote an extraordinarily provocative book whose
importance has still not registered on most early modernists: Out of Italy (Paris, 1991;
in Italian, the language in which it was originally published, the title was La seconda
rinascimento). His argument was that modern European history has unfolded under
this sign. The French story, which happens earlier than most (where it occurred even
earlier, as in Hungary, too little has survived for much full-scale argument), is a kind
of test case for this key European phenomenon. In recent years, Nicole Dacos has
examined the Flemish artistic migration to Rome in the 1530s and its impact on painting
in the north, and Thomas Da Costa Kaufmann has commented at length on the impact
of Italian architects and engineers in Eastern and Central Europe. That French national
identity, as expressed in art, architecture, literature, politics, philosophy, and music,
was also articulated through its dialogue with Rome makes McGowan’s theme essential
for anyone interested in modern European history. For French historians in particular,
understanding exactly how this happened holds the key to making sense of the “classicism” of Louis XIV and all that followed from it.
PETER N. MILLER
Bard Graduate Center, New York
The Contested Parterre: Public Theater and French Political Culture, 1680–
1791. By Jeffrey S. Ravel.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp. xⳭ256. $42.50 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).
In Molière’s 1662 Critique of the School for Women, a character praises theatergoers
in the parterre for the way they judge, “which is to let oneself be struck by things, and
to have no blind preventatives, nor any affected complaisance, nor any ridiculous scruples.” The implied criticism targeted the boxes, where fashion governed opinion as
much as dress. The theater parterre—the open pit in front of the stage where spectators
wandered about during performances—was a motley crowd of commoners and aristocrats, sometimes drunk and often boisterous, always ready to shout insults or approval
toward the performers and each other. Even as Molière celebrated the parterre’s

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

855

independence from received opinion, others called them animals—“half-man, halfgoat, and all beast,” as one wrote; a “many-headed monster,” according to another.
Jeffrey S. Ravel has brought this slice of the theater to life in The Contested Parterre,
an original and at times exuberant account of French political culture in the century
before the French Revolution. Both perspectives—the parterre as unbiased judge, the
parterre as untamed beast—receive ample support in his treatment. When spectators
in 1770 caught sight of the sixteen officers and thirty-eight riflemen posted along the
streets leading to the Opéra or passed troublemakers from earlier performances shackled
in manacles and iron collars outside the entrance, they must have known what was in
store. Reports of disorder were legion, as pandemonium swept across the floor in waves
of pushing and shoving. The place was steamy and foul smelling. In addition to the
usual whistling and hooting, spectators occasionally showed their disapproval by hauling down their pants in front of the stage. (“The creation of this fecal deposit,” Ravel
rather archly writes, “signified the audience’s unwillingness to follow the normal rules
of exchange governing the spectator-spectacle relationship” [p. 44].) Pickpockets enjoyed open season in the overcrowded floor, and in this all-male enclave there seemed
to have been a fair amount of exploratory groping too.
Can such a raucous group tell us anything systematic about politics in absolutist
France? Ravel makes a convincing case that in its social heterogeneity, with men thrust
together pell-mell without the orderly divisions of the boxes up above, the parterre
constituted a spontaneous, genuinely participatory public. The royal guards’ struggle
to contain the parterre was therefore about more than preserving the peace. It was also
about preserving the political sanctity of “the Opera house, which belongs to the King,”
as one arrest citation from the 1720s reads (p. 159). The same rhetoric also justified
the heavily armed presence in the other two theaters, the Comédie-Française and the
Théatre-Italien. In his classic account of spectacle as statecraft under Louis XIV, Music
in the Service of the King (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), Robert Isherwood emphasized the
reproduction of royal authority in elaborate stage allegories. Ravel implicitly questions
just how effective such spectacles really were and, beyond the pointed allegories explicitly intended to display royal power, how effective the court was in enforcing its
more subtle forms of power through etiquette and opinion. More often than not, public
intervention emanating from the parterre meant that the theaters in Paris did not reproduce the authority of Versailles. In the eighteenth century, those sympathetic to the
parterre—particularly after new edicts from Versailles granted guards the authority to
arrest spectators—approvingly described its members as “frondeur,” “republican,” and
“patriotic.” Ravel writes, “The theater, and the parterre in general, provided fodder for
those who wished to imagine alternatives to absolutist culture” (p. 9).
Such a claim rests on two assumptions: that despite the parterre’s disruptiveness it
could also be critically engaged and that the disruption itself was implicitly political.
Ravel acknowledges that standing for hours on end weakened one’s ability to concentrate. But he also cites the acute commentary written by critics who watched from the
parterre and the extraordinary way spectators there could control whether a premiere
failed or succeeded. His chapter on the open-air fair theaters, which performed broad
farces from the commedia dell’arte tradition, details how “the parterre [became] an
actor,” to cite the words of a commissioner assigned to monitor performances in 1712:
prohibited from declaiming by the royal theaters’ monopoly on the spoken word on
any stage in France, the fair theaters for a time wrote dialogue and songs on long
scrolls, which audiences called out or sang as the actors carried on in silence.
Ravel builds on this moment to look at other examples of substantial audience participation, singling out the 1724 premiere of Voltaire’s Marianne in particular. At the
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tragedy’s climax, when the doomed queen lifts a cup of poison to her lips, one wag
provoked a torrent of raucous laughter that stopped the show and abruptly ended the
run by crying out, “La Reine boit!” Ravel reads both political and aesthetic defiance
in this mocking reference to the Feast of Kings, when the carnival “king” drinks as the
others call out “Le Roi boit!” Whether one wishes to go as far as Ravel does in saying
that at such moments the parterre “considered itself an equal participant in the production of meaning on the Paris stage” or that audiences “insisted on the right to shape
the meanings of plays created by the King’s players,” his account does describe an
increasingly outspoken and arguably oppositional public voice in the waning years of
the Old Regime (p. 126). His horrific account of a debacle in the theater of Angers—
royal guards charged the parterre with bayonets, shot one spectator at close range, and
held pistols to the heads of others—lends support to his view that political tensions
could play themselves out inside the theater. By the late 1780s, observers explicitly
equated the parterre with the will of the people; it was, wrote Henri Meister in the
Correspondance littéraire, “the nation which serves as a prelude to the Estates-General” (p. 188).
This is a meticulously researched and fluently written history of an improbable set
of political actors. Ravel combs Parisian and provincial archives to map the precise
social complexion of spectators, and he scours police and press records to reconstruct
the feel of theaters during performances. The conclusions of this broad study point to
important modifications in what has been the reigning view of the public sphere in
French historiography over the past decade and a half. In contrast to scholars who date
the emergence of the public sphere from the 1770s, Ravel shows that references to the
parterre as a critical public long predate the last third of the eighteenth century; he
argues that its responses constituted a political voice as focused and potentially threatening as the social critiques that appeared in print decades later.
The Contested Parterre complicates and enriches the Habermas-inspired view that
newspapers, reading societies, and trial briefs were the principal vehicles of a critically
engaged public on the eve of the Revolution. “The ‘enlightened’ public was not composed uniquely of reader-citizens,” Ravel writes in his afterword, “and the revolutionaries at the end of the century did not merely envision a disembodied entity when they
spoke of the nation” (p. 227). Ravel provides ample reason for us to rethink who made
up this “enlightened” public and, in the process, restores to that entity its flesh and
blood.
JAMES H. JOHNSON
Boston University
Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870. By
Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Pp. xiⳭ350. $55.00.
In the 1650s Paris was already a large city with some 450,000 inhabitants; perhaps
100,000 of these were potential borrowers and lenders. Such a large population could
hardly have organized its asset transactions without some form of financial intermediation: it is this intermediation, chiefly the role of the Paris notaries, which is the main
focus of this important but difficult study. The authors contend, and seek to demonstrate, that notaries “stood at the center of a financial system that provided the key
ingredient to match borrowers and lenders: information.” Notaries thus made possible
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numerous financial transactions that would not otherwise have taken place in a large
city such as Paris. They helped overcome, but could not completely resolve, the “segmentation of credit markets” (p. 151). The crisis of John Law’s system in 1720 was “a
juncture between two financial systems in Paris, that of the seventeenth century based
on personal connections and that of the eighteenth century dominated by long-term
notarized credit” (p. 276).
Life annuities (rentes viagères) were the fastest-growing type of government debt in
France in the eighteenth century (Fig. 2.6) and most of them were marketed by the
notaries. The eighteenth century also saw a boom in private credit, most of which was
accounted for by the rise of the obligation: whereas obligations had amounted to less
than 5 percent of all outstanding debts as late as 1742, they constituted half the stock
of the Paris credit market by the time of the Revolution (Fig. 2.3 and p. 47). The
institutional changes of the Revolution and the Empire, above all the creation of the
hypothèques, “a system of registering liens and real estate transactions,” undermined
the role of the notaries: it “made public the sort of information that notaries kept to
themselves in the eighteenth century” (p. 229). The notaries were unable to compete
with the rise of the Crédit Foncier de France, so that they progressively abandoned
their own credit brokerage to other financial intermediaries; it is with this change that
the authors end their account of two centuries in the history of the Paris credit market.
What general conclusions emerge for the nonspecialist reader? There are in essence
three sets of conclusions, which concern respectively the crown, the private sector, and
the relationship between the two (the testing of the “crowding out” thesis and alternative
hypotheses). The first involves the extent of royal borrowing, as recorded in the sources
utilized by the authors. The enormous debt issue in 1713–14 was a consolidation by
Nicolas Desmaretz, who attempted to turn all the government’s debt into 4 percent
perpetual annuities. Measured in real terms, the public debt had reached per capita
levels that were unprecedented by the end of the reign of Louis XIV, and levels that
would not be attained again until the Revolution. The collapse of Law’s system brought
in its wake “the harshest default that France would witness until 1797,” amounting to
1.5 billion livres (pp. 69, 87). Thereafter, measured in livres of constant silver value,
the state’s total debt fell some 10 percent between 1715 and 1789; but while this was
taking place, long-term debt rose at the expense of borrowing via short-term loans and
the sale of offices (pp. 98, 105). In 1788, the king could have balanced the budget by
repudiating the foreign debt completely and reducing interest rates on the domestic
debt to 6 percent. Nine years later, the state defaulted on two-thirds of its debt, a loss
of 2.6 billion livres to the government’s creditors (pp. 197, 200).
The study’s second set of conclusions involves the private sector. On the whole,
although the state’s defaults were serious, the most damaging actions for the private
markets before 1726 “were the monarchy’s currency manipulations . . . [for] parties to
long-term private credit contracts had no way to escape the effects of currency manipulation” (p. 57). Inflation was the second great enemy, not least because of the failure
of the decentralized credit market to aggregate information under rapid inflation (p.
206): between 1789 and 1795, inflation wiped out over 99 percent of the currency’s
value, costing lenders in the private market 1.67 billion livres, as the stock of private
debt dropped to nearly zero (p. 200). The currency was stabilized in 1796. Outright
repayment of loans was the wisest course of action for those who waited until 1795 to
do so. For borrowers, properly anticipating the stabilization was critical. Thereafter,
borrowers preferred long-term loans, while lenders wanted the opposite. No satisfactory
solution to the mismatch emerged in Paris until the 1850s.
Finally, the study illuminates the relationship between the government’s demand for
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credit and the private market. Hoffman and his colleagues argue that royal borrowing
did not crowd out private borrowers in the reign of Louis XIV. Rather, they contend,
the effect was positive: financiers borrowed money from private individuals in order
to relend to the crown. Since there was spectacular growth in the private credit market
in the eighteenth century, any version of the “crowding out” thesis is rejected in this
study. Economic recovery and a long period of currency stability played their part; but
the rest of the growth in the private market in the eighteenth century was explained by
the spread of the obligation and the capacity of the Parisian notaries to respond to the
new market opportunities (p. 113). Had Law succeeded, notaries would have been
forced out of marketing the public debt in the 1720s. Instead, successive government
defaults “gave them unparalleled access to information about investors” (p. 297).
Whereas in other historical accounts Law’s system is held to have “blocked financial
growth in France by ruling out the sort of banking system that existed in England,”
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal argue instead that it “ushered in a long period
of expansion and financial innovation in the Parisian credit market,” allowing the notaries to take on the role of credit brokers (p. 95). Debt transactions were based on
“shared knowledge about the availability of a lender’s funds, for example, or about the
soundness of a borrower’s collateral. Allocation therefore depended on information
flows between the lenders and borrowers” (p. 9). In that sense, the Parisian credit was
relatively accurately priced: one wonders if Well-Priced Markets might not have been
a more accurate (if less resonant) title to describe the phenomenon of eighteenth-century
growth depicted in this valuable, but sometimes abstruse, study.
RICHARD BONNEY
University of Leicester
Haute Cuisine: How the French Invented the Culinary Profession. By Amy B.
Trubek.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Pp. xiⳭ178. $24.95.
Recent histories of shopping, tourism, and concert going have taught us a great deal
about the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’s efforts to transform itself into a modern
leisure class that set the standards of taste for the rest of French society. In Amy
Trubek’s Haute Cuisine: How the French Invented the Culinary Profession, we can
now observe the nineteenth-century French bourgeois consumer à table. Trubek explores the origins of haute cuisine in the ancien régime and its transformation in the
market society of the postrevolutionary era, contrasting the noble patrons of the ancien
régime who ate in the privacy of their homes with bourgeois diners of the nineteenth
century who conspicuously displayed their taste for fine food in the new public spaces
of the commercial city. Haute Cuisine is about more, however, than the bourgeois
consumer’s pursuit of cultural status. It also provides the perspective of haute cuisine’s
producers, recounting the efforts of chefs both to exploit the market and to protect
themselves from its vagaries by arrogating professional status.
Trubek’s point of departure is to ask why French haute cuisine epitomized fine dining
throughout the nineteenth century. Part of its cachet, of course, stemmed from the
dominance of French taste in the ancien régime. From at least the reign of Louis XIV,
the French court established taste codes throughout Europe in everything from decorating, fashion, and high art to manners and cuisine. But why did this reputation persist
in the nineteenth century, once the Revolution destroyed the closed system of court
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and noble private patronage of individual chefs? How did French haute cuisine retain
its cachet in the bourgeois market society of the nineteenth century?
Trubek situates haute cuisine historically, insisting correctly that its Europeanwide
reputation among ancien régime aristocrats alone cannot explain its popularity among
bourgeois consumers in France and abroad in the nineteenth century. Rather, consumer
demand on the part of upwardly mobile bourgeois converged with the mission of chefs
to establish themselves as bona fide professionals, creating a flourishing market for this
luxury commodity. These factors not only sustained haute cuisine, Trubek demonstrates, but also reinvented it for the modern era. As the haute bourgeoisie sought to
fashion itself as a leisure elite, restaurants, gentleman’s clubs, and hotels proliferated
to meet their needs, multiplying the venues for haute cuisine. At the same time, chefs
striving after professional recognition did a great deal to promote the celebrity status
of haute cuisine among consumers and to keep standards of quality high by fostering
competition within the upper echelon of producers. Far from undermining the art of
haute cuisine, Trubek argues, commodification and competition bolstered its glamour.
Unlike the elite cuisines of China or India, French haute cuisine set the standard for
elegant dining throughout Europe and the United States during the nineteenth century.
For this reason, Trubek maintains that it can be taken as a case study in cultural imperialism. She notes the irony, for example, of the British penchant for French cuisine
contrasted with their overweening sense of superiority to the French in every other
arena. In Britain and elsewhere, she contends, the French culinarily colonized by dominating knowledge about cooking. Bourgeois Britons and others craved French food not
only for its sensual pleasures, in other words, but also because it endowed the consumer
with the authority of the connoisseur.
Trubek is both an anthropologist and a classically trained professional chef who
teaches at the New England Culinary Institute. Her training as an anthropologist shows
in ethnographic descriptions of the nineteenth-century kitchen, including passages on
the food itself and the techniques of haute cuisine. But her book is less a study in
anthropology than it is a social and cultural history of haute cuisine. Trubek uses the
writings of gastronomes, trade journals, cookbooks, and some archival materials to
reconstruct the world of cuisine from a variety of perspectives: those of the bourgeois
diners who sought to distinguish themselves through their association with elite cookery, the chefs striving for recognition as professionals, the British restaurant goers who
detested the French but loved their cuisine, the humble kitchen workers organizing for
control over working conditions, and the bourgeois housewives whose domestic cookery was belittled by the experts.
Trubek is at her best depicting the internal conflicts within the world of haute cuisine.
In seeking the status of professionals, chefs attempted to define haute cuisine as an art
different from, on the one hand, the everyday domestic cooking of bourgeois housewives in the private sphere and, on the other, the menial labor of subordinate kitchen
workers. To do so they formed organizations (the Société des Cuisiniers Français was
the most prominent), launched trade journals and instructional journals for the wider
public, founded a culinary school, and mounted food competitions, conferences, and
exhibitions. In Trubek’s description, bourgeois women who subscribed to instructional
cooking journals and attended culinary expositions and contests played an important
role in supporting these initiatives, despite the fact that the very same journals and
expositions consistently conveyed the message that domestic cooking was an inferior
cuisine.
By the same token, chefs were at pains to signal their distinction over other haute
cuisine workers, sous-chefs, garde-mangers, cuisiniers, aides de cuisine, and pâtissiers

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

860

Book Reviews

among them. Certainly, as Trubek shows, workers in the food trade were cognizant of
the differences between themselves and chefs. Like other kinds of laborers, haute cuisine workers began to organize their own associations and publish their own trade
journals from the 1880s on, responding largely to the emergence of large-scale industrial food enterprises and addressing issues—working conditions, hiring practices, and
wages, among them—that the elite Société des Cuisiniers Français did not. The public,
however, did not see the differences between chefs and their underlings as clearly.
French chefs’ quest for professionalization ultimately failed, Trubek argues, because—
unlike doctors and lawyers—chefs were unable to establish clear boundaries between
their labor and expertise and that of women and workers. While part of the problem
was too many cooks, so to speak, material barriers to professionalization were also
important: the chef remained, in part, a manual laborer who did physically demanding
work for pitifully inadequate wages.
More than anything else, Trubek’s book concerns the creation and consolidation of
a new bourgeois cultural identity in the market society of the nineteenth century. Both
bourgeois consumers pursuing cultural refinement and chefs striving after the authority
of the professional, after all, lay claim to elite status through cultural capital. Chefs
thwarted in their efforts to earn public recognition as professionals were like many on
the margins of the bourgeoisie, who tried and failed to attain middle-class status. By
considering both successful and unsuccessful attempts at social mobility, Trubek points
toward the complexity of class formation in the nineteenth century. She does not,
however, develop this argument explicitly, nor, in the end, does she weave together
the various narratives to tell one coherent story. Part of the problem is that her portrait
of the bourgeoisie is painted with too broad a brush and lacks the shading that might
have allowed her to see her different protagonists as part of the same process of class
stratification in the new, democratizing market society. Yet, while the book does not
provide a completely satisfying synthesis, it offers an eminently readable, historical
account of the curiously persistent power of French haute cuisine.
LISA TIERSTEN
Barnard College
Reinventing Voltaire: The Politics of Commemoration in Nineteenth-Century
France. By Stephen Bird. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 2000,
number 9. Edited by Anthony Strugnell.
Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000. Pp. xiⳭ223.
“Above the mind is the heart; above individuals, society; above Voltaire, Jesus Christ.”
Thus admonished the editor of France départementale, a little-known Parisian periodical, in 1834. Four decades later, in a speech marking the centennial of Voltaire’s
death, Victor Hugo proclaimed: “To protect the poor, the ailing, . . . that is the war of
Jesus Christ; and what man wages this war? Voltaire.” Despite the political chasm
between them, representations of Voltaire the philosophe and Voltaire the quasi-evangelical reformer coexisted during the nineteenth century—a century of incessant and
unmatched political interest in this figure. So claims Stephen Bird in the present book,
an intelligent, informative, but underargued effort to lay bare the “reinvention,” between 1830 and 1900, of the “emblematic” Voltaire—symbol of France’s division into
rival political camps. Informed by Pierre Nora’s Lieux de mémoire (Paris, 1984–92),
Bird’s reading of Hugo and other novelists, pamphleteers, journalists, politicians, and
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pedagogues yields a pithy conclusion. Voltaire’s “protean . . . opus—at times deeply
conservative in political and religious matters, liberal and irreligious at others”—made
him palatable to diverse political schools and, hence, one of “the most ubiquitously
[politicized and] popularised members of the French literary canon in this period” (pp.
2, 163).
Most specialists of postrevolutionary France have encountered this political “reinvention” firsthand. The contribution of this monograph (based on the author’s University College, London, dissertation) is to display its multiple facets and correct oversimplifications. Bird analyzes this phenomenon on five intersecting planes—political
discourse (mainly in the press), caricature, statues, “working-class editions” of Voltaire’s works, and schoolbooks—and displays its magnitude. Installed between 1830
and 1900, the six Parisian statues of Voltaire granted him an unparalleled visibility.
During these same decades, publishers issued over one hundred editions of Voltaire’s
works at sixty-five centimes or less per volume. Educators likewise drew repeatedly
from his oeuvre, though only in the 1880s did they tap the philosopher of Candide
alongside the historian of Le siècle de Louis XIV.
Voltaire’s political resurgence owed much to predictable associations: anticlericalism
and “Voltairianism” (defined here as rejection of all orthodoxies) as well as tolerance,
free speech, and other rights consecrated during the early French Revolution. In one
respect, Republican and liberal appreciation of Voltaire clashed with traditionalist denunciation of a rationalist and iconoclastic, if not atheistic, Prussophile. But Bird looks
beyond such neat cleavages. Republicans and liberals debated among themselves Voltaire’s contribution to the Revolution and disagreed—especially after 1848—about the
exact meaning of Voltairianism, between anticlericalism and love of reason and justice.
Likewise with their political adversaries: whereas some Catholics equated Voltaire with
Satan, others emphasized his underlying faith in order to delineate a Christ-like figure,
“harbinger of a reformed Christianity” (p. 153). In addition, the era’s most prevalent
and durable representation of Voltaire was also the most consensual: Voltaire the aesthetic and moral conservative, the bulwark against romanticism, the “Christian moralist
in spite of himself” (p. 196). This representation reached its apex under Louis-Napoleon, who sought to subvert a potent symbol while, as elsewhere, building consensus.
The Second Empire thus found it easier to mobilize Voltaire—on the Pantheon’s pediment, for instance—than did the July Monarchy, forced as it was to court Catholic as
well as anticlerical support. While “militant” Republicans reclaimed the anticlerical
Voltaire at century’s end, the advent of the Third Republic announced the decline of a
figure that many Republicans now perceived as politically superfluous, needlessly contentious, insufficiently democratic, and too malleable to stand as precursor of their
regime.
Bird’s perceptive account, grounded in the era’s political history, broadens our understanding of Voltaire’s legacy. We already knew, for instance, that even radicals such
as Louis Blanc condemned the deleterious impact of Voltairianism upon a society in
need of religiosity (Edward Berenson, Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in
France, 1830–1852 [Princeton, N.J., 1984], p. 51). Bird uncovers not only left-wing
attempts to fashion composites of faith and reason around Voltaire but also internal
misgivings about a figure who had scorned the peuple. His most suggestive chapter
analyzes the campaign of Léonor Havin, editor of the Republican Siècle, to erect a
Parisian statue of Voltaire in the late 1860s. Bird describes Havin’s vision of an “open
air pantheon” (p. 44); the rumblings of traditionalists; the unwillingness of some Republicans to attach anachronistic political ideas to Voltaire; and the protracted search
for a politically suitable location, from the Place Monge to the (renamed) Place Voltaire.
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More revealing yet was the success of a subscription that drew over two hundred
thousand contributors—many of them self-described artisans and laborers—from all
of France. The large number of collective subscriptions (undertaken in cafés, freemasonry lodges, and the like) illustrates the vigor of the French associative realm in the
mid-nineteenth century.
In this chapter as elsewhere, the author is at his best when explaining “how . . .
Voltaire’s legacy [was] politicised” (p. 2)—the question he posed at the book’s outset.
But his decision to ignore both the Restoration and the centennial of Voltaire’s death
(in 1878) because they have been the subjects of “extensive research” (p. 7) reflects a
disappointingly narrow approach to a phenomenon that invites further-reaching questions and arguments. Why, besides his “protean” status, Voltaire proved better to “think
with” than other literary figures; what these multiple, fragmented representations of
Voltaire reveal about the era’s need for and use of literary illustrations; what, beyond
politics and religion, Voltaire meant to French men and women of diverse social stations: these problems remain unresolved. Bird does suggest, borrowing from Chantal
Martinet, that collective participation in the Siècle’s subscription fulfilled a yearning
for community. To deepen and substantiate such claims, however, he would have
needed to expand his Paris-centered corpus, rich in political sources, to include local
forms of sociability as well as inventories made after death, festivals, almanacs, and
other windows into popular and material culture.1 As well as it retraces the posthumous
fate of a key literary figure, Reinventing Voltaire leaves the reader with a feeling of
incompletion. Voltaire has much yet to tell us about the political culture of nineteenthcentury France.
STÉPHANE GERSON
New York University

Art, War, and Revolution in France, 1870–1871: Myth, Reportage, and Reality.
By John Milner.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xiⳭ243. $55.00.
In Art, War, and Revolution in France, 1870–1871, John Milner undertakes a large
task—recounting the history of the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, and the
Paris Commune as experienced and represented by French artists and writers. The book
contains 395 illustrations, most of them in black-and-white reproduction (many of
them, of course, were created in black and white), but many of them in glorious color.
Some are famous works of art; others are rarely seen or reproduced. It is a pleasure to
see so many French drawings and paintings of this period gathered in one place, although some of the images are very small.
In the text of the book, Milner tells the story of this tumultuous and bloody period
of French history through the writings of artists, essayists, and novelists. Historians
will find the text general and descriptive rather than analytic, but Milner’s account of
artists’ experiences and reactions to this turbulent period is not found in most histories
and is quite interesting. Some artists fled; others stayed. Some were apolitical; others,
1
We learn little about the latter, yet razors bearing Voltaire’s image had already surfaced under
the Restoration. See Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration
France, 1815–1830 (Berkeley, 2000), pp. 190–91.
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deeply involved in events. Some were lucky enough to have their studios and most of
their artwork survive the war; others, like Alfred Sisley, lost everything when their
homes were destroyed.
Most interestingly, Milner reveals the nonartistic side of artists’ lives, largely through
their letters and those of their families. Ernest Meissonier, a renowned military painter,
was a colonel in the armed forces. Édouard Manet served under him as a lieutenant,
writing letters to his wife and painting when he could. Rosa Bonheur stayed in her
home and worried about what to do if it were overrun by the Prussians (which it was).
Gustave Courbet, an ardent republican, worked feverishly to protect the paintings and
sculptures in the Louvre during the war, only to be held responsible for the Commune’s
destruction of the Vendôme Column. Honoré Daumier produced biting caricatures criticizing the French government’s handling of the war and the Commune. And the young
painter Frédéric Bazille wrote letters while he tramped from one end of France to the
other with the Zouaves; in 1870 he was killed in battle.
Milner is interested in the reactions of writers as well as artists, but his handling of
this material is less successful than his treatment of the private writings of the artists.
Most of the writers he selects for inclusion (primarily Émile Zola, Edmond de Goncourt, and Jules Clarètie) were harsh critics of the Commune. Omitting the writings of
more sympathetic observers and participants gives a misleading impression of intellectuals’ reactions to the Commune. It also influences Milner’s interpretation of it.
While he strives for objectivity, like virtually all writers on the Commune, he fails to
achieve it, adopting as his own the opinions and judgments of the conservative writers
he quotes. He thus refers, for instance, to the confrontation between the National Guard
and more conservative Parisians on March 22 as “a massacre”—of the conservatives—
and criticizes the tone of Courbet’s letters to his family as “absurdly optimistic and
self-assured” (pp. 143, 152). Other interpretations are possible in these and other instances.
The strength of the book lies not in its history, however, but in its analysis of the
period’s art and the artists who created it. Milner categorizes paintings, drawings, woodprints, photographs, and so on, according to their message and the speed with which
they were produced. He regards those that were completed and displayed rapidly (especially in the illustrated press) as fulfilling a largely reportorial function. Those that
were produced years after the fact, from his perspective, are less reportorial and more
clearly adversarial. This distinction is a useful organizing device, despite the danger
that the reader will begin to see the quickly produced drawings and woodcuts as “objective.” Milner’s text makes it clear, however, that both early drawings and later
paintings are personal statements representing what artists felt as well as what they
saw.
Representations of the French and Prussian struggle for control of France in the
winter of 1870 demonstrate Milner’s point. In battle after battle, the French were depressingly defeated. Artists who worked quickly presented bleak, snow-covered landscapes, wounded and defeated men, and scenes of carnage and death (see pp. 55, 100).
There was, as Milner says, “little scope for a positive interpretation” of what was
happening (p. 89). Later, defeats could be recast as heroic resistance. Alphonse de
Neuville’s 1878 painting of the French surrender at Le Bourget is a case in point. With
the passage of eight years, he could represent the French as showing “great bravery,
only conceding defeat in the face of overwhelming Prussian might” (p. 89). In 1870,
Milner argues, no such interpretation was possible.
Historians and art historians who have worked on this period of French history, as
well as anyone else who is interested in the history of art and artists’ lives, will find
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the book a pleasure to read. To have so many works of art reproduced in one place is
in itself a considerable contribution to scholarship.
GAY L. GULLICKSON
University of Maryland

Monumental Intolerance: Jean Baffier, a Nationalist Sculptor in Fin-de-Siècle
France. By Neil McWilliam.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Pp. xivⳭ326. $70.00.
In the early afternoon of December 9, 1886, the Parisian deputy Germain Casse was
attacked and stabbed in the stomach as he talked with a constituent at the Palais Bourbon. When it was discovered that his assailant was the popular sculptor Jean Baffier
and not some shiftless socialist or anarchist, there was widespread speculation that the
artist had gone insane. The critic Albert Wolff argued that Baffier had “a mind unhinged
by disappointments and misery” (p. 15) and therefore could not be held responsible for
his crime. But police questioning soon revealed a radically different state of affairs.
Baffier’s assault was not a spontaneous act of passion or madness but the culmination
of a long-standing fight against the Republican establishment, a fight that involved not
only explicit political action but also polemical pamphleteering and provocative monumental sculpture.
In his excellent new book, Monumental Intolerance, art historian Neil McWilliam
explores this “idiosyncratic figure” and probes “the interconnections among his various
spheres of activity,” convinced that Baffier’s life and work can help to illuminate the
art of the Third Republic and “the cultural life of the period more generally” (p. 3).
Focusing on the “interplay among cultural modernism, political conservatism, and the
turbulent experience of social change in the decades straddling the fin de siècle,”
McWilliam concentrates on a cluster of themes originally identified by Kenneth Silver
in his study of the postwar “rappel à l’ordre,” Esprit de Corps (Princeton, N.J., 1989),
and later fleshed out in such works as David Cottington’s Cubism in the Shadow of
War (New Haven, Conn., 1998), Romy Golan’s Modernity and Nostalgia (New Haven,
Conn., 1995), and Mark Antliff’s Inventing Bergson (Princeton, N.J., 1993) (p. 4).
However, while recognizing the “pathbreaking” nature of works such as these,
McWilliam also criticizes their oversights and limitations. First, he takes issue with the
key role played by Charles Maurras and the Action Française in these studies, arguing
that “the ‘extreme right’ is certainly not reducible to royalism, just as the aesthetic
vehicle canvassed as most appropriate for the expression of an essential Frenchness
was not confined to classicism” (p. 5). Second, he also rejects the exclusive focus on
the art of the avant-garde displayed by these works. He rightly claims that the avantgarde “represents a small and—for many contemporaries—insignificant constituency
within fin-de-siècle cultural life” (p. 4), and that any study that wants to make general
claims about the visual art of the early twentieth century must come to terms with the
hegemonic institutions such as the Academy and the Salons as well as dominant practices such as official commissions. Third, he challenges the “unreflexive readiness
within art-historical study” to privilege Paris and “fetishize the metropolis,” effectively
occluding provincial France, treating it simply as “malleable raw material for the itinerant landscapist” (pp. 5–6).
In order to address these problems and “bring into focus aspects of cultural nationalism that have been previously invisible in accounts of the period” (p. 5), McWilliam
turns to Baffier. Claiming to have written a “historical study of an artist rather than a
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purely art-historical study,” he uses the sculptor as the entry point into a series of
historical, artistic, and ideological problems (p. 5). In lucid, thematically based chapters,
he begins with an aspect of Baffier’s life or work that then opens up topics of more
general historical and theoretical interest, such as regionalism and national identity or
the problematic nature of war memorials and the public commemoration of national
trauma. In an especially useful and convincing discussion, he turns to Baffier’s political
writings in order to demonstrate the fragmentation of the fin de siècle ideological
landscape and the complexity of the Right in particular. In contrast to historians who
see Maurras behind every reactionary agenda, he argues that Baffier explicitly rejected
Maurras’s Latinism as a bastardization of the Celtic roots of French culture and instead
developed the idea of “atavistic localism,” a glorification of peasant tradition and medieval inheritance in the service of a return to feudal harmony and social cohesion.
However, despite its many important contributions to the literature on the French
Right, Monumental Intolerance is not without its problems. First, like many books in
the social history of art, the art itself is given decidedly short shrift. Too often it is
treated as merely the embodiment or transparent signifier of an underlying ideology,
rather than as an independent material artifact deserving sustained scrutiny of its own.
Second, for a book so tightly focused on one figure, Baffier feels strangely disembodied
much of the time. Like his art, he too often becomes a mere cipher that McWilliam
must work with in order to access the ideological discourse of the Third Republic. We
rarely get a sense of what motivates or compels him beyond the generic explanation
of anxiety over cultural crisis. Not that McWilliam does not drop some tantalizing
hints. At a certain point in the text he writes that “it is Baffier’s own family that stands
at the heart of his work. . . . Baffier’s parents, in particular, their faces weathered and
bodies hardened by years of extenuating labor, serve as archetypes for an entire class.
The portrait busts of Mère and Père Baffier . . . testify to the suffering of peasants,
whose burden is borne with quiet dignity tinged with wistful forbearance. Their pensive,
absorbed state characterizes a number of works in which simple agricultural tasks are
endowed with almost sacramental power” (pp. 182–83). Might these passages not
imply that, at least on one level, the apotheosis of the peasantry in Baffier’s sculpture
and ideology functions not as a celebration of rural life but as a flight from it, a form
of aesthetic compensation for the broken bodies of his family? While I am not suggesting that McWilliam essay psychoanalytic interpretations, more attention to the
intersection of the personal and political would have added depth and humanity to his
book.
Despite these criticisms, Monumental Intolerance remains an impressive work. Intelligently conceived, clearly written, and forcefully argued, it deserves a place on the
shelf beside the “pathbreaking” works that the author so admires.
IHOR JUNYK
Toronto

Pulp Surrealism: Insolent Popular Culture in Early-Twentieth-Century Paris.
By Robin Walz.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. Pp. xiiⳭ206.
$35.00.
Robin Walz’s Pulp Surrealism leaves no doubt that the French surrealists were aware
of, and even inspired by, some currents of the mass print culture that surrounded them
in the earliest phases of their attempted cultural revolution. Walz’s study, which he
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calls “an interpretive history of the intersection between mass print culture and surrealism” (p. 3), claims more than an intersection between the two. The book’s conceit is
that the period itself was surreal—as evidenced in its mass print culture. Hence, the
surrealists did not create surrealism (“the science of the ephemeral” [p. 2]) but discovered it in their very surroundings. Put another way, Walz makes the historian’s usual
claim that artistic and literary movements cannot be explained by individual psychology
or in a narrow context of high-culture antecedents. Rather, such aesthetic movements
both reflect and comment on something meaningful in their broader historical context.
For Walz the question becomes, what drew the surrealists to this mass culture? His
answer: the mass culture itself was actually sensational, extraordinary, spectacular,
insolent, and surreal.
The book is composed of four chapters that present different examples of mass print
culture and its divergent connections to the surrealist project. The first chapter looks
at the Passage de l’Opéra and Parisian guidebooks in relation to Louis Aragon’s Le
Paysan de Paris, arguing that Paris was the “ideal surrealist text” and thus that Aragon’s
“guide to the surrealist imagination” was written in guidebook form (p. 37). The chapter
also presents a very interesting consideration of the nostalgia for “vieux Paris” that
followed in the wake of Haussmannization.
The second chapter is a delightful romp through the wildly popular series of novels,
Fantômas, a sort of French “Batman and Robin” replete with gadgets, large-scale disasters, spectacular robberies, and an amazing gallery of peripatetic rogues. Walz describes the popularity of the series and analyzes its generic structure—especially what
he calls the emphasis on “swerves and dodges”—and concludes that the series was
surrealist avant la lettre, which is why the surrealists liked the novels. The final two
chapters treat the “haiku” of the popular press, the fait divers, first in a detailed account
of the notorious and murderous “Bluebeard of Gambais,” Henri Landru, who was tried
and executed for murdering ten women. The second examines the frequent suicide
reports in the daily papers. Both chapters explain that these newspaper tropes caught
the eye of the surrealists because of their illogic and dark humor. In essence, the fait
divers “shared affinities with the surrealist revolution in daily life” (p. 139).
One of the significant contributions of Pulp Surrealism is that it treats culture in the
1920s as more than simply a response to World War I, thus demonstrating a sensitivity
to certain cultural continuities that span the period from the 1880s to the 1930s. Walz
also separates the production of mass culture from its reception. He rightly argues that
despite what might be perceived as the socially and politically conservative context of
their production, the novels he studies were open to popular interpretations that differed
from the values of their bourgeois authors. Yet Pulp Surrealism does not make enough
of a case for an “alternative” periodization for what is usually known as the “interwar
years.” Furthermore, it only makes vague references to other significant transformations
such as the advent of automobiles, the wireless telegraph, and film, missing a chance
to connect with other studies, such as Michael Miller’s Shanghai on the Métro: Spies,
Intrigue, and the French between the Wars (Berkeley, 1994), which make a very strong
argument about culture in the 1920s and 1930s and seem to strike the right balance
between the 1920s as a “postwar” response and as a generative era shaped by technological innovation, among other things. As Walz puts it here, the reader is left to
wonder what separates this “surreal” culture from the mass print culture of the prewar
period. The genre of the fait divers that Walz describes was hardly new in his period,
having been firmly ensconced since at least the 1860s with the advent of the mass press.
What is different about these tales from the 1920s seems vital, and there were differences—not the least of which was the use of photography, especially exploited in
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glossies such as Détective and in new dailies such as Le Soir, known as the newspaper
for the “cinematic” era.
Walz seems to be suggesting that all mass culture from the 1880s on was surreal but
that it wasn’t until the 1920s that intellectuals finally noticed and named it. If that is
the case, what does one make of such important cultural movements before the turn of
the century as Emile Zola and his naturalist school or the “other” modernist avantgarde, the impressionists, who may have had a shorter run as “insolent” artists than did
the surrealists but whose influence was more profound and long lasting? The surrealists
were also more than writers; they were painters, photographers, and filmmakers. The
book’s emphasis on mass print not only constrains our vision of mass culture but also
our sense of the work of the surrealists. And, if the war, like the car, is one major event
that separates the 1880s from the 1920s, from the vantage of mass culture nothing
could have been so novel and important as the rise of film, whose influence on mass
print culture and high culture continues to shape our own creative and critical discourses.
But was Paris more “surreal” than, say, “real”? After all, the nineteenth-century
realists also saw the city as their ideal text. For example, the opening of Balzac’s
infamous story “La fille aux yeux d’or” is a clever replica of such early guides to Paris
as Le Diable à Paris. Guidebooks to Paris have a long and interesting history but one
that belies Walz’s description of them as “stable texts” that stood in for a constantly
changing city. Aragon surely did read contemporary guidebooks to Paris, but he also
read Balzac, Zola, and other city literature. If the surrealists saw in Paris an inspiring
landscape, it may more confirm the centrality of Paris to modern cultural innovation
and the “painting of modern life” than its status as a surreal panorama.
Walz brings to the study of mass culture the hierarchizations that mark scholarship
in fields bound by aesthetic judgment and quality control. For example, he appears to
hang the openness of the Fantômas on the quality of the novels themselves as somehow
rich enough to sustain a certain level of complexity. Many students of popular and
mass culture have argued instead for the essentially fluid meaning of such forms and
practices, however mundane and banal. The popularity of the material under consideration in the study is more taken as a given than explained as a historical phenomenon.
We learn that the surrealists were drawn to these instances of mass culture, but we do
not know otherwise why they were so popular or whether the surrealists saw in them
elements that the general public did not. Pulp Surrealism thus shows a genuine appreciation for the complexities of mass culture while it also insists on a hierarchy of
product that privileges what Walz perceives to be “insolent” strains of mass culture.
In this way, he cheers on the good taste of the surrealists who rescue mass culture from
its otherwise banal and quotidian nature.
Pulp Surrealism shows, significantly, that the seeming originality of the avant-garde
was really a vision inspired by everyday life. In the end, the book’s preoccupation is
to endorse mass culture because it was meaningful to intellectual and artistic elites.
What one strains to imagine, however, is what the metro rider on his way to work
reading about the exploits of Landru, the concierge perched in her loft with Le Soir,
and the audiences in the Gaumont theater who faithfully turned out for the next installment of the film version of the Fantômas novels made of the fantastic and surreal
world they consumed with enthusiasm and gusto.
VANESSA R. SCHWARTZ
University of Southern California
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Constructing Class and Nationality in Alsace, 1830–1945. By David Allen
Harvey.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. Pp. xiiⳭ249. $40.00.
The long Franco-German rivalry over Alsace not only occasioned military conflict but
also strongly influenced how French and Germans imagined both themselves and each
other. From 1789 onward, the two emergent nation-states strove not only to claim the
region but also to make its residents into proper citizens. While Alsace became central
to the nationalist imaginings of many French and Germans, their competition meant
that Alsatians’ own sense of national loyalty remained ambiguous and deeply problematic.
David Allen Harvey’s fascinating book explores this competition between forms of
collective identity in modern Alsace and its eventual resolution. He argues that the
complexity of the Alsatian case between 1789 and 1945 permits us to gain new perspectives on collective identities: how they emerge, why they appeal to individuals,
and how social actors reconcile different identity constructs to one another. The Alsatian experience also promotes a reappraisal of the two types of social consciousness
most closely associated with modernity: nationality and class. Harvey rejects the notion
that collective identities are somehow fixed and that class and national loyalties should
be seen as fundamentally at odds with one another. Rather, he stresses that identities
are discursive creations, whose meanings and relevance are constantly in flux (p. 5).
Moreover, individuals exercise significant choice in their adoption of particular identity
constructs. Hence, precisely because multiple variants of both class and nationality
identities coexisted and competed in Alsace, workers had a considerable range of options that they could exercise to achieve their personal and collective goals. The history
of Alsatian workers between 1789 and 1945 thus emerges as one of their ongoing
struggle with the question of identity and “primary loyalty,” a narrative that ended only
in the wake of the Second World War.
Harvey explains that a dialectic between identity discourse and worker experience
drove the shifts in Alsatian workers’ collective identity in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Between the French Revolution and the Second World War, five specific
discourses framed the imaginations of Alsatian workers. Each took root because it
promised the workers tangible advantages (e.g., a sense of citizenship or better working
conditions). Each would eventually lose sway, however, as working-class living and
working conditions and the larger social and geopolitical environment evolved.
The first discourse to emerge was that of French republicanism. By linking French
national sentiment with the ideal of social egalitarianism, it empowered Alsatian workers to demand political and economic rights due to them as French citizens. Significantly, this identity took root in Alsace before the linguistic and cultural assimilation
of the province to French norms had occurred. In other words, Alsatians adopted a
French model of citizenship while still holding on to the characteristics that, beyond
the Rhine, defined them as Germans.
After the Revolution of 1848, republicanism proved less attractive, for the French
state promoted economic liberalism and order over social justice. This permitted the
shift to the second identity discourse in Alsace: paternalism. Although it was profoundly antilabor, Alsatian workers drew certain advantages from the paternalist discourse, notably improved living conditions. At a time when local perceptions of Germany (especially Prussia) remained largely negative, paternalism’s promotion of
Frenchness also appealed to Alsatian workers. Hence, despite the economic and political dislocations accompanying Germany’s annexation of Alsace in 1871, paternalism
lived on, precisely because it could express opposition to the Germans.
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The expiration of the antisocialist legislation in 1890, however, combined with the
German state’s growing intervention in the social sphere (which undermined the position of the patrons), allowed a new narrative identity to gain favor: international
socialism. Socialism was particularly compelling for two reasons. On the one hand, it
offered Alsatian workers the class unity that earlier discourses denied and, with it, a
means for gaining additional improvements in work and living conditions. On the other
hand, the internationalist dimension of socialism promised a way to transcend the
Franco-German divide that increasingly threatened all Alsatians after 1900.
Alsatians greeted their French liberators with enthusiasm in 1918; nonetheless,
French efforts to “de-Germanize” Alsace bred profound discontent toward “the interior”
by 1920. Disillusioned with Germany and now France, Alsatian workers replaced the
discourse of socialism with that of Alsatian autonomism. In one of the more penetrating
chapters, Harvey shows how the ongoing Franco-German competition over Alsace
destabilized the region, provoked social tension, and divided the ranks of the working
class. Only in 1929, when the French state pursued a more conciliatory line toward
Alsace and the depression forced greater attention to economic concerns, did the working class begin to forsake the autonomist cause.
A final identity discourse emerged in the 1930s, when the struggle against fascism
and the pursuit of a more just society gave Alsatian workers a renewed sense of unity
and purpose. The Popular Front synthesis of socialist internationalism and French republicanism spoke directly to Alsatian concerns over working conditions and, even
more so, the growing threat of German National Socialism. The continued strength of
German sentiment in interwar Alsace, however, limited the discourse’s appeal outside
of the working class. After 1945, though, with German claims on Alsatian identity
thoroughly discredited by the Nazi occupation and with the French state abandoning
its traditional support of liberal economics, this socialized French republicanism did
become the basis for a collective identity not just for workers but for all Alsatians.
Constructing Class is an impressive achievement. The complexities of Alsatian history between 1789 and 1945 pose many challenges to the historian. For the most part,
Harvey has acquitted himself of them admirably. Nonetheless, a few criticisms are in
order. Most significantly, the relationship between the collective identity of “Alsatians”
and “Alsatian workers” remains ill defined throughout the book. This is a critical issue,
not only for properly understanding sociopolitical dynamics within Alsace but also for
comprehending the articulation and employment of these discourses. Indeed, workers
developed none of the three narratives that were explicitly cross-class in nature (republicanism, paternalism, autonomism). Similarly, it would have been helpful for Harvey to have distinguished more rigorously between Alsace and industrialized Alsace
(including the spatial evolution of this latter category) in his discussions. The comparative framing of the entire study could also have been more balanced. To his credit,
Harvey insists upon the importance of extraregional events in the articulation (and
rejection) of identity discourses. However, developments in France do not receive the
same sort of consideration as those in Germany. Furthermore, while Harvey goes out
of his way at times to situate his argument within German historiographical debates—
one of the most egregious instances is his reference to structuralist-intentionalist interpretations of Nazism (pp. 192–93)—he makes few efforts to link his insights to
French and more broadly European historical concerns. These remarks aside, David
Harvey has written one of the more stimulating recent accounts of collective identity
construction in modern Europe. It merits the close attention of specialists and nonspecialists alike.
ANTHONY J. STEINHOFF
University of Tennessee, Chattanooga

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

870

Book Reviews

Learning to Be Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and
Lorraine, 1850–1940. By Stephen L. Harp.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998. Pp. xviiiⳭ292. $36.00.
Comparative histories based on extensive primary research are a rarity these days, and
on these grounds alone Stephen Harp’s ambitious study of close to a century of schooling as nation building in Alsace and Lorraine should be welcomed and applauded.
Harp’s important book will not only appeal to educational historians but also offer
engaging arguments and hypotheses to those interested in the formation of national
identities, the link between region and nation, the connection between language and
national identity, and the role of borderlands in European history.
Learning to Be Loyal focuses on the relationship between primary schooling and
national identity during what the author considers to be the critical period of mass
schooling and mass nationalism. Harp explores how states used primary schools to
construct an imagined national community and turns to educational policy as a window
into the process of modern nation building. His central argument is that continuities
between French and German educational policies in Alsace and Lorraine far outstripped
the differences between them. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century,
both governments increasingly thought that language was linked to national identity,
both placed a heavy emphasis on history and geography as a way of introducing children to their region and their nation, and both saw primary education as a key vehicle
for promoting the construction of national identity. For Harp, France and Germany
participated in a larger European process that saw primary schools play a crucial role
in the creation of contemporary national identities. On the local level, however, French
and German efforts to integrate Alsace and Lorraine into a greater national whole met
with limits. While both states could at times appear ruthless in their linguistic and
educational policies, both had to concede a measure of autonomy to local authorities
in order to ensure successful implementation of those policies. As a result, both provinces enjoyed a degree of independence in the educational realm that was not shared
by other parts of their nation.
Harp uses his findings to argue convincingly that the oft-repeated distinction between
a German, ethnic conception of identity and nationhood and a French, civic-republican
one is not as compelling or significant as has often been claimed. The great strength
of his study is to illustrate how at the grass roots the construction of French and German
national identities marched in parallel (despite the ideological difference between the
republic and the empire), a finding that is all the more striking in two provinces that
were imagined to exemplify the profound differences between both nations.
Harp has combed regional and national archives, mastered an impressive primary
and secondary literature in French and German, and is deft at placing the nitty-gritty
of regional history within a larger French, German, and European framework. His area
of study—the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine—lends itself well to a comparative history of French and German primary schools and nation building. Ruled
alternately by the French from the late seventeenth century until the Franco-Prussian
war of 1870, then by the Germans from 1870 to 1918, the French again (1918–40),
and the Germans again (1940–44), before finally reverting to France at the end of the
Second World War, the two provinces provide excellent material for comparative histories of France and Germany across a range of domains. In the educational realm,
Alsace and Lorraine boasted high male literacy rates and one of the best primary school
systems in France by the 1830s.
Harp’s approach has limits, however. The comparative angle so well sketched out
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in the preface, the introduction, and an outstanding comparative chapter on the growing
patriotic content of education during the Great War is not always fully substantiated
throughout the book. The two chapters on French administration—one on the years
before 1870 and a second on the interwar years that is remarkable in its brevity (eighteen
pages)—stand in contrast to the five chapters devoted to the period of German rule
from 1870 up to the Great War. Much of this, no doubt, reflects the book’s original
incarnation as a dissertation concerned only with the period of the German annexation.
But this severe imbalance is a pity because it is precisely following Alsace and Lorraine’s reintegration into France after 1918 that some of the central issues that interest
Harp—from nation building to the relationship between language, culture, region, and
nation—are brought into sharpest relief. French administrators harshly imposed the
French language in the primary schools on a population that overwhelmingly spoke
German, and their longer-term objective (achieved only after the Second World War)
was to change radically the linguistic and cultural affiliation of the border provinces’
inhabitants. The Germans, as Harp underlines, understood the relationship between
language, education, and nation in similar terms, but given the fact that the region’s
population already massively spoke German, their undertaking was surely less radical
in nature. And from the perspective of those interested in educational history, the rich
analyses of curriculum, teachers, pupils, and their parents are largely confined to the
period of the Kaiserreich and find little equivalent under French republican rule.
Finally, Harp’s focus on nation building comes at the expense of a more finely
grained comparative analysis of the relationship between regional and national identity.
In the footsteps of Celia Applegate’s work on the Palatinate (A Nation of Provincials:
The German Idea of Heimat [Berkeley, 1990]) and Alon Confino’s study of Württemberg (The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National
Memory, 1871–1918 [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997]), Harp underlines how the multiple
attachments to an Alsatian and Lorrainer Heimat helped local inhabitants both imagine
themselves as part of the nation and attach themselves to it. But he pays little attention
to the fact that under French rule Heimat (la petite patrie) was not a source of allegiance
to the nation; this significant difference suggests that the similarities between French
and German senses of nationhood are perhaps not as marked as Harp would lead us to
believe.
The contested borderland of Alsace-Lorraine, once at the center of polemical and
historical literature in France and Germany, lost its place in the limelight after the
Second World War. Stephen Harp, however, is part of a growing generation of historians who have taken an interest in borderlands as a key site in which to examine the
forging of national identity and to compare educational, social, and political change
from the higher echelons of the administration to the grass roots. Harp’s thoughtprovoking monograph is a fine example of how the history of borderlands can shed
light on larger national and European issues; this is why it should elicit interest well
beyond a small circle of educational historians.
LAIRD BOSWELL
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Domestiquer l’histoire: Ethnologie des monuments historiques. Edited by Daniel
Fabre. Texts collected by Claudie Voisenat. Mission du Patrimoine Ethnologique,
Collection Ethnologie de la France, volume 15.
Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2000. Pp. xⳭ222. Fr 130.
In France, as elsewhere, historical monuments have constituted a well-established,
state-sponsored administrative domain for well over a century. As objects of scholarly
attention, they have long figured as a defining focus for historians of art and architecture, and more recently they have drawn historians interested in commemoration or
collective memory. The essays in this volume aim to define and establish the pertinence
of ethnological approaches by highlighting the inventive, paradoxical ways in which
monuments are collectively conceived and used, especially by the populations living
near them, as well as the social relationships engaged by such thoughts and actions.
As a conveniently concrete locus for the consideration of social uses of the past, historic
monuments are here shown to shed light on the complexities of ongoing identity construction and expressions of power.
The articles included in this volume were originally presented at a seminar on anthropological approaches to historical monuments, coorganized in 1997 by the French
Ministry of Culture’s Ethnological Heritage Delegation (Mission de Patrimoine Ethnologique), the Center for Anthropological Research in Toulouse, and the Ethnographic
Research and Action Group of the Aude (GARAE). The seminar, held near the old city
of Carcassonne, one of the most heavily visited historic monuments in France, brought
anthropologists (and several historians) together with specialists on monuments from
the Ministry of Culture. The resultant collection itself provides a fascinating illustration
of the multiplicity of meanings that can be attributed to historic monuments as well as
some of the jockeying for power and identity that may occur around them.
Daniel Fabre opens the collection by addressing the oddity of juxtaposing historical
monuments and ethnology. His rich and stimulating essay lays out the conceptual and
institutional developments in France over the past several decades that have made it
possible to imagine bringing the two together, and it goes on to offer a research agenda
at this new confluence. In particular, he notes the dramatic expansion—in numbers and
diversity—of objects whose historic value has been officially recognized to merit statesponsored protection as reflections of a collective past. Such attention to a widening
array of ordinary things, usages, and their physical contexts, he argues, is related to
the dominance of Annales history in France since the 1960s and is consistent with the
incorporation of the elastic notion of “historic monuments” into the emergent—and
even vaguer—rubric of patrimoine [heritage]. This move was institutionally marked
in 1980, officially designated in France as the Année du Patrimoine, by the creation of
a Direction du Patrimoine within the French Ministry of Culture. This new office
comprised the well-established agencies long concerned with historic monuments as
well as several newly minted delegations, notably a Mission du Patrimoine Ethnologique (in addition to one concerned with photography and another with industrial heritage).
Fabre sketches the sequence of subsequent attempts by ethnologists to position ethnological expertise within the world of officially sanctioned national history and monument/heritage administration, an endeavor coinciding in time with efforts by many of
the same ethnologists to assert the legitimacy of research in France within the world
of ethnological scholarship. From the outset, ethnologists have insisted on the importance of the intangible dimensions of monumental or patrimonial objects and the value
of situating them within social and symbolic systems of meaning. Initially, ethnological
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expertise in this domain rested on familiarity with the historic (or folkloric) rural lifeways represented by vernacular objects, relevant to their selection, conservation, and
presentation as representative of a collective past. Increasingly, however, the ethnological enterprise in France has shifted to the present, promising insights about the social
dynamics of contemporary populations relevant to their reception or construction of a
shared heritage. With this collection of essays, focusing on the social processes illuminated by historic monuments in contemporary urban as well as rural settings, ethnological knowledge is yet more firmly situated in the present.
The heart of the collection comprises a series of fieldwork-based case studies from
southern France, Italy, and Spain, offering lively documentation of the social processes
by which monuments may inspire indifference as well as celebration, conflict as well
as solidarity. These cases also provide intriguing examples of the coexistence of distinct
“communities of interpretation,” each attributing quite different meanings to a given
monument, the past it represents, and its significance to the present. For instance, S.
Sagnes’s essay on a landmarked church in the Aude department notes the indifference
manifest in published local histories and townspeople’s comments to the building’s
significance to architectural history (for which it was landmarked). She argues that for
local populations its importance is that of a parish church: a locus for marking important
life events of community members and a tangible symbol of a singular collective
identity. The art or architectural historical significance of monuments—as well as their
power to freeze time—are similarly displaced in B. Palumbo’s analysis of the ongoing
social and political cleavage between two parishes in a Sicilian town; here the church
building, ritual objects, and annual ritual associated with each, as well as the history
of conflicts involving these, are deployed to maintain the distinct identities of each
group and the active antagonism between the two. M. Bergues considers another kind
of social cleavage, as well as differing assessments of representations of the past, in
her essay on a rural area in the Dordogne department. On the one hand, newcomers
and vacation-home owners aim to secure their attachment to their adoptive home
through active commitment to the development of sites and activities around local
heritage, but, on the other, local farmers, taking for granted their roots in the area,
consider fixed and romanticized visions of old-fashioned lifeways to be both unappealing and false.
A subsequent section offers multiple approaches to the old city of Carcassonne,
designated a national landmark in 1849 and a world heritage site (UNESCO) in 1997.
M.-G. Colin, its head curator, offers a sketch of the city’s history since its origins in
the Roman empire, ending with a comment on the challenge of simultaneously conserving the important architectural and historical heritage of the site and accommodating the mass tourism it draws. Historical ethnologist J.-P. Piniès challenges this view
of the inherent and self-evident importance of the site, as well as suggesting some of
the political stakes involved in decisions about its management, in his analysis of
shifting official assessments of its value over the first half of the nineteenth century.
He begins with the Napoleonic regime’s decision to dismantle and recycle building
materials once the citadel had outlived its military usefulness, and he ends with its
designation as a national landmark under the July Monarchy and the beginnings of its
restoration by Viollet-le-Duc. C. Amiel’s essay, drawing on interviews with current
residents having long family roots in the old city, is, like those in the previous section,
concerned with the perceptions of those who routinely live with a monument, but her
case is a major site drawing substantial scholarly and touristic attention. She begins by
asking why residents of historic Carcassonne have retained no negative memories of
the displacements caused by turn-of-the-century renovations and then argues that their
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collective identity rests on a conception of the site as a contemporary monument whose
history begins with its renovation, rather than as part of an unbroken chain linked to
the pasts imagined by tourists or scholars.
The final section includes several essays exploring the general significance of historical monuments. O. Poisson, a high civil servant in the Historic Monument administration, notes that although monuments and heritage function to help connect people
to a place, objects recognized as monumental (or patrimonial) are apt to be things that
stand outside of ordinary contemporary life, marking instead a past unambiguously
distinguishable from the present (e.g., Roman ruins, archaic rural objects). This argument offers an interesting way to think about the contrasting conceptions of a given
site discussed in many of the case studies, while these in turn add nuance and flesh to
his formulation.
Fabre ends the volume with a provocative essay that draws on the work of Alois
Riegl to argue that monumentalization—and a fortiori patrimonialization—are symptoms of specifically modern relationships to the past. He thus elaborates a theoretical
justification for the position displayed throughout the volume: that an ethnology of
monuments can (or must) be about life in the contemporary world, rather than about
particular objects or the archaisms they putatively represent. With the exception of
architectural historian J.-M. Leniaud, who uses examples from classical Greece and
Rome to challenge the claim that monumentalizing the past or preserving a collective
heritage is an especially modern impulse, none of the other authors explicitly addresses
this line of argument. Indeed, the striking diversity of monumentalized objects considered here, and the wide range of ways they are shown to be conceived and used, invite
caution about oversimple formulations of the phenomenon.
Nonetheless, this collection effectively redefines—and establishes the interest of—
ethnological approaches to consecrated historical objects. Offering relatively little information about such objects themselves or the officially sanctioned histories they
represent, these case studies instead provide stimulating and empirically well-grounded
illumination of collective uses of the past and of the multiplicity of meanings and social
relationships that can be engaged around things anointed as Historical. This volume
will be especially valuable to those concerned with lieux de mémoire—and what historian can afford not to be?—shown here to be considerably more complex, ambiguous,
and interesting terrain than has often been suggested.
SUSAN CAROL ROGERS
New York University
Macht und Ohnmacht der Verflechtung: Rom und Bologna unter Paul V.
Studien zur Frühneuzeitlichen Mikropolitik im Kirchenstaat. By Nicole
Reinhardt. Frühneuzeit-Forschungen, volume 8. Edited by Peter Blickle et al.
Tübingen: Bibliotheca Academica Verlag, 2000. Pp. 481.
Bologna, one of the loveliest and most interesting cities in Italy—as well as perhaps
the best place outside the Vatican to study the history of the papacy and its territories,
in no small part because of its imposing university library—fortunately does not appear
on many tourist itineraries. Perhaps in consequence, unfortunately, it has not attracted
much attention from scholars. There is certainly nothing like the “myth of Florence”
or the “myth of Venice” that have so captivated Anglo-American historians. This is
apparently solely a function of anglophone ignorance, since Nicole Reinhardt briefly
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discusses a similar myth among Bolognese historians of the libertá di Bologna, which
she interprets as compensation for its loss of communal autonomy. Despite this myth,
she notes that native Bolognese have also neglected the early modern history of their
city. Now, first with Guido Dall’Olio’s Eretici e inquisitori nella Bologna del Cinquecento (Bologna, 1999) and here with this book, that situation is beginning to change.
Reinhardt’s book is a largely unrevised thesis. Submitted to the European University
Institute in Florence, it was written under the direction of Wolfgang Reinhard; Paolo
Prodi, dean of Italian historians of the early modern state, was on the committee. Both
are practitioners of social science history in the grand style, and thus—unsurprisingly—Reinhardt spends a fair amount of time on theory and method. Her introduction
addresses the problem of modernization, discussing Reinhard’s theory of the evolution
of early modern government as well as Prodi’s alternative view of the development of
early modern papal “absolutism.” With commendable independence, Reinhardt largely
rejects both approaches, preferring instead to take off from Reinhard’s more recent
investigation of the mechanisms of clientalism and patronage. She offers a theory that,
rather than acting as agents of change, both mechanisms presented stumbling blocks
to centralization of power in papal hands. Although she necessarily joins the chorus of
criticism of idealist worship of the state as canonized by Hegel, she does not therefore
reject his dialectical method, arguing that patronage relations between Rome and Bologna were doomed to undercut papal centralization of power and that Paul V fully
realized this.
Against Reinhard, Reinhardt argues that the pope’s clientage in Bologna was largely
a consequence of his papacy, not a precondition of it, despite his lengthy earlier tenure
as vice-legate of Bologna. Paul successfully kept the Bolognese away from informal
sources of power in Rome by denying them access to the college of cardinals (he
appointed only one Bolognese cardinal) and, therefore, largely neutralized the institutional strength they enjoyed, given their permanent presence on the Rota. Paradoxically,
perhaps, the great powers in Bologna rarely or never sought papal patronage. Instead,
it was the newcomers, the would-be senatorial families, who approached the pope
successfully. Precisely this success, however, doomed them to a limited role in Bologna, where the two great faction leaders, the Pepoli and the Malvezzi, continued as
much as possible to stay aloof from papal incursions. Nevertheless, in nearly every
important contest, especially over patronage (and in the case of university appointments), the pope usually got his way. Exercising papal power directly was a much
more useful tool than patronage. But as Reinhardt also emphasizes, despite the apparent
lack of interest or downright incompetence of the Bolognese senators, the pope was
far from able to destroy Bolognese autonomy; at least as of 1621, she finds a situation
adequately described by neither “absolutism” nor “autonomy.” She hints—perhaps as
a nod to Reinhard—that, in the long term, the new elite created by papal patronage
identified with the papal state and that this alliance eventually led to its success. But
demonstrating the point would go well beyond the limits of her book, just as it would
undercut her thesis.
Its heart is a study of relations of godparentage employed as a means of uncovering
clientage. Reinhardt is forced to this study in part by limitations of sources: only one
substantial archive of family correspondence survives (the Malvezzi-Campeggi), and
the diplomatic sources she mines in the Vatican are very little help. She also undertook
this approach for reasons of method, since it lends itself readily to network analysis
(the Verflechtung of her title) at the same time as it helps to put a human face on what
can be a very mechanical approach in the hands of some of the sociologists and anthropologists who invented the method. An almost complete set of registers for the city
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of Bologna (but not for the contado) gives her a sample of about six hundred baptisms
between 1589 and 1621. Their analysis reinforces the view of arrivistes attaching themselves to papal families through godparentage, while the grand factions instead maintained their ties to great princely houses, especially the Medici and the Farnese. The
evidence on which this chapter rests appears in appendixes of fifty-six pages, which
amount by themselves to a useful prosopography of the Bolognese elite in the early
seventeenth century, a contribution on a smaller scale like Christoph Weber’s on the
papacy and papal administration in general.
The first part of the book is an institutional portrait of Bologna, especially the workings of the two centers of power—the papal legation and the senate—as well as a
narrative of how the papal legates dealt with their assignments, usually in the absence
of any clear instructions from Rome (a point Reinhardt does not fail to emphasize in
defense of her subordinate thesis that the appearance of papal absolutism may be just
that—appearance and no more). Much similar anecdotal material also appears in the
analytical sections, almost amounting to a history of Bolognese politics in the early
seventeenth century.
Curiously, despite detailed treatment of the legates and the machinery of papal government, one institution is entirely lacking: the Inquisition. It is, of course, not strictly
relevant to Reinhardt’s remit. One suspects, however, as an extrapolation from Gigliola
Fragnito’s work on the congregations of the Index and the Inquisition, that there was
more than a little friction between legate and inquisitor; this would also have helped
to undercut even Paul V’s drive to control.
THOMAS F. MAYER
Augustana College
The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice. By Luca Molà.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pp. xixⳭ457. $48.00.
The title of the book and the author’s stated intention (p. xviii) of “filling the gap in
Venetian historiography” are both far more modest than the actual achievement. To be
sure, Luca Molà is correct that little has been written in the modern era about silk
production in Venice, whereas other sectors of the economy—salt, glass, spices, and
above all banking—are relatively familiar. He also demonstrates that the gap that he
addresses is a major one, as his chosen sector is revealed to have been crucial to the
Venetian economy and fisc. Employers in 1529 claimed that the industry employed
some 25,000 persons, and while this figure surely exaggerates (the entire city population
was only about five times that), it indicates that a large part of the city depended on
silk for a livelihood. To take another index, Molà estimates that the “annual turnover
of the raw silk trade” (p. 305) in the Venetian dominion—and raw silk was but a
portion of the overall industry—nearly equaled the total revenues of the state.
Had Molà only filled that gap, the book would have been useful and a success. He
has, however, accomplished much more. This will be the definitive study of the Venetian silk industry, which, considering that Italy was preeminent in silk production
during the Renaissance (and beyond) and that Venice was one of the very largest
producers of the peninsula, already marks it as a major contribution. (The achievement
is all the more remarkable when one takes into account that the book originated in a
Ph.D. dissertation, which usually produces a far more restricted monograph.) But it
goes beyond that. Molà has worked out some enormously tricky problems regarding
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the materials and processes of production, and his findings will be of great assistance
to all future scholars, Italianists or otherwise. The book’s command of the secondary
literature relating to production throughout (and, occasionally, beyond) Europe is so
thorough that it might serve profitably as a guide to readers interested in the industry
on the continent generally. Additionally, many of the structural issues relating to the
Venetian silk trade were common to other centers; here too the general reader will
profit from a detailed but lucid narrative.
The first section (chaps. 1–2) is the most geographically diffuse, as Molà examines
the spread of the silk industry from a few Italian centers to the peninsula at large and
to the rest of Europe, and looks at the ways in which states attempted to attract and
retain a highly mobile workforce. The second section (chaps. 3–8) is concerned with
the silk industry in Venice proper. Working through the stages of production from
obtaining raw materials to spinning, dyeing, weaving, and marketing, Molà demonstrates a dazzling command of highly complex technical issues of materials and process.
He also forcefully argues that—contrary to repeated but untested assumptions—guilds
and government overseers were not forces for inertia and stagnation, leading in the
long run to a loss of industrial dominance. Rather, producers and Venetian magistrates
proved highly responsive to changing consumer tastes, for example diversifying their
product lines with lighter, cheaper cloths, new hues, and cloths of mixed fibers. They
embraced new techniques—the use of cochineal dyes from the New World, for example—and encouraged technological innovation through the pioneering use of industrial patents. Far from protecting obsolete systems, the government constantly
forced the industry to adapt to others’ innovations in order to protect market share.
The final section (chaps. 9–11) looks at “Venice” in the larger sense, examining silk
production and marketing throughout the Venetian mainland dominion. Here too the
archival research is exhaustive, and Molà’s command of the material is entirely sure.
Here too, as well, there is argued a strong thesis that runs counter to much prevailing
wisdom. In the past it has been maintained that Venetian magistracies were primarily
concerned to protect the home industries, to the point of stunting mainland economies,
or worse—“eviscerate” is one of the verbs applied to the effect of Venetian rule on
local production. On the contrary, says Molà, Venice proved far less protectionist than
other states. Mainland producers (Verona and Vicenza in particular) were allowed to
export silk thread outside the dominion, at relatively low tax rates; there was no demand
that all goods flow through the capital. While in theory the home industry enjoyed a
monopoly on the weaving of velvets and other fine silks, in actuality upper-end production flourished throughout the dominion. In the 1570s, to be sure, Venetian guilds
made a concerted effort to shut down weaving outside the city, but the effects were
only temporary and mainland weavers soon returned to production, tacitly and sometimes explicitly encouraged by Venetian governors.
One might not expect that such a dense, highly technical account would make for a
good read, but it does. Molà’s passion for his subject is palpable, and he soon convinced
this reader not only that the subject matters intensely but that even the smallest details—
especially the details, perhaps—are of urgent importance. Richard Goldthwaite (on the
jacket blurb) is quite right that this is excellent economic history and that it will set
the standard for future studies; it is also unusually engaging.
JAMES S. GRUBB
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
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The Hunchback’s Tailor: Giovanni Giolitti and Liberal Italy from the
Challenge of Mass Politics to the Rise of Fascism, 1882–1922. By Alexander
De Grand. Italian and Italian American Studies. Edited by Spencer M. Di Scala.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001. Pp. xⳭ294. $69.95.
Alexander De Grand’s political biography of Italy’s first “minister of the underworld”
offers an illuminating and original account of parliamentary life during the liberal
period. The Hunchback’s Tailor follows Giovanni Giolitti from his election to the
Chamber of Deputies from his home district of Dronero in 1882, through his five
premierships, to the demise of representative government after Mussolini’s seizure of
power. The book ends with a short but provocative historiographic essay on the interpretations of Giolittian legacy, including the negative verdicts of contemporaries, both
antifascist and fascist, as well as more positive reassessments in the aftermath of World
War II.
Giolitti’s career overlapped the life span of liberalism. He entered the new national
bureaucracy in 1862 at the age of twenty and somehow defied the traditional divisions
in high politics on the peninsula. He worked five years in the Ministry of Justice before
moving on to the Ministry of Finance, where he did duty directly under Quintino Sella
and then Marco Minghetti. If these two leaders of the historic Right sponsored Giolitti’s
initiation into public administration, his tenure in the civil service reached its apex once
the Left took office. Following a brief and bumpy interlude when Agostino Depretis
first became premier, Giolitti got himself appointed secretary-general of the Court of
Accounts, the highest oversight body in Italian officialdom, and finally counselor of
state, a position that made him eligible to stand for parliamentary election. Thus, at the
age of forty, he ran for deputy. He would represent the college of Dronero from 1882
until his death in 1928.
Giolitti began his reign in parliament as a state builder rather than a statesman. In
the Chamber of Deputies, he sounded more like a civil servant than a lawmaker, voting
with the majority on most issues except those dealing with taxes and expenditure. But
his expertise in finance placed him in a unique position during the 1880s, years of
economic crisis and agricultural depression. Francesco Crispi named him minister of
the treasury in 1889, but he resigned the post in 1890 over concerns with the government’s failure to balance the budget. In 1892, the king asked Giolitti to form a cabinet,
with disastrous results. His administration fell eighteen months later amid rumors of
banking scandal, and his political future seemed dead.
This inauspicious start makes Giolitti’s easy preeminence in parliament seven years
later all the more remarkable. He returned to power first in February 1901 as Giuseppe
Zanardelli’s minister of the interior and then in November 1903 as prime minister. He
went on to establish what were to become the hallmarks of the Giolittian “system.” He
made concessions to traditionally disaffected camps in Italian politics in order to consolidate opinion at the polls. He easily cultivated the radicals. He held out an olive
branch to the socialists by insisting on the neutrality of government in labor disputes.
He courted Catholics by letting Zanardelli’s divorce bill die in committee. The election
of Pius X to the throne of Saint Peter signaled a change in the Holy Penitentiary’s
prohibition on voting in national races, so the policy of rapprochement with clerical
moderates delivered concrete results in the 1904 elections. After decades of papal
intransigence, the Roman church no longer sought to undermine the legitimacy of the
liberal state.
Unlike partisan portraits of Giolitti, which paint him either as a cynical manipulator
of single-member constituencies or as the patron of the underprivileged, De Grand’s
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biography describes a fundamentally conservative character, one who believed the system was strong enough to give labor some liberties. Italy’s greatest prime minister after
Cavour arrived on the scene as a civil servant with common sense and a clerk’s concern
for a balanced budget. In opposition, the parliamentarian from Dronero acquired social
vision and legislative experience. As minister of the interior and as premier, he set a
progressive domestic agenda but left the socialists out of the governmental loop. The
economy flourished during the heyday of Giolittismo. Between 1901 and 1910, the
nation saw prodigious industrial growth and enjoyed higher productivity rates than did
Europe as a whole.
After 1911, the year universal manhood suffrage became law and also the year the
government embarked upon war with Turkey, Giolitti became increasingly pessimistic
about the prospects of the liberal regime. He did not attempt to redress regional disparities, adopting different measures for different parts of the country. His hostility to
the piazza increased after 1914, when he withdrew from government. Alien to the new
world of mass parties and public rallies, he returned to power in 1920 only to lose his
majority following the 1921 general elections. Even under the specter of Mussolini’s
dictatorship, Giolitti stayed true to his own construction of the parliamentary state, if
not parliamentary democracy. He delivered his last speech in the chamber on March
16, 1928, the sole deputy to speak out against a fascist law eliminating freedom of
choice at the polls. A bitter man of eighty-six, he died four months later.
An Anglo-American audience will find in De Grand’s biography a great resource on
one of the outstanding statesmen of fin de siècle Europe. Well written and cogently
argued, his book offers a balanced account of the dominant personality behind the
political and administrative apparatus of the liberal state. It integrates new primary
documentation—personal papers and records on the banking scandal, for the most
part—with the standard liberal scholarship on Giolitti available only in Italian.
ALICE A. KELIKIAN
Brandeis University
Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy. By Susan
Zuccotti.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xiiⳭ408. $29.95.
The debate over Pius XII’s “silence” during the Holocaust continues to stir controversy,
producing a steady stream of publications, including several recent bestsellers (John
Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope [New York, 1999]; Garry Wills, Papal Sin [New York, 2000];
James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword [Boston, 2001]). Weighing in on the question of
whether Pius XII did try to save Europe’s Jews from annihilation, Susan Zuccotti
focuses especially on the situation in Italy during the war. If there was one place where
the Pope had the ability to influence both government action and popular perceptions,
it was certainly Italy. Moreover, since not only the Pope and his secretary of state were
Italian but so too were virtually the entire Curia and papal diplomatic corps, the Vatican’s relationship with Italy was like no other in the world.
Zuccotti begins with the well-known fact that Pius XII never spoke out publicly
against the destruction of Europe’s Jews. Indeed, he never publicly uttered the word
“Jew,” nor did he ever identify the Germans as responsible for any crimes against them.
The debate to which this book contributes concerns Pius XII’s defenders’ argument
that his silence was motivated by his desire to protect his vigorous behind-the-scenes
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efforts to save as many Jews as possible. Zuccotti systematically refutes this claim,
demonstrating that the Pope, although the recipient of increasingly desperate pleas that
he take action—not only from Jews but from many Catholic clergy as well—did almost
nothing to save the Jews.
The first chapters of the book offer some historical context by focusing on the Vatican’s views of the Jews in the years leading up to the war. Zuccotti’s main point here
is that antisemitism was deeply rooted in the Vatican. There is little new in this portion
of the book, and there are a few misleading statements. Enrico Rosa, author of a series
of antisemitic articles in La Civiltà Cattolica, is identified twice (pp. 12, 25) as a Jesuit
who was a “regular contributor” (p. 12) to the journal. He was more than that, having
served for sixteen years as the director of the journal. Zuccotti’s characterization of the
close Vatican oversight of the journal as a product of the twentieth century is similarly
misleading, as this oversight began practically with its founding in 1850. Her statement
that Pius XI “asked three Jesuit priests to prepare a document condemning racism”
(p. 32) is also a bit off, as he asked only one, the American John La Farge, and it was
the (antisemitic) head of the Jesuit order who added the other two.
Following this section, the book turns to the war against the Jews in various Catholic
areas of Europe, including those, like Slovakia and Croatia, where priests played a
major governmental role. Here Zuccotti shows that even when various papal nuncios
reported on the shipping of tens of thousands of Jews to their deaths and called on the
Pope to take action, their pleas went unheeded.
This section of the book, together with the discussion of the Pope’s failure to issue
any public protest over the Nazi seizure of a thousand of Rome’s Jews in October 1943
and their deportation to death in Auschwitz, will be of interest to the general reader,
although it adds little to the existing scholarly literature. Where the book does make
an important original contribution is, paradoxically, in establishing the extent and nature of efforts to save Italy’s Jews by Catholic clergy. The French Capuchin priest
Father Marie Benoı̂t, for example, after working on behalf of Jews in France earlier in
1943, came to Rome in June of that year and began working with the Italian Jewish
refugee aid organization, Delasem. Although he contacted Pius XII several times asking
for aid in these efforts, his calls went unanswered. Yet, the Roman Capuchin monastery
became the center of a large clandestine effort to save Jews and helped 4,000 of them
to find hiding places during the Nazi occupation in 1943–44. Similarly, in Turin,
several Catholic groups aided the Jews, including the Salesians, who sheltered scores
of them in their church schools and buildings. A young Dominican priest, Father Giuseppe Girotti, without his superiors’ knowledge, hid many Jews in his monastery.
Arrested in August 1944, he was deported to Dachau, where he was murdered.
The most that can be said for Pius XII, writes Zuccotti, is that he rarely tried to
prevent acts taken on behalf of the Jews by Catholic clergy in Italy. It was not true, as
his defenders have argued, that the Pope sought to shelter Jews in the Vatican itself.
He did not.
To explain his silence, Zuccotti appropriately points to the Pope’s preoccupation
with not offending the Germans or the German government. Not only did Pius XII
retain a fondness for Germany from the dozen years he spent there as a papal nuncio,
but from the very outbreak of the war he also harbored the (in retrospect illusory)
ambition of one day brokering an end to the war. The deal he had in mind would have
prevented Germany’s destruction and thus retained its role as a bulwark against the
church’s primary enemy, Soviet communism.
Zuccotti does more than offer historical analysis, for she also passes moral judgment
throughout the pages of the book. In discussing the Vatican, the Pope, and other church
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institutions, she continuously uses such phrases as “they should have acted vigorously”
(p. 112); “steps he should have taken” (p. 166); and “it should have been the norm
rather than the exception” (p. 201).
For an outstanding historical study of the “silence” of Pius XII, readers of Italian
should consult the newly published book by Giovanni Miccoli, I dilemmi e i silenzi di
Pio XII (Milan, 2000). But for insight into the actions that Catholic clergy did take in
Italy to save the Jews, and the lack of support they received from the Vatican for these
efforts, Under His Very Windows is a valuable addition to the literature.
DAVID I. KERTZER
Brown University
A Bishop’s Tale: Mathias Hovius among His Flock in Seventeenth-Century
Flanders. By Craig Harline and Eddy Put.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, with assistance from the foundation
established in memory of Philip Hamilton McMillan of the Class of 1894, Yale
College, 2000. Pp. xⳭ387. $27.95.
Mathias Hovius was a hardworking churchman of no charisma but great competence.
Son of a lowly fuller, he rose to become archbishop of Mechelen, in the Spanish
Netherlands, from 1596 to 1620. Had the archdiocese commanded a reasonable endowment, someone of higher rank and greater ambition would likely have filled the
post, but in the 1590s Mechelen was still recovering from the Dutch Revolt against
Spain. The town itself had been sacked by English troops in 1580, while scores of rural
churches had been reduced to rubble. The spiritual and institutional devastation of the
Catholic Church was on a similar scale. Hovius, who had escaped the “English Fury”
by hiding in a wardrobe, oversaw the church’s reconstruction and worked to reform it
along Tridentine lines. It was a herculean task, requiring all the steadfast diligence of
a man whose motto was Patience Conquers the Mighty.
This book is less a biography of Hovius than a chronicle of his endeavors as reformer
and rebuilder. It focuses less on the man, who comes across as rather colorless, than
on the world he tried to change, which was anything but. As archbishop, Hovius had
to cope mostly with problems—at least, that is what the surviving records, as reflected
here, mostly document: obstinate heretics, philandering monks, pilfering nuns, rival
schools, stubborn villagers who did not bother with the sacrament of confirmation,
combative canons who fished more than they prayed, impoverished pastors who slept
in churches and let their hens lay eggs on the altars. As Craig Harline and Eddy Put
emphasize, Hovius was “almost always . . . negotiating, not merely imposing” solutions
to these problems (p. 305). Indeed, resolving them required much effort, clever strategizing, and a favorable conjuncture of forces. These did not always come together,
leaving glaring abuses and a frustrated archbishop. However, there were satisfactions
too, such as the saintliness of a gifted boy, the miracles worked by the Virgin on a
distant hill, relics that could be authenticated, and the support Hovius received time
and again from the pious Archdukes Albert and Isabella. Using a prelate as a window
onto contemporary religious life is an unusual and creative strategy, for which the
authors deserve much credit. Although it gives the resulting picture a modest clerical
bias—lay folk appear much less prominently in this “bishop’s tale” than do clergy—
overall the strategy succeeds excellently in offering readers a panoramic view of Catholic religious life in Flanders at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Written in
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lively, clear prose, this book is no microhistory but has some of the qualities of one.
Though a bit long for the purpose, it would serve very well to teach undergraduates.
The book is organized as a series of episodes, each pegged to a specific date, though
the stories often range backward and forward in time. Inevitably, some are more interesting than others, the best of them combining colorful personalities or events with
a wider significance. Hovius’s escape from the English, which opens the book, draws
readers directly into the Dutch Revolt and how individuals experienced it. The rise of
Sharp Hill (Scherpenheuvel), in eastern Brabant, from a local shrine to a major pilgrimage site exemplifies the recasting of old practices that the Catholic/Counter-Reformation so often entailed. Just a stone’s throw from the front line in the war between
Spanish and Dutch forces, it was transformed by princely patronage and a spate of new
miracles into a “‘national’ monument to the Virgin” and “symbol of old faith against
new” (pp. 107, 97). The disruption of a Corpus Christi procession by Protestant sailors
visiting from the republic illustrates the problems that the much longed-for peace between Spain and the Dutch (the Twelve Years’ Truce) paradoxically brought to the
archdiocese. By contrast, the provincial church council held in 1607 was a dull affair.
Its recounting is instructive chiefly in revealing the obstacles the Roman curia, to assert
its supremacy, would throw in the path of reformist bishops. In this case the obstacles
took two forms: the requirement that Rome approve the council’s decisions, and a
rogue priest with powerful friends and the title of papal pronotary. Hovius overcame
the former with a combination of persistence, tact, and well-placed gifts; he dealt with
the latter, Henri Costerius, by having him arrested in the middle of the night and then
compiling a mountain of evidence of his misdeeds. If there was one category of cleric
who caused Hovius the most headaches, however, it was surely canons, as several
stories—colorful, but a bit repetitive—attest.
Aside from a bit of trimming, there are few changes that would have made this
extremely fine book even better. One is the inclusion of more direct quotations from
the authors’ primary sources. The sparseness of such quotations probably contributes
to making the book such an accessible, easy read, but it leaves the reader without much
sense of Hovius’s voice, his use of language, and that of other characters. Given the
broad audience the book is intended—and deserves—to have, it should definitely have
included a fuller explanation of the political structure of the southern Netherlands and
the institutional structure of the archdiocese. The two charts intended to convey this
information are too compressed and difficult to read to be of great use. The book does
provide other good reference materials: a guide to Dutch pronunciation, a glossary of
ecclesiastic terms, and a map. The authors reserve for a postscript their review of the
historiography and an account of the extraordinary challenges they faced in pursuing
their archival research. Thank goodness there are fewer and fewer archivists around
who would menacingly promise, “If you’re good, then you’ll get more” (p. 307)!
BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN
University of Iowa
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Mad for God: Bartolomé Sánchez, the Secret Messiah of Cardenete. By Sara
Tilghman Nalle.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, with assistance from the Program for
Cultural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry of Education and Culture and
United States Universities, 2001. Pp. xⳭ228. $49.50 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).
Cuenca, a small city of undeniably dramatic beauty, also holds the dullest collection
of inquisitorial records in Spain (or so I previously believed). Their very unremarkableness helped give exemplary value to God in La Mancha (Baltimore, 1992), Sarah
Nalle’s earlier study of the Catholic Reformation in the diocese of Cuenca. However,
her new book uses the abundant records of Cuenca’s Holy Office to craft a microhistorical portrait of a remarkable sixteenth-century prisoner, Bartolomé Sanchez. This
rustic “Spanish Menocchio” deployed his homemade resources in a prolonged and
tragicomic standoff with Cuenca’s Inquisitors, who never quite knew what to do with
him.
Sanchez’s case began after he engaged in some bizarre behavior in his village church
at Cardenete in March 1552, inspired by a vision that he interpreted through obsessively
studying his cheap book of hours. When he continued to expound some radically
anticlerical heretical notions, his parish priest finally denounced him to the Inquisition,
and he was arrested a year later. Questioned by Cuenca’s Holy Office, Sanchez claimed
that he was a prophet sent by God to revenge the innocent victims of the Inquisition,
dropping hints that he was nothing less than Elijah reincarnated. After much leisurely
interrogation and a bout of exasperation when he destroyed the religious imagery in
his cell (pp. 87–89), Sanchez was finally sentenced to be burned at an auto-da-fé in
April 1554; but he recanted just before reaching the scaffold and was “reconciled” six
weeks later (p. 108).
After a relatively quiet period in Cuenca, Sanchez returned to Cardenete, where he
burned his penitential sanbenito in April 1556. Now a recidivist, a category that ordinarily generated an automatic death sentence, he was nevertheless allowed to make a
second and transparently insincere retraction at the instigation of a savvy cellmate (p.
122). Cuenca’s inquisitors merely ordered him whipped. After a delay of fifteen
months, during which Sanchez’s case was briefly brought before the Supreme Council
of the Spanish Inquisition (pp. 128–30), Cuenca’s judges ruled Sanchez insane in
August 1558 and arranged his admission to a well-run asylum in distant Zaragoza.
However, he soon escaped back to Cardenete, from which he was promptly shipped
back to Cuenca, where his paper trail finally ends in March 1560 (pp. 161–62).
Madness comprises a major theme within this short book, and here one senses the
fine German hand of Erik Midelfort, prize-winning historian of sixteenth-century madness (A History of Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany [Stanford, Calif., 1999]),
whose department Nalle joined for a year (p. ix). A few years before encountering
Sanchez, Cuenca’s Inquisitors had judged a case both wildly different from and similar
to his: that of an exfriar and hermit, a kind of pı́caro who claimed to have been whipped
by Holy Offices throughout the Iberian peninsula (including Portugal) for proclaiming
himself alternatively as the Messiah, Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, and, for bad measure, Martin Luther. Having no adequate local institution for insane people, they sent
him to an asylum in Toledo (p. 88). Sanchez, in contrast, seemed sane to everyone,
except when he got going on religious themes; at one point, the Inquisitors described
him as “insane and possessed” (p. 136), but demonic possession was not a fashionable
diagnosis in Spain at that time and no one proposed that he be exorcised. As Nalle
astutely notes (p. 143), Sanchez’s most peculiar outbursts tended to come shortly before
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Easter; one might add his burst of sacrilege in his cell before Christmas 1553 as well
as his confident expectation that God would punish the Inquisition for its sins on All
Saints’ Day.
The most important comparison running through Nalle’s book, implicitly and finally
explicitly (pp. 165–66), is with Domenico Scandella, a.k.a. Menocchio, today a kind
of sixteenth-century rustic folk hero on university campuses across America and Europe
thanks to Carlo Ginzburg’s pioneering microhistorical intellectual biography.1 Because
Nalle’s account examines many of the same issues as Ginzburg’s study, it seems fair
to compare these highly original, vehemently anticlerical, and equally loquacious autodidacts, each of whom underwent two trials after being originally denounced by his
village priest. The differences outweigh the very real similarities between them. Although the Spanish Inquisition is conventionally considered far more bloodthirsty than
the Roman Inquisition (and it is beyond doubt that the Spanish tribunal burned at least
ten times as many people), Menocchio was treated far more harshly than Sanchez.
When back with their families in their home villages after their condemnations for
heresy, the Spaniard burned his sanbenito, while the Italian merely left his at home;
but it was Menocchio—considered “almost a heresiarch” at his first trial because he
had one simpleminded follower—who was burned in 1599 as a relapsus, after consultation with the Vatican. In contrast, the Spaniards, including the Supreme Council,
simply wanted Sanchez to disappear when he refused to keep silent about his peculiar
beliefs.
Why was the Cuenca Inquisition so reluctant to punish this relapsed heretic for an
incredible list of heresies, blasphemies, and sacrileges, for which they would have
promptly burned anyone with Jewish or Moslem (or even French) ancestors? Sanchez
was treated so indulgently because he was an “old Christian,” an ordinary rustic with
rudimentary literacy (p. 101) who was ipso facto considered incapable of committing
serious heresy (see p. 94). I am inclined to reverse a phrase in Nalle’s conclusion to
the effect that Cuenca’s Inquisitors “did not believe in Sanchez’s sanity (and therefore
his guilt)” (p. 165). Instead, it was because they, in their enormous condescension,
could not believe in his guilt that they tried so hard to find an excuse to doubt his
sanity. Of course, there may have been several more Bartolomé Sanchezes in early
modern Spain; buried in a footnote (p. 205, n. 7) is the information that almost 5 percent
of the certified madmen in Spain’s largest special institution had been sent there by the
Spanish Inquisition.
WILLIAM MONTER
Northwestern University

Transatlantic Ties in the Spanish Empire: Brihuega, Spain, and Puebla, Mexico,
1560–1620. By Ida Altman.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ254. $45.00.
Brihuega nowadays is a fairly sleepy town near the Madrid-Barcelona highway. Most
Spaniards have heard of it thanks to the battle that took place near there in 1710, which
turned Philippe d’Anjou, the Bourbon candidate for the Spanish throne, into Felipe V.
1
Carlo Ginzburg, Il formaggio ed i vermi (Turin, 1975). Menocchio’s fame multiplied after the
fine English translation by J. and A. Tedeschi, The Cheese and the Worms (Baltimore, 1980).
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During the sixteenth century Brihuega was a medium-sized center of textile production,
with a population of some four thousand inhabitants. Like most such towns in Castile,
it found itself increasingly threatened by a lethal combination of foreign competition
and sluggish local demand. Before lasting decline set in, however, a large number of
townspeople opted to seek their fortunes elsewhere. Amid the flood of sixteenth-century
Spaniards who made their way to the New World, the case of the briocenses who voted
with their feet was exceptional in at least two respects. First was the sheer size of the
outpouring: from 1560 to around 1620 some thousand persons left their town behind,
the vast majority of them for good. Even more striking, however, was the fact that
almost all of the migrants wound up in the same place, in Puebla de los Angeles, a
rapidly growing city founded in the 1530s some seventy miles to the southeast of
Mexico City. The contrast with conditions at home could not be greater, for Puebla
was well on its way to becoming the center of a remarkably dynamic regional economy.
The migrants from Brihuega contributed their share to its development, and before long
their skills and experience helped make it New Spain’s leading textile producer.
Thus the tale Altman tells is not one of the exploits of conquistadores and other
pioneers. Instead, her concern is with the daily routines and aspirations of ordinary
people, and in particular with the causes and consequences of the myriad decisions
they made while adopting new roles far from home, as merchants, slave owners, and
above all as obrajeros, that is, supervisors or proprietors of small-scale textile factories.
Altman reviews virtually all aspects of the migrants’ lives, from their economic activities on both sides of the Atlantic to their religious beliefs, demographic and marital
behavior, and basic norms of social and political organization. To this end she reconstructs detailed stories of a number of migrants and their families. While she expresses
some regret for the necessarily “impressionistic and anecdotal” quality of her discussion
(p. 183), surely more than one reader will applaud the individualizing focus that allows
her to add some new flesh to the old bones of social history. Taken together, this cluster
of biographies shows the briocenses deriving substantial advantage from their opportunities for improvement. Above all, it reveals how they built for themselves lives that
were largely similar to the ones they left behind yet enhanced materially by the resources the empire put at the disposition of those willing to take advantage of their
own hard work, along with that of others.
The extent of Altman’s achievement should be measured not only by its results but
also by taking into account the sources with which she had to wrestle. It is clear that
she has made the best of a bad situation, as relatively few local records from Brihuega
have survived. The absence of municipal, parish, and above all notarial records forced
her to look in other directions, including the Simancas archive, where she found the
only census material from the period. The papers of the Inquisition were especially
useful, providing a wealth of information about the families who were required to turn
in detailed genealogies to accompany their petitions for familiarships and other offices.
Not surprisingly, Puebla produced much thicker documentation, especially in the economic sphere, and Altman puts it to good use as she traces a broad range of continuities
and discontinuities in the lives of common folk grasping for new chances of success
near the outer frontiers of the Spanish world.
When all is said and done, what is new in this book? Many of its findings in regard
to religion, family, and social relations among the briocenses come as little surprise.
Considerably more novel is the chapter on public life, which treats the reader to a view
of local society and politics—especially their conflicts—at the ground level. Altman
suggests that here the emigrants wound up losing, as they were obliged to leave behind
their long-standing if limited participation in parish and municipal politics when they
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moved to the more hierarchical and oligarchical setting of Puebla. She also carefully
documents the existence in Brihuega of tensions between Old Christians and descendents of Jewish converts, tensions that oddly enough may have surfaced as the latter
became more thoroughly integrated in local society. Little is really known of this sort
of micropolitics in early modern Spain and its empire, and even the brief presentation
offered here leads one to question the accepted wisdom regarding the exclusion of the
popular classes from public affairs, especially in Castile. There are, to be sure, matters
left undone. For example, more could have been made of the lack of evidence for
briocenses being active in any particular devotional confraternity in Puebla. When early
modern Spaniards wanted to make a statement about collective identities, they often
did so by founding or reshaping lay brotherhoods. Their failure to do the same in Puebla
may suggest that from the beginning their desire for local integration was stronger than
their willingness to seek institutional means of articulating, much less shoring up, their
ties with their place of origin.
In a fine conclusion, Altman reflects on the two stages of her long-term research on
Spaniards in the New World. In her earlier work on migration from Extremadura, she
focused on its impact on the sending society (see Emigrants and Society: Extremadura
and Spanish America in the Sixteenth Century [Berkeley, 1989]). In Transatlantic Ties,
she has reversed her emphasis, preferring now to observe the emigrants themselves.
The transition is a rewarding one. The many strengths of this level-headed and wellwritten book serve to remind us that, alas, all too rarely historians undertake sustained
research on both sides of the Atlantic. Even less often do they come up with such
impressive results.
JAMES S. AMELANG
Universidad Autónoma, Madrid

The Reformation of the Dead: Death and Ritual in Early Modern Germany,
1450–1700. By Craig M. Koslofsky. Early Modern History: Society and Culture.
Edited by Rab Houston, Edward Muir, and Bob Scribner.
London: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Pp. xiiiⳭ223.
$59.95.
Despite an explosion of interest in “historical thanatology” over recent decades, the
mortuary culture of early modern Germany, unlike that of England, France, or early
America, is still relatively unexplored in English-language scholarship. Craig Koslofsky’s short but assured study of death rituals in Lutheran Germany does a great deal
to remedy that deficiency. As the title suggests, the leitmotiv of his book is the impact
of the Protestant Reformation on society’s ways of handling the dead, and his starting
point is the assertion (arguable but admissible) that “the Reformation transformed the
funeral more profoundly than any other ritual of the traditional Church” (p. 2). Nonetheless, this is far from being a narrow study of doctrinal and liturgical reform. Although
Koslofsky gives a clear and convincing account of the thought of Luther and other
reformers on these issues, he is critical of French historiography (as exemplified by
Michel Vovelle and Philippe Ariès) for focusing rather artificially upon “attitudes towards death” and for showing insufficient awareness that “the history of death in early
modern Europe is never a history of death alone” (p. 155). Since death (like age or
gender) can be considered a social construct (albeit one with a biological root), it
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follows that its performance and meanings cannot be divorced from wider social and
cultural themes.
The conceptual and methodological underpinning of the book is candidly confessed
at the outset. It takes its bearings from ethnographic and anthropological studies of
death rituals, especially those of Robert Hertz and Arnold van Gennep, and applies the
insights of these pioneers through the more recent prism of “practice theory” to get at
issues of change as well as structure. Death ritual represents not merely a declaration
of the social order but also a potential reordering—as Koslofsky wittily puts it, “liminality is opportunity” (p. 8)—and conflict and appropriation are recurrent themes of
the narrative. In general the theoretical ballast is applied with a light touch, though in
places it can seem to overbalance the evidence. In line with the Hertzian dictum that
the understanding of death depends upon identifying the interconnectedness of opposing pairs of concepts (body-soul; individual-community; living-dead), Koslofsky pays
considerable attention to a dual separation of the living from the dead as a consequence
of the Reformation: a spiritual separation as intercessory prayers were abandoned, and
a physical separation as the location of burial was increasingly shifted from church and
churchyard to new extramural cemeteries. This parallel distancing of bodies and souls
is regarded as “an essential cultural precondition of the German Reformation as well
as one of its most profound consequences” (p. 41). Yet it is by no means clear that the
relocation of burial sites was a necessary corollary of Protestant reform: it took place
on a distinctly limited scale in England, for example, and even in Germany was an
exclusively urban phenomenon. Certainly, Luther regarded extramural burial as biblical, but, as Koslofsky himself has to admit, the official rationale for closing traditional
graveyards was always on public health grounds rather than theological ones (the foul
airs they exuded were believed to exacerbate the plague), and the process was already
well established before the Reformation as a consequence of fifteenth-century demographic growth.
More persuasive is the reading of Lutheran funerals as sites of social and political
capital and exchange. There is a useful account of the restructuring of the traditional
funeral order to reflect the perceived needs of the community rather than those of the
dead, with the funeral sermon increasingly coming to define the event as a religious
and social ritual (though why funeral sermons were so much more a feature of the
Lutheran than of the Reformed Protestant world remains something of a mystery). In
the later seventeenth century the funeral was transformed again by the increasing popularity of the nocturnal burial (Beisetzung). Initially a shameful proceeding, which like
other forms of “dishonourable burial” functioned as an instrument of social discipline,
nighttime burial was increasingly taken up by the elites, to the chagrin of clerics losing
the opportunity for instructive (and lucrative) sermonizing. By the early eighteenth
century the Beisetzung had become normative. Koslofsky sees in the development a
reaction to excessive cost which could simultaneously remain a badge of social distinction, as well as the influence of pietism, and (more speculatively) a baroque fascination with the cultural possibilities of the night (as exemplified elsewhere in firework
displays and the court festivals of Louis XIV). It was also a decisive move from public
to private. Depopularized and declericalized, the funeral was on its way to becoming
a family rather than community affair. Here the argument might have followed its own
strictures and asked more directly if this was linked to a wider movement to social
exclusivity on the part of elites, for example in the withdrawal from participation in
popular festivity posited by Peter Burke. Alongside the narrative of the “rise and fall”
of the Lutheran funeral, Koslofsky offers an exciting analysis of its potential for expressing and engendering conflict, particularly in his account of the parody and inver-
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sion practiced by the crowd at the 1592 funeral of Christian Schütz, a crypto-Calvinist
minister in Electoral Saxony whose interment was caught up in a wave of popular antiCalvinism after the death of Christian I. There is a danger of overreading such cases:
the fact that one of the female mourners was attacked by a boy with a dirty broom may
or may not represent a specifically gendered symbolic enactment of pollution and purification, but there is no dissenting from the overall conclusion that “the liminal periods
created by religious ritual represented and reconstructed the social order, and were thus
seized upon as opportunities for religious violence” (p. 132).
One might wish that the book had more to say about commemoration, about the
practices and beliefs of the people as opposed to the elites, and about the deep underlying continuities in mortuary culture which undoubtedly ran across the Reformation
divide. But there is no need to close on a negative note. Koslofsky has produced a
book which is engagingly written and of interest to scholars across a wide range of
specialisms. At a time when cultural historians are increasingly taking their bearings
from literary theory rather than from social anthropology, he demonstrates that paradigms derived from the latter can still be deployed to produce fruitful and imaginative
results.
PETER MARSHALL
University of Warwick
Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus und die “Macht des Volkes”: Civile
Ordnungsformationen und kommunale Leitbilder politischer Partizipation in
den deutschen Staaten vom Ende des 18. bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts.
By Ralf Pröve. Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte,
volume 159.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000. Pp. 580. DM 116.
Scholarly interest in republicanism as an intellectual tradition and as a political movement has reached German historiography in the last decade. Looking over the largely
monarchical political landscape of the Holy Roman Empire and the German nineteenth
century, historians have tended to see republicanism in central Europe as a municipal
phenomenon—certainly in the autonomous city-states, such as Frankfurt, Hamburg,
and Bremen, but also in the many cities subject to the rule of a prince. The nature and
origins of this republicanism have remained in dispute. Sometimes it is seen in the
context of a clash between princely authority and corporate, urban institutions running
from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Other authors emphasize the revival
of the republican traditions of classical antiquity, along the lines of J. G. A. Pocock’s
“Machiavellian moment.” Still others point to the importance of the Jacobin tradition,
stemming from the French Revolution.
Ralf Pröve’s study of republicanism in Germany obtains its focus through its temporal, spatial, and topical emphases. Pröve’s work covers the years 1780–1850, following Reinhart Koselleck in seeing these decades as a period of conceptual transformation in which the intellectual world of the old regime gave way to that of modernity.
In selecting a region from the socially and politically heterogeneous German landscape,
Pröve turns from the southwest, focus of many studies of republicanism, to the north
and east. His work discusses in detail the Mark Brandenburg and the Principality of
Hessen, with briefer looks at Thuringia and Mecklenburg. Finally, and most importantly, Pröve quite properly observes that the armed, male citizen, defending his rights,
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weapon in hand, was central to all versions of republicanism. His study is therefore an
investigation of such armed corps—militias, or civic and national guards—as a way
to understand both the theory and practice of republicanism.
Pröve analyzes the intellectual debate on arming the population, beginning with
eighteenth-century Enlightenment critiques of the mercenary armies of the absolutist
monarchs. He brings out the transforming effect of the French Revolution and its wars
that spurred the debate about popular armed formations, both in imitation of the revolution and in opposition to it. This debate reached its peak at the time of the uprisings
against Napoleonic rule in 1813. During the Restoration, interest in militias became
intertwined with liberal demands for a constitution, a connection further developed in
the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.
The author then moves from the debate over armed formations to their actual creation
and activities. He starts with a little-known incident, Napoleon’s organization of a
municipal watch corps in French-occupied Berlin in 1807, and shows how the various
forms of militias founded by the Prussian reformers, for all their anti-Napoleonic intent,
made use of and expanded on Napoleon’s initiatives. Intensive studies of the civic
guard in the 1830 revolution and subsequent constitutional conflict in the Principality
of Hessen and of civic guards in several German states during the 1848 revolution
round out the book.
Pröve sees these armed corps as central to the republican ideals of universal political
participation and individual devotion to the common good and as an important vehicle
for the transformation of old regime municipal republicanism into early nineteenthcentury liberalism. The militias encompassed virtually the entire municipal citizenry—
even day laborers could be included, insofar as they were heads of household—but
their internal structure reflected social hierarchy. Guard members invariably elected the
town notables as their commanding officers, reserving lower-ranking and noncommissioned officer positions for smaller businessmen or master craftsmen.
This leading role for the notables represented a sharp change from the town watches
of the eighteenth century. Then, every effort was made to fob off participation onto
members of the very lowest classes. Following the upheaval of the French Revolutionary era, it became a badge of honor for the municipal elites to participate in leading
roles. Pröve regards these armed corps as the most widespread and significant instance
of political participation in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century.
Enlisting all adult male heads of household, the guards exemplified pre-1850 German
liberal societal ideals; their actions in support of constitutional government reflected
liberal political ideas as well, which thus appear as somewhat transformed versions of
a republican tradition with multiple origins.
The book is well written and generally convincing. At times, its scholarly apparatus
seems a bit disproportionate to its empirical investigation. (Does the work really need
to begin with a ninety-five-page-long review of the literature?) Such features reflect
both the culture of German academia and the economics of German scholarly publishing. However, in spite of the work’s considerable extent, there were two areas where
I felt that the author might have had more to say.
One such area is the gender dimension of his subject. Long neglected in German
historiography, gender ideals and gender relations have enjoyed a growing interest in
recent years. Pröve, however, does not address them in his study, although they seem
very relevant to his work. The members of the armed formations under study were all
armed men. Qualification for service involved being a patriarchal head of household,
a general precondition of citizenship both in the republican tradition and in at least one
important version of early nineteenth-century German liberalism. There was clearly an
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ideal of manhood or of masculinity involved in the collective bearing of arms and the
elaborate ritual culture of parades and celebrations surrounding it.
A second problem of the book involves the two separate tracks of the author’s
investigation: his studies of the contemporary intellectual debate about armed formations and of the actual practice of these groups. While armed formations may have
been in theory a central feature of republican and early liberal ideals, their practice
often looked quite different. Pröve documents, in quite interesting detail, the frequent
incompetence and dereliction of duty of members of the guards, their heavy drinking
while on duty, their preference for display and parades over the preservation of public
order, and the increasing reluctance of the small-town burghers of central and northern
Germany to serve in these corps after a brief period of initial enthusiasm. Such circumstances do not exactly provide evidence for the role of militias as vehicles of political
participation and public spiritedness.
Yet even granting these criticisms, this book remains an important work. It offers
another demonstration of the significance of the republican tradition in central Europe
and its gradual transformation into nineteenth-century liberal and democratic ideals.
The book underscores the importance of militias in moments of political crisis in Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century and shows the important role they
played in public life.
JONATHAN SPERBER
University of Missouri, Columbia
Adel und Revolution in Böhmen: Strukturwandel von Herrschaft und
Gesellschaft in Österreich um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. By Ralph
Melville. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz,
volume 95. Edited by Heinz Duchhardt.
Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1998. Pp. viiiⳭ394. DM 88.
Much of the historiography on the Habsburg monarchy of the nineteenth century has
focused on the rise of nationalism and on national movements as essentially bourgeois
phenomena. In addition, historians have tended to bundle the rise of the bourgeoisie
with the fall of the high aristocracy, the success of the former inevitably signifying the
doom of the latter. The practical effect of this causal equation has been to obscure the
continued power, influence, and social place of the old aristocracy. Ralph Melville’s
excellent book, Adel und Revolution in Böhmen, is a major contribution to the scholarship on the Habsburg Vormärz, or “Pre-March,” and a long overdue study of the
place of the Bohemian aristocracy in the critical transition to modern political and
economic life. The purpose of Melville’s study is to examine the connections between
landholding, local administration, and political activity. This approach allows him to
bring his considerable evidence to bear on larger questions such as the impact of political, economic, and social modernization; the roots and consequences for regional
differences in the Habsburg monarchy; the nature of reform programs; and the outbreak
and defeat of revolution. By questioning the overwhelming attention focused on the
“liberal-bourgeois ascendancy” in the pre-March years and looking in depth at the
varied political reforms advocated by members of the Estates opposition in the 1840s,
Melville’s work serves as a significant contribution to the debate on the role of class
and the national movements in the causes and outcomes of the Bohemian revolution
of 1848.
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Beginning with an in-depth analysis of the structure of landholding within different
regions of the monarchy, Melville presents a distinct picture of the “world of lordship”
and the power of the landed class, as well as of regional differences among nonHungarian Habsburg lands. What emerges from this study is the degree to which Bohemia was unique in the structure and nature of its landholding and lordship. Melville
rightly takes issue with the idea of the world of lordship as a world in decline, particularly in relation to Bohemia, and with arguments based on the notion that landholding and lordship were corroded from within by the conflict between the structure
of Grundherrschaft (feudal lordship) and the demands placed on the agrarian economy
by the modern state and modern economic development.
Melville’s portrait of Bohemian landholding and lordship reveals the degree to which
Bohemian Grundherrschaft, in comparison with that of other provinces or regions, was
dominated by a type of holding that was large, cohesive, productive, and directly farmed
by the owner. While this conclusion in and of itself is not new, he paints a picture of
Bohemian lordship and land management that is more vibrant, rational, and modernizing (if not yet modern) than has generally been supposed. Rather than focusing on
the continued status of peasants as serfs owing labor or robot, Melville points to the
revisions that had taken place vis-à-vis labor contracts in practice, and, like Herman
Freudenberger (“Industrialization in Bohemia and Moravia,” Journal of Central European Affairs 19 [1960]: 347–56, and “Progressive Bohemian and Moravian Aristocracy,” in Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria
Theresa to World War I, ed. Stanley Winters and Joseph Held [New York, 1975], pp.
115–30), he discusses the significant role played by the large Bohemian estates in
industrialization and improved agricultural techniques. More critical for his argument,
and more relevant to the rest of the book, is Melville’s conclusion that the size, coherence, and productivity of Bohemian estates contributed directly to preserving the
role of manorial/patrimonial administration and by extension the power of the nobility.
As Melville convincingly argues, the “world” of the manorial subject was encompassed
by the estate, at least in legal and administrative terms, which meant that the borders
of estates were remarkably coterminous with local administrative units and institutions.
In his view, the preservation of local control in administration was central to the ability
of the aristocracy to retain a considerable measure of power, and in fact it formed the
basis for the opposition of the aristocracy to the government. Thus, whereas peasants’
labor obligations may have been negotiable, challenging the patrimonial hold on local
administration was not; it was this fundamental question of local administrative control
around which various reform agendas in the Vormärz emerged and on which the aristocratic “participation” in the revolution faltered.
In order to elucidate the various connections between landholding, local power, and
the role of the aristocracy in the revolution in 1848, Melville moves away from the
local level for most of the book, extrapolating from local conditions to the politics of
reform and of the Diet. In order to do so, he devotes considerable attention to the
careers and political agendas of a number of aristocrats, particularly Count Leo Thun
and Count Franz Stadion. These individuals, in both their political activities and their
positions, are illustrative of the permutations of reform advocated in the Vormärz and
ultimately enacted (or rejected) during and in the aftermath of the revolution. Melville’s
chapter on Count Leo Thun, who as Governor of Bohemia was the highest official in
the Bohemian administration during the revolution, is particularly informative. Thun
has been one of the figures nearly universally reviled for his role in 1848, and he held
a number of views which seem on first glance to be difficult to reconcile: long-standing
outspoken support for the Czech national movement, resolute adherence to traditional
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aristocratic administration, and apparent support for a new administrative order. Melville’s argument suggests that it is easier to understand the course of the revolution
(not to mention Thun’s career) if one keeps in mind the nature of local administrative
power. Ultimately Thun—and arguably the aristocracy more broadly—was defeated
in Prague not by the military, the Czech national movement as such, or the Viennese
government, but by his own political views.
By basing his discussion on the question of administrative reform and the role of
the Estates (i.e., the landowners) in administration, Melville’s work untangles the different strands of the revolution—class, nation, military, ideology. Connecting the structure of landholding, and all that land tenure and patrimonial administration meant in
terms of local power and provincial political activity, Melville greatly improves our
understanding of the nature of political opposition in the Vormärz, of the role of the
aristocracy in the revolution itself, and of the connection between political opposition
and the national movement. It is in relation to this last issue that the national question
appears. In Melville’s view, in addition to the obvious consequences of the brutal
suppression of the revolution in June 1848, it was precisely the attempts by powerful
aristocrats to preserve their prerogatives in local administration that were the source of
much of the “anti-feudal” rhetoric of the national awakeners and that explain the inability of the elites to reach a “revolutionary” understanding with bourgeois representatives of the national movement. As he notes, by refusing to see the rights of the Czech
people, as evidenced by the nobles’ struggle to maintain local power, bourgeois proponents of the national movement effectively excised the nobility from the national
community. As Melville himself describes, the historiography of the nobility in this
period and this part of the monarchy is particularly thin. He can congratulate himself
that, with this book, it is considerably less so.
RITA KRUEGER
European University Institute
Museums in the German Art World from the End of the Old Regime to the
Rise of Modernism. By James J. Sheehan.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiiiⳭ258. $35.00.
Museums and Memory. Edited by Susan A. Crane. Cultural Sitings. Edited by
Elazar Barkan.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ257. $55.00 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).
On the basis of a generation of critical scholarship, museums have come to occupy a
crucial intersection for interdisciplinary cultural studies, one befitting their recognized
centrality to relations of power and knowledge. The defining texts in the study of
museums have, with few exceptions, been collections of essays by scholars in a variety
of fields: art history, anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and area studies, as
well as history—for example, Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material
Culture, edited by George Stocking (Madison, Wis., 1985); Exhibiting Cultures: The
Poetics and Politics of Museum Display, edited by Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (Washington, D.C., 1991); and The New Museology, edited by Peter Vergo (London, 1989).
Nor has the pattern greatly changed. Thus, in the field of critical museum studies with
which both these books identify themselves, Susan Crane’s speculative, theoretically
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informed, and somewhat heterogeneous collection seems much more familiar than
James Sheehan’s focused, comprehensive, altogether more traditional monograph. Considering the two together enables an assessment of the distinctive contributions of these
different scholarly genres. The fact that half the essays in Crane’s volume either concern
Germany or are informed by the author’s knowledge of German history facilitates the
comparison.
Examining the period from the beginnings of public museums to World War I,
Sheehan aims to place German art museums in their historical context, with special
attention to aesthetic theory and artistic practice. The book moves chronologically,
with chapters devoted to the eighteenth-century background, the “age of revolution”
(1789–1830), the high point of the nineteenth-century museum boom (to 1880), and
the period from 1880 to 1914, which Sheehan associates with modernism. His compass
includes all of modern Germany, with a brief excursion to Vienna to discuss the design
of the Kunsthistorisches Museum, but he pays special attention to the major German
art centers of the nineteenth century, Berlin and Munich. The book traces the evolution
of museums from royal collections open to the genteel public, to showcases for works
from classical antiquity and Renaissance painting (the traditions deemed most likely
to improve citizens’ morals), to more diverse and practical institutions with a generous
representation of modern art and national traditions. Sheehan largely succeeds in his
goal of relating the development of museums to the broader canvas of German history.
He notes, for example, that well into the nineteenth century princely courts retained
considerable influence over the construction and funding of museums as well as their
collecting and exhibition policies. Only in the 1870s and 1880s did academically trained
experts begin to replace courtiers and well-connected artists as curators; at the same
time, in most of the German states, supervisory responsibility for museums devolved
from courts onto government agencies.
Museum collections nevertheless remained the property, often personal, of the
prince, and throughout the nineteenth century they served to promote dynastic glory,
even as they increasingly catered to the desire of the upper-middle classes to proclaim
their elite status through Bildung, or culture. A keen awareness of the tension created
by these multiple roles, and of a number of others, runs through Sheehan’s book. Were
museums designed primarily to instruct or to provide aesthetic pleasure? If most museum administrators could agree on the compatibility of these aims, the question remained of what kind of instruction they should offer and for whom: a narrative of the
history of art for the bourgeoisie? Or a general course in taste for craftsmen? Such
debates obviously had a crucial bearing on the arrangement of works of art in the
galleries, which until quite late in the nineteenth century tended to follow fairly rigid
chronological schemas and divisions by national school. But they also involved what
Sheehan describes as a tension within historicism between an enabling sense of connection with the past and a more melancholy strand that foresaw the fading of present
glories (p. 87). This dialogue in turn led to questions about the place of the present in
the history of art. Although the creation of a National Gallery in Berlin to showcase
modern German art emerged from strong public interest in the 1850s, the proper character of such a museum remained controversial, leading to a famous 1899 confrontation
between Emperor William II and the museum’s director, Hugo von Tschudi, over the
latter’s weeding out and reinstallation of the collection along international modernist
lines.
Each of Sheehan’s chapters follows the same tripartite structure, beginning with a
discussion of theories of aesthetics and conceptions of the role of art and of museums,
continuing with a section on museums as institutions, including issues of collecting,
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leadership, and public response, and concluding with a discussion of museum architecture. Although this approach affords the analysis continuity, it also leads to a certain
predictability. Notwithstanding Sheehan’s assertion that the book seeks “to demonstrate
how these ideas, institutions, and structures worked together” (p. xii), the organization
sometimes conveys the impression that museums simply emerge from and respond,
largely passively, to particular complexes of ideas, and that museum buildings then
express these museological conceptions. This is in part a consequence of the focus of
the first sections on the aesthetic ideas of leading thinkers, notably Immanuel Kant,
G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. With the possible exception of Karl Friedrich
Schinkel, the curators and architects discussed in subsequent sections cannot live up
to these formidable opening acts.
Yet as some of the contributors to Crane’s collection argue, museums played an
active, even transformative role not only in political controversy but also in epistemic
disputes crucial to the ways scholars think and write about culture even today. In her
essay “The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in the German Museums,” Suzanne
Marchand persuasively argues that in the late nineteenth century, German museums,
as the institutional focus of disciplines challenging the primacy of textual over material
evidence in the study of culture, “helped to launch a critical attack on humanist scholarship” (p. 180). In “The Museum’s Discourse on Art: The Formation of Curatorial
Art History in Turn-of-the-Century Berlin,” Alexis Joachimides traces the development
of a serious rift in art history between university-based scholars and curators. Sheehan
depicts the relationship between the emerging field of academic art history and curatorship as a harmonious one, at one point using the term “elective affinity” (p. 91), but
Joachimides portrays it as both publicly and personally contentious. From Wilhelm
von Bode to Max Friedländer, curators believed that art history had to concern itself
with questions of authorship and attribution, the central issues of connoisseurship,
whereas even the academic art historians we now associate with formalism, such as
Heinrich Wölfflin, were interested in more abstract categories, visual laws, and culture
on a larger scale. Both Marchand and Joachimides, moreover, place these developments
in a larger historical context, including criticism of the classically based Gymnasium
system by frustrated members of the middle classes, the expansion of fields like historical geography that staked a claim to German presence on the world stage, the
pressures of the art market, and both domestic and international politics. Sheehan’s
analysis tends to elide these kinds of connections into general discussions of the Zeitgeist.
Crane’s opening essay helpfully sets out the larger theoretical stakes of her collection.
The insight that museums construct narratives to impose order on the creation of cultural meaning is not new; the contribution of this volume is to consider that process
through the lens of memory, both individual and collective. As Crane writes, “the
‘fixing’ of memory in the museum constitutes an apparent permanence of the recollected, organized in static time and space. Memory of cultures, nature, and nations is
set to trigger memory in and for multiple, diverse collectives” (p. 3). Topics include
the silences about the Japanese past of photographic exhibitions in 1990s Tokyo (Julia
Adeney Thomas), the importance of memory in the birth of the museum in Renaissance
Europe (Paula Findlen), the appropriation of the imperial Chinese past in the Forbidden
City (Tamara Hamlish), and the reactions of Native Americans to Euro-American ethnographic exhibitions of their culture (Diana Drake Wilson); all share a critical approach to their subjects and a questioning of the narratives promulgated by the museums
they study. Of particular interest to readers of Sheehan will be an essay by Michael
Fehr, director of the Karl Ernst Osthaus Museum of Hagen. This museum occupies the
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building commissioned by Osthaus at the turn of the century as the Folkwang Museum;
in a brief discussion, Sheehan rightly presents it as one of the first museums in Germany
to offer, in an interior designed by the Belgian art nouveau architect Henry van de
Velde, a total aesthetic experience of modernism. Sheehan notes that the city of Hagen
never really appreciated Osthaus’s patronage, and after his death in 1921 it sold off
most of his collection to Essen. From Fehr we learn that the building survived and that
since his arrival in 1987 it has served as a kind of “ironic museum.” Featuring changing
works of installation art, the museum confronts visitors with the institution’s complex
and in many ways painful past.
To the extent that Fehr’s installations, and those of visiting artists, involve falsified
or fictive labels (calling original works copies, for example, or inventing a history for
a series of oil paintings of the pre-1920 Folkwang Museum that Fehr himself commissioned), they follow criteria of truthfulness quite distinct from those of professional
historians. Fehr cites as inspiration the Museum of Jurassic Technology (MJT) in Los
Angeles, a real space with exhibits invoking fictional people and events. In a ruminative
essay on museums and narrative, Crane casts the MJT as a kind of modern cabinet of
curiosity, one that takes as its primary object the norms and procedures of the museum
itself. Like Fehr, she finds that “an artist mode” (p. 42) of museological production
can free both the institution and its visitors from some of the constraints of its conventional procedures. Like the critic Wolfgang Ernst, whose contribution, “Archi(ve)textures of Museology,” consists of a series of disconnected aperçus, she considers narrative temporalization one of the most powerful of the ordering structures of
the museum, an Enlightenment imposition on the more disparate stories attached to
curiosities. Indeed, for Ernst, the very notion of historical progress that informs the
arrangement of Sheehan’s book “was an effect of such museal staging and framing”
(p. 20). The narratives with which museums surround objects create an illusion of direct
dialogue between the visitor and the past; like many scholars over the past twenty
years, Ernst calls on museums to be more open and reflective in their relations with
the public. He would presumably sympathize with Fehr’s argument for presenting
museums to the public as “spaces that present the fiction we require to find our bearings
in the world” (p. 59).
Ultimately these two books will probably find different audiences. In his very brevity,
Sheehan clearly aims at students in general courses in modern German and European
history, and this book will certainly enrich them. The Crane volume, meanwhile, will
find a home in more advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on a broad range
of topics in cultural studies. Ideally, however, they would be read together, for their
distinct qualities and revealing methodological differences have the potential to further
necessary dialogue between historians and theorists of culture.
DANIEL J. SHERMAN
University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds. By
Mark Cornwall.
London: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Pp. xviⳭ485.
$69.95.
From the war’s opening moments the combatant nations in World War I waged an
unprecedented propaganda campaign to influence opinion at home and abroad. But not
until 1917 did “front propaganda”—the deliberate use of subversive and novel infor-
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mation as a military weapon—became a distinct feature of the fighting. Such propaganda sought to create morale problems, promote desertions, and weaken unit cohesion.
Used gingerly by the Germans and Austro-Hungarians against Russia after the fall of
the tsar, front propaganda meshed with Bolshevik appeals and appeared to accelerate
the collapse of Russian military units. After this success, Austria-Hungary would employ it against Serbian forces in exile, with modest results, and against Italy with more
success in the first weeks after the Italian defeat at Caporetto in late 1917. Prodded by
the British, the Italian leadership would regroup and launch their own front propaganda
against the more susceptible Habsburg monarchy in 1918. The net result, as Mark
Cornwall’s monumental study shows, contributed substantially to the eventual undermining of Austria-Hungary. Italy was, in the end, no longer the “least of the great
powers.”
Cornwall explores for the first time how the military leadership viewed front propaganda. If most generals looked askance at this “ungentlemanly” weapon, army intelligence chiefs soon realized its value and would usually control its operation. The
army leaders also came to realize that the living conditions of their troops could affect
their ability to resist such propaganda. In the Habsburg case growing food shortages
at the front coupled with news of political radicalization at home would erode troop
strength. Nor was the Austrian High Command (the AOK) unaware of the need to
combat the appeal of the propaganda. But its efforts toward “patriotic instruction” were
doomed to failure—too little, too late, and with no convincing message to the nationalities against the increasingly sophisticated Italian efforts.
The author, drawing upon archival and research sources in ten languages, does more
than just analyze the operation of front propaganda. Seeking to revise the traditional
kudos given to Lord Northcliffe and British propaganda operations at Crewe House,
Cornwall shows that first Vienna and then Rome grasped far more quickly than the
British the utility of front propaganda as a war weapon. At the same time he examines
in extraordinary detail the Italian political scene, in which leaders such as Luigi Albertini and his newspaper, Corriere della Sera, sought to push the Italian foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, into a propaganda campaign against the Habsburg monarchy.
Sonnino steadfastly refused, fearing that such a campaign would assist the Yugoslav
cause and thus rob him of the chance to gain Dalmatia as promised by the Treaty of
London of 1915. Even Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, who gave some credence to
the campaign and backed its operators in repeated confrontations with Sonnino, always
hedged his public statements. This political ambivalence deprived the Italian propaganda effort of its most formidable weapon—a direct appeal to South Slav troops in
the Habsburg units to defect and bring about a united Yugoslavia.
Not surprisingly, the British attempted to change Italian attitudes about this, with
the journalist Henry Wickham Steed of Crewe House pressuring Rome at least to back
the Czech cause and, eventually, the creation of a Czech Legion to fight against Habsburg forces. But there would be no comparable South Slav unit.
The success of the Italian operations, which Cornwall is careful not to overstress,
owed much to the monarchy’s situation in 1917 and 1918. The death of Emperor Franz
Joseph, limited internal liberalization, the reconvening of the Austrian Reichsrat, food
shortages, the example of the Russian collapse, and America’s entry into the war all
combined to create fertile conditions for Italian front propaganda. But this only happened after General Pietro Badoglio had replaced Luigi Cadorna as chief of staff and
after British pressure had led to the creation of a Padua Commission to coordinate the
efforts. The campaign was helped by the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities
in early 1918 and later by the American-British pledge to destroy the Habsburg monarchy. These steps were certain to offer inducements to the disaffected nationalities to
leave the war effort.
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Although handicapped by the Yugoslav issue, the Padua group produced thousands
of leaflets, many dropped from the air into Habsburg ranks. A quick example suffices:
from mid-June to mid-September 1918 the commission produced 375 separate manifestos, each drawing upon a different nationality theme but with one common refrain
for the Habsburg soldier: why continue fighting? From midsummer until early October
desertions and illnesses reduced Habsburg troops on the Italian front from 650,000 to
400,000 men. By the time the Italians won the battle of Vittorio Veneto, the Habsburg
army was a pale shadow of its former self.
The most spectacular Italian propaganda activity, however, came on August 9, 1918,
when Gabriele d’Annunzio led a squadron of Italian planes over Vienna, dropping
specially crafted messages calling upon the Viennese to end the war. Not only did the
flight reveal the vulnerability of the capital, it also served as a painful reminder that
the Habsburg’s erstwhile prewar ally, Italy, could manage to avenge the humiliations
of the earlier Iszono campaigns.
Cornwall carefully notes the circumstances that made front propaganda a weapon of
modern warfare. Increasing literacy among troops played a role; clever use of domestic
newspaper quotes in manifestos played a role; and airplanes to deliver the messages
that ensured that front propaganda would not be a matter for the trenches alone were
also involved. Nor does he ignore the more prosaic and more familiar front-line efforts
to encourage defectors from the other side, a tactic in which the Italians were increasingly successful in those units containing sizable numbers of Czech soldiers.
Deftly using archival sources from six countries, Cornwall has reconstructed and
revised our knowledge of a hitherto neglected aspect of the campaign against AustriaHungary. He provides a necessary corrective to the usual emphasis on British propaganda efforts in the First World War, an assessment the postwar Austrian and German
generals reinforced since it was more flattering to them to credit London rather than
Rome with this success. Even if Sonnino blocked a major campaign, the Italian military
were appreciative of the advantages of front propaganda.
In the final analysis, Cornwall argues, it was the monarchy’s internal problems and
not front propaganda that caused the ultimate collapse in late 1918. Those internal
problems, which he analyzes in less detail, included food shortages, increasing political
discontent, and a political apparatus unable to separate itself from Germany. The hopedfor peace dividends from the end of the Russian fighting never came to Austria-Hungary. But if front propaganda did not itself undermine the monarchy, its use by the
Italians certainly sped up the process. Cornwall offers new insights into the collapse
of the monarchy while revising the traditional less-than-friendly assessment of the
overall Italian war effort. His ability to weave military actions, domestic politics, and
international diplomacy together has produced a major work on the last years of Habsburg rule.
SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON JR.
University of the South

Karl Popper—the Formative Years, 1902–1945: Politics and Philosophy in
Interwar Vienna. By Malachi Haim Hacohen.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiiiⳭ610. $54.95.
As its title reveals, Malachi Hacohen’s biography of Karl Popper ends when Popper
left the safety and isolation of exile in New Zealand for a professorship at the London
School of Economics. Ending at that point is justified, however, since by 1945 Popper’s
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foundational work was behind him, his most famous book had been written, and his
philosophical instincts were set in stone. This biography intends to show how Popper’s
philosophical mind-set was formed by the intellectual culture of post–World War I
Vienna and, Hacohen adds, by Popper’s experiences as an assimilated Jew. “I rehistoricize the life that he dehistoricized. My aim is not only to provide a fuller and more
accurate account and recover a rich culture that vanished but also to rescue the young
Popper for the present, to see how the adventurous socialist who revolutionized the
philosophy of science and formed a compelling vision of the Open Society can help
us rethink our problems today” (p. 21).
Hacohen claims to correct both Popper’s Autobiography and widespread misconceptions of Viennese culture and Popper. With regard to these misconceptions, Hacohen
briefly mentions Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin’s Wittgenstein’s Vienna and Jürgen
Habermas on Popper. With regard to Popper’s own account, Hacohen identifies Popper’s “self-aggrandizement” in erasing his first faltering steps and in muting his early
socialist politics. At first he gives the impression that Popper’s later political conservatism will loom large in his study, but by its end these political issues recede against
Hacohen’s emphasis on Popper’s youthful encounters with educational theory and psychology in the 1920s as the lost prolegomena to his philosophy of science and methodology.
The resulting biography is a very mixed success. I will return in a moment to its
reconstruction of Popper’s youthful thought and first steps toward philosophical independence. These parts of the biography are a contribution to the study both of Popper
and of philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. But in Hacohen’s less
innovative commentary on Popper’s political writings and often uncertain summaries
of the central philosophical debates, the results either echo Popper’s accounts or muddy
the waters. The lack of critical engagement with Popper’s ideas, again contrary to the
biography’s initial claims, further weakens its effect. There is also a tiring imitation of
Popper’s worst stylistic tics. The terms “brilliant,” “genius,” “revolutionary,” “radical”
are incessantly repeated, and Hacohen even combines them when he proclaims that
Popper then “radicalized his revolution” (p. 199). I do not begrudge Hacohen this
admiration for Popper, and undoubtedly a biographer must think his subject important.
But the repetitive drumbeats, when combined with long sections largely confirming
Popper’s own version of the central issues, give the resulting work a veneer of promotion rather than assessment.
In discussing Popper’s early intellectual development, Hacohen strives to correct the
order of events. “Popper formulated neither the induction nor demarcation problem
before 1930, and his intellectual breakthrough in the logic of science required him to
renounce a previous research program for psychology as ‘psychologism’” (p. 14). This
correction of Popper’s memory is somewhat less important, I think, than the biographical detail on Popper’s interest in neo-Kantianism, educational psychology, and physiological psychology found in Hacohen’s early chapters. The details cannot be summarized here, but suffice it to say that Hacohen makes a persuasive case for the
influence of the psychological Kantianism of Jacob Fries (1775–1843) transmitted to
Popper by Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). Fries’s claim against Kant was that a priori
principles are a posteriori anthropological facts about human development. Fries’s position seems to have led Popper into a serious consideration of debates about the relationship between psychology and logic (along with his strange bedfellow Edmund
Husserl) and very likely shaped his lifelong commitment to epistemological naturalism
(often buttressed by appeals to biological adaptation). As Hacohen puts it: “He gave
to Kant’s question of how it was that our subjective epistemological apparatus conformed to objective relationships in the universe a genetic-biological answer” (p. 167).
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Furthermore, this early dose of Kantianism, as Popper himself stressed (but without
the details), made him immune to logical positivism and its cure for metaphysics. But
Hacohen’s account of and assessment of the influence of M. Schlick, R. Carnap, and
O. Neurath again largely follows and then confirms Popper’s published views.
Hacohen does add a new twist, though not a very Popperian one. He defends Popper’s
“antifoundationalism” in epistemology as the right answer to what he repeatedly calls
“poststructuralism.” He states that he wrote the biography in part to “show that an
intellectual biography is possible after poststructuralism” (p. 21). He even claims in
his reconstruction that “Popper and the Vienna Circle did address ‘poststructuralist’
problems, but their answers were different and, in my view, better than ours. They did
not echo poststructuralism, but voiced an alternative to it” (p. 262). Hacohen is confident that some answer is needed to this utterly undefined position since he announces
that “poststructuralism has made a laughing matter of traditional scientific and historical
empiricism” (p. 270). This movement or attitude or position (sometimes Hacohen puts
the word in shudder quotes and sometimes not) is virtually central to his assessment
of Popper’s significance. “Popper negotiated these tensions brilliantly in his work. His
philosophy arbitrated the claims of order and change, certitude and criticism, universality and difference. The resolution was unique. . . . Permanent negotiation of freedom,
difference, and change with rationality, universality, and order, constant experimentation with theories and tradition: This was his philosophy’s great appeal. He provided
a liberal response to both dogmatism and ‘poststructuralism’ by finding a place for
both in a process of perpetual revision and rethinking” (pp. 148–49).
I doubt that this type of response constitutes Popper’s value to philosophy, if Popper
should prove as enduring a figure as Hacohen now believes him to be, and I further
doubt there is a coherent position called “poststructuralism.” On several central features
of Popper’s thought—for instance, his defense of methodological individualism, his
arguments against historical laws, his claim to have solved the problem of induction,
his theory of probability, and his defense of psychophysical dualism—serious criticisms are already on the table. Hacohen has not defended Popper with respect to such
deep criticisms nor added to our critical understanding of Popper’s widely read political
and cultural philosophy. But on the early roots of Popper’s approach to psychology,
science, and logic, Hacohen’s biography has much to offer.
There are, I must finally mention, gaps in the bibliography. Modesty prevents me
from pointing to some, but the failure to include (and I only list some examples) Mark
Notturno’s Objectivity, Rationality, and the Third Realm: Justification and the Grounds
of Psychologism; A Study of Frege and Popper (Boston, 1985), Barry Smith’s Austrian
Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Chicago, 1994), or Alberto Coffa’s Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station (New York, 1991) is
insular and odd.
ROBERT D’AMICO
University of Florida
Grüne Front gegen Weimar: Reichs-Landbund und agrarischer Lobbyismus,
1918–1933. By Stephanie Merkenich. Beiträge zur Geschichte des
Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, volume 113.
Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998. Pp. 424. DM 91.59.
The years of the Weimar Republic were a period of agricultural crisis. A study of the
largest of the agricultural interest groups, the Reichslandbund, is thus necessarily a
story of lobbying in times of crisis. Stephanie Merkenich portrays the Reichslandbund
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as an organization that combined lobbying—in other words, a practical self-interested
politics ready to bargain and to compromise—with a more or less uncompromising
opposition to the political system. Her portrait of the association is an issue-oriented,
organizational history told from the retrospective point of view of the organization’s
voluntary dissolution during the institutional Gleichschaltung after 1933. The author
is convinced that the history of the Weimar Republic can only be written from the
perspective of its dissolution. There is a problem with this method, since the outcome
of the story is, after all, unknown to its participants. Especially when an organizational
history, like Merkenich’s, focuses primarily on the activities of groups, such as the
association’s leaders, it is difficult to leave out of account the fact that the end of the
story was not known in advance by the participating characters.
The Reichslandbund was an attempt to create “a unified agricultural front that crossed
the boundaries of party politics” (p. 59). It was organized after World War I. Originally,
it was formed from the union of the right-of-center Bund der Landwirte and the regional
agricultural associations that had together constituted the Deutscher Landbund. These
regional Landbünde were grassroots organizations that saw themselves as “trade unions
for the agricultural population.” Unlike the Bund der Landwirte, they were not limited
geographically to the areas east of the Elbe but existed in western and central Germany
as well. Politically, the Reichslandbund was quite far to the right-of-center. A majority
of its leaders were closely associated with the German National People’s Party (DNVP),
and some of them supported the Kapp-Luttwitz uprising in 1920. For Merkenich, this
is the decisive point. Even though the association later (in the middle years of the
Weimar Republic) developed into an interest group prepared to bargain and compromise, Merkenich nevertheless locates its politics at the extreme right of the political
spectrum. In her opinion, “a neoconservative social model, affirming the traditional
social orders” (p. 114) and an “instrumentalization of antisemitism” (p. 121) characterized its social views. As the numbers of landowners in the parliaments shrank, the
Landbund concentrated its efforts on behind-the-scenes politics and on cooperation
with the bureaucracy. Later it sought to exercise influence in the circles around Hindenburg. Himself a landowner, Hindenburg shared the concerns and interests of his
class.
Merkenich does not try to hide the increasing pragmatism that characterized the
leading circles of the Landbund in the years after 1924. She stresses the opportunities
that were missed when many landholders, after clearing themselves of indebtedness
during the period of hyperinflation, immediately plunged into renewed speculation on
an apparently lucrative future during the agricultural boom that set in after 1924. Even
the agrarian politicians of the Landbund criticized the narrow economic perspective of
the landowners. At the same time, however, the Landbund gave only half-hearted
support to the efforts of those representing the agricultural workers to replace the
patriarchal relations between employers and employees with a more modern system.
Unfortunately, Merkenich does not discuss the consequences of these outmoded social
relations for the movement of population away from the rural areas. The chief reasons
for the inner problems of the Landbund lay in its favoring the interests of economically
inefficient landowners and in its rejection of a modern policy toward agricultural labor.
Agrarian politics after 1924 revealed that the close ties between the Reichslandbund
and the DNVP would lead to friction with other economic interests. For the DNVP
was a nationalist party representing the interests of industrial employers and employees
as well. No resolution of the tariff controversy could satisfy both consumers and producers, both agrarian and industrial interests, at the same time. In the eyes of the
Reichslandbund, even the DNVP did not do a satisfactory job of representing the
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interests of the agrarian sector. Negotiations over a German-Polish trade agreement,
one that favored the interests of consumers and industry while significantly damaging
agricultural interests, led to a split between the representatives of the various interests
within the DNVP (p. 207). When, paradoxically, the Social Democratic chancellor
Herman Müller was the first to introduce a policy designed to offer consistent protection
for agriculture, it was already too late. The Reichslandbund did exercise considerable
influence on this change in agricultural policy, which reached its peak during Heinrich
Brüning’s chancellorship. In the years after 1925 most of the agricultural ministers had
been drawn from among its members. But by the end of the 1920s the DNVP, which
had represented the interests of the Landbund, had acquired a significant rival in the
Christlich-Nationalen Bauern- und Landvolkpartei (CNBL), and the pragmatism of the
nationalist party was countered by the maximalism of the client party. This made for
the split of the Reichslandbund into a radical wing and a pragmatic wing.
These are the author’s results. She is never able to present a clear thesis, and one
finds few unambiguous evaluations. This may be a result of the fact that she has cast
her research into the classical mold of an investigation into political associations during
the period of the Weimar Republic, but her results partly contradict her approach.
Earlier research on this topic held that radical interest groups led their members down
a path of making unattainable demands, a path whose failure was a foregone conclusion.
The resulting disillusionment was exploited by the National Socialists, even when they
did not receive, as they often did, the active support of these groups. The author is
clearly indebted to this perspective, one that arose during the 1960s and 1970s. Her
very choice of terms betrays this, as does her often supercilious treatment of the experiences and expectations of the historical subjects. She often refers to the “ideology
of the associations” (how does this differ from a modern “philosophy of the firm?”),
or to a “premodern rural social model” (p. 355), or even to “pathological ideas” (p.
118). In her introduction, Merkenich disclaims the intention of writing a “mental history” of the landowners (p. 14). But that disavowal comes back to haunt her. She places
too much emphasis on treating the politics and policies of the associations in terms of
the organization of power, and she never examines the extent to which contradictions
in their policies were an expression of genuinely ambivalent views rather than of mere
“ideology.”
In fact, many of Merkenich’s results argue against viewing the Reichslandbund in
the role of organizer and manipulator. The author fails to pose the critical question:
how could an interest group manage to reject the political system while at the same
time attempting to achieve concrete results for its members by working within this
system? Her portrayal of the agrarian protest movement proves that it was primarily a
movement from below that brought pressure to bear on the pragmatic bargain practices
of the association’s elites. Spurred by a crisis that threatened their very existence,
farmers in northern and eastern Germany became more militant and violent in their
protests. At the end of the 1920s, a movement took shape to put a stop to foreclosure
sales of landholdings, to raise the threat of a tax boycott, and to agitate for a boycott
on the delivery of goods. In view of such protests, which included among their targets
even officials of the Reichslandbund itself, and which were to give the National Socialists their most spectacular electoral gains, one cannot avoid the impression that the
association’s functionaries did not lead events but were led by them. Scattered citations
(such as those on pp. 199 ff.) indicative of the increasing integration of the Reichslandbund into the existing system (an integration based not so much on an agreement
about principles as on a pragmatic calculation of self-interest) support this view. Opposition to the existing state was not, as the book’s title suggests, the principal motive
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of the Reichslandbund. Rather, it was the urgent need to compromise with different
interest groups and the increasing disaffection this caused among a membership that
had expected much more. The high expectations on the part of the members had not
been primarily the result of agitation from above. They arose mainly because the agrarian landowners, in part because of their indebtedness, in part because of the pressure
of structural changes in the economy, saw themselves pushed to the very edge of the
abyss. For those involved, the agrarian crisis of the late twenties and early thirties was
an experience of economic collapse on a massive scale. The farmers were not just angry
as a result of political agitation; they were motivated by fear for their very existence.
One can make a convincing case that the Reichslandbund did more to halt the movement toward radicalization than to stir it up. Nearly all the representatives of the association—and not just the four who left the DNVP on December 12, 1929 (p. 265)—
distanced themselves more or less vocally from Alfred Hugenberg’s policy of destroying the republic. The policy of aid for the eastern provinces, which made the first real
attempt since 1930 to relieve the indebtedness in the east and to establish a sound
economic basis there, was promoted above all by Landbund representatives. The complete destruction of the existing system was not in the interests of a lobbying group
that aimed at concrete results.
Merkenich does not come to these conclusions. Admittedly, she does distance herself
from the earlier attempts to assign primary guilt to the conservative, agrarian elites. In
the end, however, she faults the “uncompromising antiliberal attitude of the old, conservative right wing” (p. 361) for calling into existence an autonomous agrarian movement that was to become, in the Christlich-Nationalen Bauern- und Landvolkpartei, a
competitor, to the DNVP. But the author fails to recognize that the CNBL, admittedly
an interest party, could only have been established because it was impossible to pursue
interests successfully with a political party that aimed primarily at the destruction of
the system itself, like Hugenberg’s DNVP did after 1929. One could put the matter
another way. Although the interest groups may, in fact, have contributed significantly
to the weakening of the structure of the Weimar Republic, they nevertheless served as
a gathering place for precisely those who wanted to maintain the Weimar system, for
the simple reason that they were able to achieve concrete results within its framework.
They were egoistic but had to be pragmatic, too.
THOMAS MERGEL
Ruhr-Universität, Bochum
Historiker im Nationalsozialismus: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft und der
“Volkstumskampf” im Osten. By Ingo Haar. Kritische Studien zur
Geschichtswissenschaft, volume 143. Edited by Helmut Berding et al.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000. Pp. 433. DM 78.
In 1998, the annual conference of German historians (Deutscher Historikertag), roughly
the equivalent of the American Historical Association meeting, devoted considerable
attention to the past of “German Historians in National Socialism” (see Winfried
Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus
[Frankfurt am Main, 1999]). Like the members of every other German profession,
historians lined up behind the Nazi state, and it is hardly surprising that those who
survived and prospered under the Third Reich in no way challenged the regime. However, over four decades after the end of the war, German historians were soberly con-
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fronting the fact that among those who had most enthusiastically supported the Third
Reich and delivered to it the “scientific” justification for massive population transfers
in eastern Europe were some of same people who had contributed significantly to
rebuilding the historical profession in West Germany after 1945. In 1947, Theodor
Schieder accepted a chair in modern history at the University of Cologne after the
position was rejected by Hans Rosenberg, a German Jewish émigré who had survived
National Socialism by moving to the United States. A decade later, Schieder became
editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, the most venerable historical periodical in the
Federal Republic, and from 1967 to 1972 he headed the Association of Historians in
Germany. When that same organization met in 1998, it was more concerned with what
Schieder had done in October 1939 to justify and legitimate the “Germanization” of
Posen and West Prussia, the creation of Lebensraum, the defense against influences of
“foreign origin,” and the immediate “relocation” (Umsiedlung) of nearly 3 million Poles
from areas that Germany had recently occupied.
In Historiker im Nationalsozialismus, Ingo Haar, a contributor to the 1998 conference, goes well beyond what he was able to do in that context and provides an exhaustively researched account of how willingly many historians embraced the racist,
antisemitic principles of the Nazi state. Indeed, well before the Nazis came to power a
group of “young conservative” historians had railed against the Weimar Republic and
linked a reordering of eastern and southeastern Europe along ethnic lines with a revision
of the Versailles treaty. Methodologically, they focused on ethnicity, population size,
historical patterns of settlement, and the transmission of culture, and they juxtaposed
“membership in a Volk”—defined in racial terms—with citizenship and “membership
in a state” defined by a constitutional order. This thoroughly racist “ethnopolitics” was
part of Weimar’s “revolution from the Right,” and it placed particular emphasis on the
“German mission in the east.” Interdisciplinary groups of scholars—sociologists, cartographers, economists, and historians—devoted particular attention to those parts of
eastern Europe that contained large populations of German descent. Proud to be identified as “fighting” academics, their goal was not only the revision of the Treaty of
Versailles but also the defeat of those historians within Germany whose peace with
Weimar and whose acceptance of a “small” German Reich were seen to undermine
Germany’s attempt to reclaim its rightful place in central Europe. Rejecting Freidrich
Meinecke, the elder statesman of the historical profession in the 1920s, as methodologically reactionary because of his focus on the state and high politics, they had even
less tolerance for “outsiders” such as Arthur Rosenberg, Veit Valentin, Hajo Holborn,
and Hans Rosenberg, whose work Meinecke had promoted and supported.
January 1933 created a dramatically different political context in which these rightwing historians could work and ensured that many of their colleagues who were Jews
and Social Democrats would leave Germany, some never to return. Those ready to
pursue the “struggle for the east with intellectual weapons” found a broad basis on
which cooperation and collaboration with National Socialism was possible and quickly
took over the scholarly infrastructure of journals, publication projects, access to archives, and institutes that allowed them to pursue their goals. Their accommodation
with the new order was effortless. They did not require the Nazi state to integrate them
into the Third Reich; rather, they willingly integrated themselves in a process that Haar
calls Selbstgleichschaltung (p. 368).
Joining those who enthusiastically welcomed the Nazi triumph was Hans Rothfels,
the mentor of some of the most energetic scholarly proponents of reversing the “deGermanization” (Entdeutschung) of eastern Europe. However, Rothfels was soon to
learn that the Nazis would classify him according to “blood,” not according to his
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conservative political convictions, his conversion from Judaism to Protestantism, his
status as a World War I veteran, or his passionate commitment to “Germanizing”
eastern Europe. For the party leadership in Königsberg and Danzig, he was not haltbar.
As a “non-Aryan,” he posed a threat to those he influenced; it was inconceivable for a
“Jewish professor to teach German history” (p. 202), no matter how closely his beliefs
conformed to the principles of National Socialism. It is astonishing to read that as he
departed from Königsberg and addressed a circle of students that included Schieder
and Werner Conze, Rothfels affirmed his commitment to the vital task of reordering
eastern Europe and his promise to continue this important work “elsewhere” (p. 240).
Elsewhere for Rothfels was ultimately Brown University and the University of Chicago,
though he would return to a chair at Tübingen University in 1951.
Many of those who stayed behind—including Conze and Schieder—went into the
Nazi Party, not exile, and provided the Nazis with the “ideological scaffolding” (p.
252) that they needed to plan policies of resettlement, removal, and, ultimately, mass
extermination in eastern Europe. Thus, Conze determined that historically Jews represented a disruptive force in Poland and exhibited “sympathies to the Russians” (p.
285). As a consequence, the Jewish population was seen as detrimental to the development of a stable “population and social order” (Volks- und Sozialordnung). Once the
Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, scholarly analyses of historical patterns of settlement
and demography became the blueprints for moving Germans in, classifying some Poles
as salvageable, and determining that others—particularly Jews and gypsies, who were
deemed to have no historic ties to the soil—should be removed altogether. By the early
1940s, Conze explicitly advocated the “removal of Jews from cities and small market
towns” (p. 316). His scholarly accomplishments and his political loyalty were rewarded
by his promotion to a professorship in 1942. And Schieder, who had bemoaned the
“destruction and expulsion of the indigenous German population” under Polish rule,
could now advocate the “removal [Herauslösung] of Jews from Polish cities” (p. 331).
With the invasion of the Soviet Union, Schieder’s gaze shifted even farther eastward,
and in 1942 he compiled a report on the demography of Bialystock, concluding that
“the Jews [had been] completely removed” and now could be found only in the “ghettos
of the cities.” Such reports did not collect dust, and Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East
Prussia and by 1941 Reich Commissar of the Ukraine, opined that only such “unselfish
and successful activity” had allowed the Nazis to achieve the “reconstitution” of the
region so quickly (pp. 354–55). Although Haar does not ascribe specifically murderous
intentions to the historians at the center of his study, he does convincingly show that
proposals for “population transfers and extermination” ultimately represented two complementary parts of the same Nazi policies (p. 337).
Haar ends his story in 1945. An epilogue would have helped. As historians of the
postwar period know, some of the key figures in Haar’s account emerged from the
Third Reich unscathed. Theodor Oberländer, minister for expellee affairs under Konrad
Adenauer, is a central character in Haar’s story. Only in the late 1950s, as more and
more West Germans showed a willingness to confront the Nazi past and acknowledge
the extent of Oberländer’s involvement in resettlement policies in eastern Europe, did
his activities in the 1930s and early 1940s come under intensive scrutiny. The pasts of
others—in particular, Conze and Schieder—long remained completely unexamined,
absorbed in that “particular quiet,” the phrase Hermann Lübbe used to describe the
silence around the Nazi past that, Lübbe argued, was necessary for the postwar Federal
Republic to incorporate former Nazis into a democratic civil society. Haar’s analysis
does not extend to an examination of why it took almost forty years for historians to
raise questions about the pasts of such prominent members of their own profession,
but for those interested in pursuing these topics, his book will be essential reading.
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The story Haar tells has much to say about what links politics, history, and national
identity; the significance of institutional structures and resources for determining what
kind of work scholars can do; and the potential risk run by any historian who aspires
to influence the future and shape the present through the study of the past. These are
issues that concern not only German historians; but, unfortunately, not all those interested in these questions will read German, and even some who do will not make it
through this weighty tome. It would be regrettable if what Haar has discovered remains
accessible only to specialists, and I can only hope that Haar will have an opportunity
to offer some of his findings to a broader audience.
ROBERT G. MOELLER
University of California, Irvine

Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity. By Omer Bartov.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. viiiⳭ302. $35.00.
One way to gauge the contribution of this brooding, thoughtful set of essays is to locate
it in the context of Omer Bartov’s earlier work on the German army in the Second
World War—more on that below. But another context should be identified too, and
celebrated. The Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis was established in 1988, in part
as the brainchild of John Gillis. Its effort to center historical study (as opposed to
balkanizing it) has made a real difference in a profession in which radical individualism
is the rule. Bringing together groups of scholars, the Rutgers Center has produced
important work on commemoration, on the social and cultural history of war, on religious thinking and action, and on utopia. Bartov (who has recently moved from Rutgers
to Brown University) has drawn on it all, deepening his own pioneering research on
the German army, presented here in a series of four interlocking essays filled with
intelligence and sensitivity. In a way, his essays show how important it is for an original
scholar to work within a collective of fellow historians; would that this were the case
throughout the profession.
Bartov’s angle of entry into the subject of the radical violence of twentieth-century
warfare is cosmopolitan. He addresses Israeli themes and American discursive practices, particularly those of American Jews, and moves easily along the spectrum of
contemporary German and French debates on these issues. In this respect, he is a direct
descendant of another scholar of brutalization in the twentieth century—George Mosse.
Mosse traversed some of the same fields of historical study visited by Bartov, though
Mosse’s familiarity with the Italian case went beyond Bartov’s repertoire. In other
respects, Bartov’s mastery of the archives of German military history (and Israeli literature) gives his account of brutalization and survival a grittiness that Mosse’s work
never had. This is hardly surprising, given Mosse’s flair for intellectual history, understood as the study of ideas in their cultural contexts, and Bartov’s contribution to
the cultural history of warfare. Despite these differences, the two historians ought to
be placed in the same intellectual milieu, between New York and Jerusalem, with Berlin
and Paris as midpoints on this impressive intellectual map.
That said, the differences in their interpretations are striking. Mosse presented the
catastrophes of the twentieth century as the unfolding of a broad project, summarized
in his book The Nationalization of the Masses. His was the voice of the gentleman
scholar, filled with irony and a very well developed sense of the absurdity of the tragic
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encounters he chronicled. Bartov’s is a tougher voice, that of a man who has measured
the hardness of the killers on the eastern front in the Second World War.
Bartov’s research made it impossible for anyone to argue that the German army
could retrieve any notion of honor out of the criminality of its behavior on the eastern
front. The first essay of this book deals with the ambiguous category of “honor,” a
word standing for a code of values that survived the bloodshed of Verdun and the
Somme. Here is a subject Mosse investigated in particular through his study of commemorative forms. Both Bartov and Mosse have charted the glorification of the rankand-file soldier and his prototypical status as the “new man” of fascism. For Bartov, it
was such men in Wehrmacht uniforms in the Second World War who committed and
abetted atrocities of staggering proportions. This “revolutionary reconceptualization of
glory” from 1918 to 1939 and beyond led to soldiers who were able to see their murdering of civilians as a “glorious” or even “liberating, redemptive” act (p. 30).
The second essay deals with French and German material equally, though Bartov’s
use of French archival sources is occasional. He has interesting things to say about the
“moral debacle” of Vichy, set against the backdrop of the catastrophic bloodletting of
1914–18 and the curious ambivalence of French leaders toward the risks of war in the
1930s. As Antoine Prost has shown in much greater detail, to such men war was
simultaneously unthinkable and just around the corner. Here was a recipe for disaster.
Bartov points out effectively to what extent French recollections of the Great War and
the Resistance obscure as much as they reveal; the same is even more the case with
respect to German suffering in the latter months of the Second World War. His point
is that an emphasis on the “traumatic memory” of mass suffering frequently confuses
historical accounts of this tormented period.
The third essay comes to the subject of identity in terms of adversarial images. The
notion of bifurcating the world into enemies and allies is, after all, not particularly new,
but the terrifying power of the modern industrialized state and a biologized version of
social engineering made it possible for such antinomian distinctions to be “remedied”
by mass murder. Here the notion of victimhood distorts history and turns it into a
vicious spiral, for self-defined victims can turn on their supposed tormentors and remove them from the face of the earth. Thus the Holocaust was a monumental act of
revenge, a response to the supposed victimization of the German people by Jews and
other “parasites.” Bartov goes further and sees the obsession with victimhood as leaving
indelible marks on the national identity not only of Israel but of France as well. Once
again, his sense of the French case is never as solidly based as his instinct for German
or Israeli history.
The fourth chapter concerns utopias. Here Bartov’s touch is not as sure, since he
defines “utopia” so broadly as to include what historians do alongside what Fourier or
Marx were up to (p. 156). But putting aside such slips, we can see much of value in
his argument that the Holocaust was a utopian project, with utopia defined as a dark
star. Much of the rest of the chapter is a set of reflections on the Holocaust, with only
a very loose link to the beginning of the essay. There is an extended discussion of the
writings of the Holocaust survivor Ka-Tzetnik, which once again shows Bartov’s versatility in dealing with material in Hebrew, Yiddish, French, German, and English. He
demonstrates that Ka-Tzetnik, in his writing, reversed his now famous statement at the
Eichmann trial that Auschwitz was “another planet.” The killers and the degraded
prisoners were all too human to Ka-Tzetnik; to Bartov this universal judgment explains
why this account of the Holocaust has by and large been ignored in discussions of the
subject (p. 210). But when Ka-Tzetnik burned the only extant copy of his own poems
first published in 1931, he pointed out how deeply our sense of the past before the
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Holocaust is polluted by that unprecedented crime. This is Bartov’s challenge to historians, a challenge repeated in the conclusion to this book, which is a set of reflections
on literary reactions to the Holocaust in recent years. His central claim is that in a host
of ways Auschwitz has transformed our sense of the past, just as it has undermined
identities, blurred the distinction between fact and fiction, and raised doubts about our
ability “to make moral judgments of universal applicability” (p. 224).
On many points, Bartov is entirely convincing. The Holocaust has indeed shaped
notions of national identity and ethnic identity in Israel, the United States, France, and
Germany. The notion of the past is indeed contested terrain today, in part because we
have to face the testimony of men like Ka-Tzetnik, voices hard to square with any
belief in enduring human values. On this level, Bartov’s book is powerful and persuasive. On other points, though, Bartov’s analysis is uncertain or incomplete. Given the
topic, this is hardly surprising. He cannot possibly prove his huge claim that “the
Holocaust is at the center of a crisis of identity . . . which has become the characteristic
feature of the twentieth century, originating in World War I and felt with even greater
urgency today” (p. 229). In these essays, the author has offered us much to think about,
though not as much as he thinks he has done. This book is less comparative (or universal) history than relational history, that is, the work of a distinguished German
historian who uses material from other nations and cultures in relation to his core
interest in order to deepen his understanding of it. And what a subject it is. Mirrors of
Destruction is not really a book of essays; it is four books in the making. We await
their arrival with somber anticipation.
JAY WINTER
Yale University
Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Magistrats der Stadt Berlin, 1945–1946. Volume 1:
1945. Volume 2: 1946. Edited by Dieter Hanauske. Schriftenreihe des
Landesarchivs Berlin, volume 2. Edited by Jürgen Wetzel.
Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1995, 1999. Pp. viiⳭ789; 1160.
With the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic and the opening of East
German archives, important new documents and archival sources have been made available to researchers interested in the immediate postwar reconstruction of Germany and
the beginning of the cold war as well as the struggle between Western parliamentary
democracy and the introduction of a Communist dictatorship in East Germany. This
development is especially welcome for the history of Berlin, the center of Allied confrontation and of the first crisis after the wartime cooperation between East and West
had ended. The occupation of Berlin by the Soviet Union and the initial period of
exclusive Soviet control, from May 1945 until early July 1945 (when the first American
and British troops arrived in the city; the French followed only in early August), led
to a situation in which Soviet occupation policy determined the direction of political
and economic reconstruction.
These two well-edited volumes of hitherto basically unavailable documents present
transcripts of all meetings of the Berlin City Council (Magistrat) from May 20, 1945,
until its last meeting on November 20, 1946. The members of the council had been
appointed by the Soviet commandant after they had been handpicked by Walter Ulbricht, the leading Communist among the German emigrants in the Soviet Union. He
returned from exile in Moscow with other party cadres determined to set up a Com-
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munist-dominated government under the protection of the Soviet armies. Although not
all appointees of the Council were members of the Communist Party (KPD), Communists took over crucial parts of the administration from which they could influence
developments to an extent far beyond that warranted by their actual support in society.
When the Western powers arrived, they accepted the Soviet decisions.
These two volumes include excellent biographies of all members of the City Council,
including information about their later political careers, photos of the most important
members, the names and tenure of all deputies, and a list of orders of the Allied
Kommandantura for the governing of Berlin until 1949. A very good index, a bibliography, and a detailed introduction to recent research make this edition a must for all
those interested in the postwar history of Berlin.
For researchers it is especially fortunate that the protocols of the City Council meetings are mostly extensive reports of what actually happened, including discussions,
rather than just the results of meetings. The editor has also added several unpublished
speeches by the Communist deputy mayor that illuminate the KPD’s attitudes. The
deputy mayor was really in charge of the city government; Mayor Werner, who did
not belong to any party, was a mere figurehead.
The 128 documents deal both with political developments (essentially a confrontation between the Social Democratic Party [SPD] and the KPD) and the overwhelming
challenge of reconstructing economic and social life in a city devastated by war. The
first volume deals with 1945; the second covers 1946. A number of problems stand out
in both volumes. The lack of housing, electricity, and heating, especially during the
winter, created difficult living conditions. The lack of a functioning infrastructure and
even of office equipment significantly impaired the reconstruction of city government.
Many members of the council, furthermore, had no previous administrative experience.
Turnover was high. There was never any distinct decision about the constitutional
responsibilities of the council. It acted under Soviet and, later, Allied control with many
interventions. Practically from the beginning the four powers enforced policy only in
their respective sectors, instead of keeping all of Berlin in perspective as had been
planned.
This was especially true with the food supply for the population, which had to be
provided by the Allies. It was delivered mostly to their own sectors, while the council
was responsible for distribution. Fallow land was used for the cultivation of vegetables
to improve the diet of the population and prevent a famine. The food situation was
further aggravated by the constant flow of refugees and expellees on their way to the
West. This led to the introduction of a residence requirement, which, however, could
hardly be enforced.
The documents also reveal the council’s efforts to deal with a wide range of other
issues. It had to struggle to get tuberculosis, typhoid fever, venereal diseases, and other
health problems under control. Decisions about removing the rubble had to be made,
new job opportunities created. Finding supplies of raw materials for industry, repairing
the transportation infrastructure, and finding solutions for social problems all occupied
city administrators. Abandoned furniture and household appliances from salvage operations were distributed to improve living conditions. The victims of fascism and other
groups had to be provided for. Evacuated children had to be brought back to the city.
All this was attempted while the city budget was not maintained by taxes or other
income. When the Allies rejected a real estate tax proposed by the City Council, city
lotteries were introduced as an emergency measure. Price and wage controls were also
considered.
Other highly controversial issues included education and religious instruction in
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schools. Denazification had led to a shortage of teachers, so new teachers had to be
trained, new textbooks had to be introduced, and schools had to be opened in order to
get children and youth off the streets. After the experience with National Socialism the
churches demanded religious instruction in public schools.
Most of these problems had to be dealt with pragmatically and did not present
opportunities for ideological conflict between the new German parties. But the activities
of the City Council also constituted a chance to influence political attitudes. Furthermore, the political climate in Berlin changed with the forced merger of the KPD and
the SPD in the Soviet zone of occupation in April 1946.
These volumes present an important collection of source materials not only for the
social and economic history of postwar Berlin but also for the policies and goals of the
new German parties. They shed light as well on the Allied intervention and the beginning of the cold war confrontation.
HERMANN J. RUPIEPER
Vanderbilt University
Literacy and Written Culture in Early Modern Central Europe. By István
György Tóth. Translated by Tünde Vajda and Miklós Bodóczky.
Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000. Pp. 266. $41.95.
This book is a fine addition to the scholarly literature on literacy in early modern
Europe. Based on exemplary archival research, Literacy and Written Culture in Early
Modern Central Europe succeeds on a number of levels. Originally published in Hungarian in 1996, this study significantly broadens our understanding of literacy and
written culture in the Hungarian Kingdom between 1600 and 1800, and it will no doubt
remain the standard work on the topic for many years to come. But the book also
represents an important contribution to the methodological discussion of the study of
literacy, since István Tóth is fully versed in the literature and provides a model of
sensitive analysis and interpretation of the place of the written word in central European
culture, from the peasantry on up through the landed gentry and various levels of
nobility. The result is a book not only about literacy as such but also about the intellectual culture and mind-set of the various orders of Hungarian society and the role of
the written word in that culture.
The primary geographical focus of empirical research is on the large and diverse
Vas County in western Hungary, although the author’s research ranges beyond to other
Hungarian counties, and he makes fruitful comparisons to other central European regions. The study begins with a chapter on the social history of elementary schools,
foregrounding such figures as “schoolmasters who did not teach” and “Lutheran pastors
who did not know how to write.” Given the fact that teachers’ incomes in outer parishes
were below that of ox herders and gamekeepers, and that schoolmasters earned the
bulk of their incomes for their work as cantors, it does not seem surprising that many
schoolmasters could barely read and write themselves. Furthermore, children of school
age (six to nine years of age) attended school only in winters, and sporadically at that,
and Habsburg “enlightened” school reforms were not actually enacted until well into
the nineteenth century. Thus, “the majority of rural residents still remained outside the
walls of schools in the second half of the eighteenth century, never acquired reading
and writing skills and continued to live in the world of oral communication” (p. 46).
Subsequent chapter titles are “The Slow Advance of Literacy in Peasant Culture,”
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“Literacy among the Nobility,” “The Lower Nobility and the Oral Tradition,” and
“Nationalities and the Spread of Literacy after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.”
The author examines a vast body of archival material including wills, letters patent,
diaries, reports of school visitations, marriage registers, and a host of legal documents
to come to the conclusion that literacy—whether defined as ability to read, to read and
write, or to sign one’s name—was quite low in the Hungarian Kingdom in the early
modern period, probably around 20 percent for peasants in Vas County in 1770 and
often not much higher among the landed gentry and lower levels of nobility. The author
emphasizes the difficulty of arriving at firm figures, the difficulty of relying on signatures for data about literacy, and so on, but he makes a valiant attempt to base his
conclusions on firm evidence. One painstaking method the author employs is to crossreference names and signatures whenever possible—did this person who signed his
name with a cross on his will ever actually sign his name to another document? Do
certain signatures appear in pairs, indicating that one person signed for both? The author
manages to pursue such laborious quests without being overly tiresome (most of the
time), often bringing the reader along on the hunt rather than simply reporting results.
This kind of study begs a few questions, most of which the author is able to answer.
Probably the most salient question is, What is the point of studying “literacy” if a large
majority of people were illiterate? If analyzing signatures versus crosses does not yield
much hard data on literacy, since signing with a cross did not necessarily mean someone
was illiterate, why bother spending so much time and effort tabulating them? If the
nature of calculations concerning the real proportion of the literate during the early
modern period is “extremely approximate” (p. 64), again, what is the point of all this
hard work? The broad answer to such questions is that the author is seeking to understand not only the levels of literacy and numeracy but also the role played by letters
and numbers in everyday life, the ways in which literacy was regarded by the community, and the transformations that began to take place during the eighteenth century
in literacy and numeracy in the cultural life of Hungarians. Tóth really wants to understand “the role literacy played in the life of the community” (p. 68) as much as to
come up with firm figures. He argues convincingly that if we really want to understand
the statistics, we need to understand the communal meaning of the written word. The
book thus branches out beyond a straightforward analysis of literacy into social history.
The one area in which the author could go further in integrating the study of literacy
into general social history is in his treatment of schoolmasters. Why talk about “schoolmasters” as a discrete category if in fact teaching was an adjunct to other tasks? The
author seems to lament the poor training and ability of schoolmasters, yet should we
even consider them to be “schoolmasters” in a modern sense? The evidence presented
in the book suggests that it would be more accurate to simply talk about different forms
of “teaching” that occurred in various places and ways, as an adjunct to the more
important business of subsistence in early modern central Europe.
The author does not shy away from talking about “oral culture,” even though it is
becoming increasingly clear that very few European cultures have ever been purely
oral. The term surely must have meaning when legal documents might require support
from oral testimony, when property lines were based on living memory, and when lost
letters patent could be verified by oral testimony from witnesses who had seen—but
could not read—them. The author documents such cases as well as evidence that, as
the written word, and the ability to read and write, began to be more highly regarded
over the course of the eighteenth century, things like signatures and land surveys started
to gain the upper hand on oral testimony and living memory.
Thus despite the statement at the beginning of the book that the author wants to
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avoid “the gathering of colourful stories that freely roam in space and time” (p. 2), a
fundamental strength of the book lies in its ability to weave local history into the quest
for statistical certainty. As the book progresses, colorful stories and anecdotes begin to
creep in at a growing pace. We learn about nobles who could not read their own letters
patent and who showed them to as many people as possible so that if they were lost
(a common enough occurrence through war and fire) there might be oral testimony to
shore up their claims to nobility. We learn about eyeglasses—who had them, who
didn’t—and about the changing sense of time as literacy became a cultural value. We
learn that a fair number of Hungarians spoke a kind of pidgin Latin, but that reports
of widespread Latin literacy, as was the case with glowing reports of Hungarian literacy
generally, were overblown. We learn about semiliterates, about gender differences in
literacy (the same as almost everywhere else), and about what those who could read
did in fact read, and how they read it.
The author thus effectively places the study of literacy into its larger sociocultural
context, with interesting and informative results. There may not be terribly many surprises here for the informed student of literacy, but the depth of research, the felicity
of the prose, the picaresque anecdotes, and the many insights into the nature of earlymodern central European cultural and intellectual life should be enough to interest most
scholars of the place and period in this book.
BENJAMIN W. REDEKOP
Kettering University

Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism, and After. By
Peter J. S. Duncan. Routledge Advances in European Politics.
London: Routledge, 2000. Pp. xivⳭ235. $90.00.
One of the several virtues of Peter Duncan’s book is its lucidity. Another is its broad
scope, suggested by the sprawl of the title, in sharp contrast with the economy of the
treatment of messianism within its covers. The book might be advertised as everything
the nonspecialist wants to know about Russian messianism in 148 pages of text.
Different eras are given strikingly different coverage. The period during which the
Slavophiles flourished—roughly the middle third of the nineteenth century—is really
the seedtime of modern Russian messianism and nationalism, but Duncan covers these
vital years in just over ten pages. Similarly, his chapter on left-wing messianism “from
Herzen to Stalin” gets only thirteen. In contrast, the messianic tendencies within the
nationalist revival of the Brezhnev era merit forty-one pages. The reason for these
anomalies appears plain: Duncan seems to have done his dissertation on the Brezhnev
period. The remainder of the book is intended to round out consideration of the problem
to cover the earlier centuries of Russian history and the chaos of recent times. Perhaps
Duncan would have liked to write a longer book. But Routledge decided to charge the
reader ninety dollars for this short book. If it were a hundred pages longer, as it arguably
should be, one can only imagine what it might cost!
Duncan, however, has done pretty well within the procrustean bed that has been
fashioned for him. Although there is not a great deal of analysis, his straightforward
narrative is clear, knowledgeable, and judicious in its judgments, and his ample bibliography will be useful to those interested in more extended treatments of the people
and movements that the author takes up. But, with the notable exception of the Brezh-
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nev period, his brief and well-fashioned account is really no more than a summary of
the best secondary sources.
Duncan defines messianism in its most basic form as the “proposition or belief that
a given group is in some way chosen for a purpose. Closely linked to this is the view
that the great suffering endured by the group will lead somehow to the redemption of
the group and possibly of all humanity” (p. 1). The personage who chooses the group
for this redemptive purpose has usually been a deity of some kind, but in more recent
periods the Weltgeist or the demiurge of History has done the honors. Duncan attributes
the persistence and vitality of messianic thinking in Russian history to the vast suffering
of the people over the centuries, to the stimulus offered by the teachings of Orthodox
Christianity, and to the geopolitics of Russia, which provided such opportunity for
invasions from both east and west and thus for popular suffering on a grand scale. He
is commendably cautious about the importance of the “Third Rome theory” during the
long centuries between the Time of Troubles and its rediscovery by nineteenth-century
thinkers. He also says little about linkages between the various instances of messianism,
a subject of considerable interest to previous scholars.
Toward the end of the book (pp. 146–47), he adds the suggestion that Eastern Europe
(Poland and Serbia are plausibly cited) also reveals a susceptibility to the messianism
of suffering, defeat, victimization, and redemption, thus suggesting a kind of messianic
regionalism. Another passage, however, reveals the author’s rather Western ambiguity
about Slavic extravagance. “Alternatively,” he writes, “one might see Russian messianism as an example of collective paranoia: on the one hand, a persecution complex,
linked to the memories of being invaded, and more recently to a fever of conspiracy
theories, centring on world Jewry or the CIA and to the fear of being excluded from
Europe; on the other hand, the delusions of grandeur typified by ‘Moscow the Third
Rome’ . . .” (p. 147).
Duncan understands there to be two poles to his subject, a “state-oriented messianism,” which is “linked with the idea of Moscow’s domination of other people (nationalist messianism),” and a messianism “linked with the idea of the Russian people
being a model for other nations to follow (universalist messianism)” (p. 3). The closer
one moves toward the nationalist messianism pole, the more closely the history of
Russian messianism resembles a simple history of Russian nationalism, and indeed
most of the writers cited belong to both histories.
There are a number of questions about the category of “messianism” that might have
been elaborated. For example, the border between foreign policy adventures impelled
by messianism and those undertaken out of a more sober raison d’état is often fuzzy
and hard to discern, as is the relationship between expansionism and messianism—
particularly in the case of Russia! And I would have welcomed some discussion of the
extraordinary continuity between the Russian intellectual world of the 1870s and that
of the 1970s, or even later. The Slavophiles have been alive in Russian culture with a
depth, power, and longevity unique in Europe, to say nothing of the United States. But
Russian Messianism, for all its virtues, is not a richly speculative work.
Finally, there are a very few minor errors. On page 51, both P. N. Tkachev and
A. I. Helphand (Parvus) get a wrong initial. But I assume that on page 2 the copy editor
rather than the author is guilty of rendering ancien régime as ancient regime!
ABBOTT GLEASON
Brown University
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Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the
Russian Far East, 1840–1865. By Mark Bassin. Cambridge Studies in Historical
Geography, vol. 29. Edited by Alan R. H. Baker, Richard Dennis, and Deryck
Holdsworth.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xvⳭ329. $69.95.
The late American geographer John Kirtland Wright coined the word “geosophy” to
mean “the study of the history of geographical knowledge” (Human Nature in Geography [Cambridge, Mass., 1966], p. 83). One of geosophy’s more intriguing subfields
deals with the way people have thought of a particular region. In this regard, geosophy
is more interested in the way places excite the imagination than in the more technical
aspects of geography’s academic evolution. While not consciously based on Wright’s
teachings, probably the best known example of this approach is Frederick Jackson
Turner’s notion about the American frontier. Mark Bassin’s new book about the ideas
generated by Siberia’s southern Pacific coast in mid-nineteenth-century Russia is an
exciting and important new contribution to geosophy.
This long awaited revision of Bassin’s Berkeley dissertation has two objectives. At
its most basic level, Imperial Visions is an account of Russia’s expansion into China’s
northeastern frontier during the nineteenth century. Bassin begins with the first arrival
of Cossacks in the region about two hundred years earlier, when adventurers like Yerofei Khabarov spoke of a “region beautiful and bountiful” around the Amur River
whose seemingly fertile lands might provide Siberia with much-needed grain and other
crops. The area could well have become another dominion of the Muscovite tsar had
it not been for the intervention of the Qing dynasty, which was just then consolidating
its own youthful rule over China and environs. Determined opposition from the Manchu
kept the Russians at bay for well over a century, until the increasingly evident decay
of the Qing in the 1840s once again whetted territorial appetites west of the Urals. The
Middle Kingdom, no longer in a condition to resist, yielded the left banks of the Amur
and Ussuri Rivers according to the Treaties of Aigun in 1858 and of Peking in 1860,
respectively.
This story has been told before, most recently in the earlier chapters of S. C. M.
Paine’s Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, N.Y.,
1996). Nevertheless, it is a major episode in the formation of the Russian empire, and
Bassin’s account is one of the best I have read. My only reservation concerns the
complete absence of archival sources. This would have been understandable had Bassin
brought his book to press in the 1980s, immediately after he defended his thesis. However, by the early 1990s nearly all of the relevant collections were freely accessible.
Bassin’s revision would have benefited from visits to the diplomatic, military, naval,
geographical, and other archives now open to scholars in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The more intriguing goal of Imperial Visions is to explain how the acquisition of
the new Pacific region inspired the Russian nationalist imagination. Here Bassin is at
his best. Based on a thorough reading of a very wide range of publications in Russian,
French, English, and German, his book is a superb essay in Russian intellectual history.
In a nutshell, Bassin argues that, toward the latter years in the unpopular reign of Tsar
Nicholas I, the Amur region became the repository for hopes about national regeneration and destiny among progressives in the imperial metropole. For some, developing
the territory promised to open an enormous virgin land to agricultural and commercial
development, much like the Mississippi drainage in the young United States (the title
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of Bassin’s original dissertation was “A Russian Mississippi?”). Others considered the
Siberian frontier in more ethereal terms. Inspired by German Romanticism and disillusioned by the autocracy’s constraints on intellectual activity, leading members of the
intelligentsia thought of the unknown Pacific tract as a blank screen on which they
might project their fantasies about a better future. Bassin explains: “For one brief
historical moment, an obscure region . . . was able to attract the interest of the entire
society, excite widespread enthusiasm, and even excite the dreams of the country’s
most outstanding social and political visionaries” (p. 2).
By the early 1860s, however, it became clear that the river was virtually unnavigable,
while the region’s allure to settlers and businessmen soon proved to be chimerical. The
“Amur euphoria,” as Bassin calls it, ended just as quickly as it began. That the Asian
territory should have intrigued Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century is not
surprising, however. The same era also marked the beginnings of the famous debate
between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. That discussion concerned the empire’s
kinship with Europe. Bassin performs an important service by reminding us that Russians also gave much thought to their relationship with Asia.
Imperial Visions promises to make a major contribution to the growing scholarship
about Russian national identity. I do hope that the publisher will soon issue an affordable paperback edition to make it accessible to the wider audience the book richly
deserves.
DAVID SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE
Brock University
Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents. By Anne
E. Gorsuch. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies.
Edited by Alexander Rabinowitch and William G. Rosenberg.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ274. $35.00.
This intelligent, well-researched, and learned book does more than teach us it wasn’t
easy to be young during the Soviet twenties. Both methodologically and interpretatively, Anne Gorsuch’s study suggests future paths for historical work on the now
completed Soviet period. Persuasively combining newer discursive strategies with the
deep research characteristic of social history, she has extensively considered comparative and theoretical issues to produce a work of mature scholarship.
For some time, students of the Soviet Union thought that the 1920s, with their
openness, were “good” and that the 1930s, with their repression, were “bad.” A decade
of scholarship since the opening of the archives has scarcely convinced us that the
women and men who lived through the 1930s were “lucky to be young, alive, and
Soviet.” Nevertheless, we do now have a much richer and more complex view of that
immensely trying decade. Conversely, scholars are moving toward a less positive view
of the New Economic Policy (NEP). One of the signposts of this rethinking is Eric
Naiman’s painfully smart, even scary book Sex in Public (subtitled The Incarnation of
Early Soviet Ideology [Princeton, N.J., 1997])—a work which, it must be noted, provides a particularly compelling argument for keeping one’s sex in private. Gorsuch’s
approach is less sensational than Naiman’s but equally revisionist. For her, the NEP
was a time of uncertainty and variety but, most of all, anxiety. The lives of the young
were not limited to the rubrics, concerns, and categories of the party’s Young Communist League, the Komsomol. Instead, Gorsuch presents a multiplicity of types, in-
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cluding hyper-militant true believers, street people, criminals, hooligans, fox-trotters,
flappers, and others. The reader is shown an entire range of what can, with some rigor,
be called “lifestyles.” Despite its association with the thankfully terminated television
show about the “rich and famous,” the term “lifestyle” is apt in this situation precisely
because choice was part of the process of assuming identities at this time of great
uncertainty. In arraying these various types, Gorsuch presents a panoply of young
people trying to find their way in the wake of a revolution whose leaders provided
insufficient guidance on how to act once the “people” had triumphed.
Gorsuch gives a rich account of the lives of urban young people in the street, factory,
club, and dance hall. Her use of new materials from the Komsomol and other relevant
archives is compelling, but the heart of her work is the extensive contemporary scientific and sociological literature on youth produced by what she calls “Bolshevik
moralists.” Gorsuch constructs her account as a dialogue between those who thought
about youth, on the one hand, and the young themselves on the other. At numerous
points throughout the text comparisons are made to other histories ranging as far afield
as revolutionary France and modern Mexico. Nor is theory neglected. Here Gorsuch is
intelligently eclectic, and it is this ability to avoid being trapped by her research—to
explain instead throughout the text the meaning of her material—that makes this the
work of a mature scholar.
Gorsuch’s reliance on published materials raises an interesting point about recent
scholarship on Russia. In attempting to ask new questions, many of us have found the
categories used by Soviet and post-Soviet archivists ill suited to providing easy answers. Evidence is no longer neatly organized into particular fondy pertaining to institutions. We must face the fact that the producers of the documents we read were not
necessarily interested in the same things those of us who now inhabit the post-Soviet
moment want to know. Studying the kinds of deinstitutionalized politics of such subjects as popular culture (extensively treated by Gorsuch) is not easily accomplished by
spending all one’s time in the archives. By not fetishizing these sorts of primary
sources, Gorsuch has avoided this problem skillfully.
Yet, her nonteleological account, with its variety of possibilities, raises one difficult
problem. The NEP did end, and a historian has the responsibility of explaining, in some
measure, why this happened. Gorsuch handles this matter elegantly by offering an
epilogue in place of a conclusion. Still, this last chapter reads very differently from the
body of the book. It is more conventional than is the rest of her account, although no
less intelligent. While it may sound like psychobabble to some, I was persuaded by
her claim that the end of the NEP was a reassertion of parental authority by the Stalinists. Did her youths of the 1920s have fun, fun, fun, ’til their daddies took the market
away, or was the market that much “fun” after all?
For all its virtues, this work could have been stronger if more attention had been
paid to class as one element in explaining the lifestyle choices of NEP young people.
I am not thinking here of a positivist, nineteenth-century notion of class along the lines
of Engels or Georgy Plekhanov. Rather, given the kinds of choices that were being
made, I do think class, as used by Pierre Bourdieu in such a work as Distinction
(Cambridge, Mass., 1984), would have enriched Gorsuch’s account. If class is problematic as a category and is no longer seen as determining, it still, as Bourdieu shows,
can profitably be part of the mix.
Finally, as someone who has written on sport, I cannot fail to mention the near
complete absence of any mention of one of young Soviet men’s favorite activities.
Gorsuch prominently cites Carole Pateman’s argument that the exclusion of women
has been inextricably tied to the “fraternity” of men. Surely, the male bastion of the
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playing field—and, more important, the locker room—assumed a significant role in
keeping females away from an important identity-creating activity that was highly
gender-specific. If the Komsomol became a “boy’s club,” sport, with its embrace of
modernity, was part of that process.
Most important, however, Gorsuch has produced a model of scholarship that should
attract readers well beyond the field of Soviet history. If raising children is difficult
enough in our present moment of political stasis, reading about the excesses of the
young during revolutionary times may provide some small assurance for today’s worried parents.
ROBERT EDELMAN
University of California, San Diego
Bolsheviks and the Bottle: Drink and Worker Culture in St. Petersburg, 1900–
1929. By Laura L. Phillips. Russian Studies Series.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000. Pp. viiiⳭ212. $38.00.
Research into the history of mind-altering substances such as alcohol can provide fascinating and important insights into more conventional historical topics. In Russia, as
elsewhere, as Laura Phillips argues, “workers’ drinking practices are a brilliant prism
reflecting the deeper political and cultural attitudes of early twentieth-century laborers.
It would be astonishing if they were not. After all, customs surrounding drink permeated
every facet of working-class life, including leisure, shop-floor culture, politics, and
family life. A Russian worker might bypass the theater, the club, movies, lectures, or
books without great difficulty, but an omnipresent culture of drink inevitably confronted
all who moved within the working community” (p. 6).
In this book, Phillips explores Russian working-class culture (particularly male
working-class culture) in the first thirty years of this century, through the distorting
lens of a vodka bottle. To be precise, she explores the working-class drinking culture
of St. Petersburg/Leningrad. Her sources include memoirs, temperance and medical
literature, newspapers, and government and trade union records of various kinds.
The time frame of her book crosses the revolutionary divide of 1917. In the history
of alcohol, as in many other areas of Russian life, this era is marked by striking discontinuities. Before the revolution, a government concerned about its legitimacy and
embarrassed by the extent of its fiscal dependence on working-class drinking began to
flirt, nervously, with ideas of temperance. Then in 1914, on the spur of the moment,
Nicholas II decided to turn a temporary ban on liquor sales introduced during mobilization into a permanent ban. Large areas of Russia were dry in the early years of the
war, though upper-class Russians rarely had any problem finding alcohol. Gradually,
though, drinkers found substitutes for vodka, and then, through paths that are still too
obscure to follow precisely, they learned to make home-distilled vodka, or samogon.
That these were new skills is apparent from the fact that the word samogon was itself
new in 1917. One of the few political continuities over the revolutionary divide of 1917
was the commitment of all governments to the maintenance of temperance. The Soviet
government banned alcohol sales but had other, more pressing concerns in its early
years, which made it difficult to police the growing domestic industry of samogonmaking. Then, in the early Soviet period, the Party reluctantly concluded that if the
government did not legalize the production and sale of alcohol, the immense profits
generated in this way would merely accrue to an emerging class of petty capitalists.
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So, in 1925, the Soviet government began selling full-strength vodka. Many within the
party hankered for stricter controls on liquor production and sale, but the fiscal needs
of the Soviet state meant that, like the tsarist government, it, too, would have to rely
on a “drunken budget.”
Phillips argues that, despite the turmoil of these years, the basic rules of male drinking culture changed surprisingly little. The drinking of hard liquor remained a widely
accepted marker of masculinity; female drinking was judged much more harshly than
that of males; and the tavern, though deprived of much of its color in the early Soviet
era (p. 91), remained an overwhelmingly male space. In the 1920s, as in the tsarist era,
“The language of workingmen shows that their most persistent assumption about alcohol concerned its relationship to gender: they understood drinking to be conduct
befitting male workers; abstinence from alcohol—and from spirits in particular—was
portrayed as the appropriate behaviour for women” (p. 31).
Yet Phillips also argues in chapter 6 (probably the most interesting chapter in the
book) that the significance of that culture changed in important ways with the emergence of a state that claimed to identify with workers, yet disliked the way workers
drank. Indeed, she describes as one of the book’s main themes “the ways in which this
‘workers’ revolution’ affected the everyday life of its main constituency” (p. 4). Worker
activists saw the traditional drinking culture of urban males as backward and harmful
to working-class discipline, and the Party inherited these attitudes, setting itself firmly
against that culture, at least in its public rhetoric.
The result was a series of compromises between the new “workers’ state” and male
working-class culture. In the factories, the many rituals associated with drinking in the
prerevolutionary world (such as prival’naia, the round of drinks bought by a new
worker) vanished, driven out by a new and more puritanical breed of managers and
officials. But drinking did not vanish; it merely took more furtive forms. “In the 1920s,
administrative efforts to keep alcohol out of factories increasingly forced laborers to
gulp their alcohol down outside the mill itself, but the revolutionary state’s cultural
activists were hardly successful in eradicating drunkenness on the job” (p. 50). And
attitudes to drinking at most levels of society remained stubbornly traditional. In 1926,
as many as 50 percent of Leningrad doctors still subscribed to the view that hard liquor
was necessary to revive the spirits of workers and prescribed accordingly (p. 62).
Finally, the compromise negotiated between drinkers and state took the form of humor,
a bitter humor that was to become typical of much of Soviet life. Drinkers often appropriated the solemn language of official temperance literature. For example, “in a
meeting at Krasnyi Treugol’nik, a certain Burilov suggested that ‘fighters’ against alcoholism should ‘[drink] a bottle a day, drink 30 bottles a month’ in order that 30
alcoholics would remain ‘without vodka’” (p. 131). One of the few criticisms I would
make of a very good and interesting book is that there is not enough about drinking as
a recreational activity, as fun. I also wish that Phillips had offered us her thoughts on
changes in the 1930s and beyond. The need of the Stalinist state for revenues, and the
movement of traditional working-class males into leadership positions in the 1930s,
suggests that that may have been the era in which these two cultures reached a semiformal accommodation which survived for much of the Soviet era. But I would have
liked to know Phillips’s views on the issue.
DAVID CHRISTIAN
San Diego State University
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Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the
Romanov Dynasty. By Chester S. L. Dunning.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. Pp. xiiiⳭ657. $65.00.
Late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth century, Muscovite Russia endured
several decades of misery that contemporaries dubbed the “Troubles.” One dynasty
expired and a new one ascended the throne, but not before at least two usurpers and
numerous pretenders attempted to claim the crown for themselves. In addition, the
country fought off invasions by both Swedes and Poles, in the process losing significant
portions of territory. Catastrophic famine and a series of bad harvests helped institutionalize both serfdom and slavery, while warfare devastated several towns, contributing to an economic contraction whose effects were felt long afterward. Even the
capital felt the Troubles, as it was once besieged by rebels and later occupied by Poles.
These events were so traumatic to the political, economic, and social body of Russia
that even today when Russians refer to the “Troubles” they conjure up visions of
colossal destruction and institutional chaos.
In a massive new book, Chester S. L. Dunning reexamines this era, challenging what
he calls “hundreds of years of misinterpretations” (p. 10). Denying that the Time of
Troubles represented a “social revolution against serfdom” (p. xi), as some modern
historians have argued, Dunning claims in a masterly and richly documented narrative
that the struggle was primarily political. Russia’s first civil war fractured society vertically rather than horizontally.
Several decades prepared the way for the opening of hostilities in 1604, when “Dmitrii,” allegedly the legitimate heir of the old dynasty who had been reported dead in
1591, invaded Muscovy with considerable Polish help. Although it is customary to
dismiss “Dmitrii” as an imposter and a Polish pawn, Dunning valorizes him as “charismatic,” “incredibly strong and agile,” “extremely intelligent and resourceful” (p. 123),
and possibly authentic (pp. 131–32). By contrast, a “ruthless” (p. 60) Boris Godunov,
who succeeded to the throne in 1598 on the death of Fedor Ivanovich, plays the villain.
Even though Godunov engaged in poor relief unparalleled for the era, his policies
engendered dissatisfaction among elites that doomed him and his reign.
Godunov’s death in 1605 helped “Dmitrii” ascend the throne, but the success was
short-lived. In 1606 Vasilii Shuiskii, another of Dunning’s villains, murdered the newly
enthroned sovereign, seizing the throne for himself and clinging to power until 1610.
Although “Dmitrii” was dead, the specter of Dmitrii continued to haunt Russian politics. Another “Dmitrii” presented himself, and, aided by fresh military leadership,
fought on under a standard that the author describes as conservative: “their goal was
as much religious as political: to restore the God-chosen ruler to the throne” (p. 260).
Now generalized away from the southern frontier where hostilities had begun, the civil
war penetrated the Volga River valley and deep into Russia’s heartland, approaching
the very gates of Moscow. Russian gentry and peasants joined forces with Tatars,
Cheremis, Mordvians, and Chuvash against a man whom they all deemed a usurper.
Foreign intervention dominated the last years of Russia’s “Troubles,” with Polish
troops occupying Moscow and the Polish king contemplating ways to seize the Russian
throne. Shuiskii was deposed in 1610 and “False Dmitrii” was also dispatched, but
identifying a successor proved contentious. Only in 1613, after a national militia successfully expelled the Poles from Moscow, was it possible to name a teenager, Mikhail
Romanov, to the throne. Although many difficulties persisted, formally the “Troubles”
and the civil war had come to an end.
In explaining this era, Dunning leans on comparative history, especially the “dem-
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ographic/structural” model of Jack A. Goldstone (Revolution and Rebellion in the Early
Modern World [Berkeley, Calif., 1991]), according to which rapid population growth,
price inflation, and rising social demands taxed early modern states beyond their ability
to cope. In applying this analysis to Russia, Dunning sees intra-elite competition as the
driving force behind Russia’s civil war; in an era of relative scarcity, “younger sons of
elite families . . . increased much more rapidly than the increase in the overall population” (p. 21), leading to hardship and disaffection among cadet families. Although
Russia’s elite did split over the various contenders for power, evidence on Russia’s
population in this era is not strong; nevertheless, nearly everyone agrees that late in
the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth century Russia’s population stabilized or
perhaps even contracted. And before the late seventeenth century there are no reliable
estimates of population growth among elites, undermining Dunning’s explanation (Ia.
E. Vodarskii, Naselenie Russii v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII veka [Moscow, 1977], pp.
63–73).
But whether or not structural vectors explain the conflict, Dunning emphasizes that
Russians of all stations responded to political values in taking sides. But how can we
know what seventeenth-century Russians thought? Acknowledging that there are no
new sources to plumb, the author instead seeks help in comparative history. Unfortunately, the history of England or the Ottoman Empire can tell us little about what
Russians of that age felt, but Dunning is undoubtedly right in emphasizing that when
whole towns committed to the cause of the rebels they made a dramatic statement of
political preference.
For readers of this journal, Dunning’s most important claim may be that, from the
perspective of the twenty-first century, “it is possible to trace many of the problems
associated with Russia’s ‘historical backwardness’ and the poverty and oppression of
its people under both the tsars and commissars to the aftermath of the civil war carried
out in Tsar Dmitrii’s name” (p. 480). In the author’s view, seventeenth-century sovereigns looked back at the Troubles and concluded that Russia’s “traditional, Godcentered ideology” (p. 476) was responsible. Therefore, the Romanov tsars consciously
adopted a more rational ideology that significantly enhanced the political potency of
both tsar and patriarch and helped multiply the secular and clerical bureaucracies. The
long-term result was a “widening split between the Russian people and an increasingly
impersonal central government and church that intruded more and more into the lives
of the tsar’s subjects” (p. 477). Although Dunning’s account does not fully dispose of
social explanations of the “Troubles,” there can be no doubt that Chester Dunning has
authored a powerful political history of one of modern Russia’s defining moments.
DANIEL H. KAISER
Grinnell College
The Enemy on Trial: Early Soviet Courts on Stage and Screen. By Julie A.
Cassiday.
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ260. $38.00.
The world is a stage, Julie Cassiday seems to be saying in her book. The subjects of
her study are Soviet show trials, films and plays about Soviet courts in the first decades
of their existence, and that strange and yet characteristic Soviet institution of the 1920s,
the agitational courts (agitsudy). She deals with the period leading up to the purge trials
of the great terror, and therefore the book, at least to some extent, can be regarded as
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a background study to that series of horrendous events. In effect she is saying that the
script had been prepared gradually and unconsciously, the stage was set, the roles
defined, and all that remained was to find the players. Here one cannot say that “life”
imitated “art,” for “life” and “art” were the same. The verbiage from the show trials
could easily be taken from movies, and vice versa. The characters of the “enemies” as
depicted by Soviet prosecutors were exactly the same as figures presented on the screen
and on stage. They were vermin, rats with human faces, who had a completely unmotivated hatred not only for Soviet life but also for everything decent. These were
people without redeeming qualities, people who had been rotten from the day of their
births.
It is necessary to put both “art” and “life” in quotation marks, for “life” had little to
do with reality. The accusations and confessions in the trials were nothing but a pack
of shameless and far-fetched lies, and Soviet films of the 1930s that depicted enemies
and subversives can be regarded as art only by stretching the meaning of the term
beyond what is reasonable. Drama requires conflict. Interesting conflict requires protagonists equally matched, and that was not possible in Soviet “art.” Tragedy requires
a tragic hero who fails. Nothing could be further from the depiction of the enemy in
Soviet films than the character of the tragic hero.
Cassiday’s approach to her subject matter is that of a scholar of literature: she analyzes films, plays, and trial transcripts as literary texts. In the process she has some
interesting things to say. Her analysis, for example, of such well-known films as The
Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks, By the Law, and
Don Diego and Pelegaia is fresh and insightful. She is correct in noticing the subversive
messages in these films, whether or not they were intended as such by their creators.
She is entirely correct in dismissing Lev Kuleshov’s orthodox interpretation of his own
film, By the Law.
Cassiday mentions the Nuremberg trials and the Scopes monkey trial in order to
show that it is an error to believe that the Soviets were unique in attempting to couple
drama and justice. To be sure, in the Scopes trial, as in the trial of the mining engineers
in Moscow in 1928, there was drama. The kitten and the tiger are both felines, but they
are by no means alike. She argues that the Soviets were not wrong to make justice into
theater. She writes, “Contrary to expectations, the theatricality of the Soviet courtroom
did not undermine the justice handed down to Stalin’s enemies of the people. Instead,
the theatricality constituted the gruesome justice of the Soviet show trial, giving it a
distinctive form, function, and undeniable force” (p. 27). I do not understand what kind
of justice she has in mind, gruesome or not. Since these sentences come from a crucial
paragraph of her introduction, I also do not understand what exactly the argument and
purpose of her book are.
Although she does mention the Vera Zasulich trial and “revolutionary theatricality,”
the historical and political context is missing in her discussions. We do not learn who
the Bolsheviks were and what ideology drove them. Undoubtedly, the show trials were
propaganda. But who organized this propaganda, and how effective was it? We never
learn. There is no Soviet background: no mention of famines, denunciations, or methods
of extracting confessions. This is a book on show trials in which the names Henrik
Yagoda and Nikolai Ezhov do not appear. Cassiday is interested in texts. There are
plenty of references to Andrei Vyshinskii and Nikolai Krylenko, for they were “actors”
in the drama. Reading this book one might come to believe that it was not Stalinists
who were carrying out mass murder against their own people, but that there was a play
that was to be acted out. We are never told explicitly who was the author of the play,
which seems to have developed on its own. The actors in this book do not act in the
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sense of making decisions for which they can be held responsible; they are merely
participants in a drama. Literary analysis is not the best way to approach the extraordinary topic of mass murder.
PETER KENEZ
University of California, Santa Cruz
Revolutionary Acts: Amateur Theater and the Soviet State, 1917–1938. By Lynn
Mally.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ250. $45.00.
Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin.
By Karen Petrone. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European
Studies. Edited by Alexander Rabinowitch and William G. Rosenberg.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. xⳭ266. $39.95.
These two fascinating and innovative books are concerned with a set of early Soviet
practices and symbolic strategies that it is difficult to name in a single word. Neither
“leisure” nor “entertainment” would sound purposive enough for a culture where watching a comic skit could cause a trade union leader to ask anxiously, “Does anything
remain in workers’ heads but laughter after a Blue Blouse performance?” (Lynn Mally,
Revolutionary Acts, p. 70), or where participants in a late 1930s New Year’s ball had
to be “‘strictly cautioned’ to have fun” (Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous,
p. 103). As Mally’s book, in particular, demonstrates, the term “art” is also of at best
dubious relevance. The amateur drama groups of the early Soviet era with which her
book is concerned explicitly repudiated “aesthetic drama” in favor of “social drama”
(p. 19), and their performances sought not only to challenge audiences in the manner
of most modernist art but also to break down the barrier between representation and
action altogether. They were concerned with “production” in an industrial as well as a
theatrical sense: in some groups, notably the “agitbrigades” of the late 1920s, actors
were selected on the grounds of ideological probity and their “excellent records on the
factory floor. . . . Their performance skills rated no mention at all” (p. 153). The fact
that amateur theater could become no more than “a fighting weapon in the battle for
the Five-Year Plan in four” (ibid.) not only heralded an assault upon the autonomy of
art so dear to the old intelligentsia but also attested the Soviet state’s move to a reliance
upon legitimation via ritual that had closer parallels in the early modern world (Russia
under Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, France under Louis XIV) than in late imperial Russia.
Perhaps the most specific single word one can use for the subject of study would be
deistva, or “ritual enactments,” a Russian concept echoed in the title of Mally’s book,
Revolutionary Acts.
To outline this terminological problem is not to engage in philological pedantry: it
is of primary relevance to both analyses, in particular Petrone’s. The word “celebrations” in Petrone’s subtitle foregrounds a daringly permissive grouping of some superficially very different phenomena of Stalinist public culture: physical culture parades
and other mass demonstrations; eulogistic tributes to polar explorers and pioneers of
aviation; the rehabilitation of Christmas festivities (secularized as “New Year tree parties” and carnival-masquerades); the celebration of the centenary of Pushkin’s death in
1937; and the bombastic propaganda hymning the introduction of the Soviet Constitution of 1936. The disparateness of the material considered sometimes lends the book
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the feel of a collection of essays (albeit always lively and worthwhile ones) rather than
a book constructed around a strong central argument, especially given the absence of
any preliminary exploration of how the term “celebrations” is to be understood (readers
are informed that, “from the first days of the revolution, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of celebration culture” [p. 13], but they are not told what Petrone
supposes the essence of such a culture to be). Elided also are issues of inclusivity: why,
one wonders, are the celebrations surrounding the building of the first metro line in
Moscow not analyzed? Why has Petrone chosen to focus on the Pushkin jubilee (the
subject of a fair amount of specialist work already) and not on the equally important
(but less familiar) festivities that marked Gorky’s return to the Soviet Union? Why,
above all, is there no consideration of the celebrations for Stalin’s sixtieth birthday in
1939? But as Petrone’s study progresses, it takes on a momentum that overrides superficial objections of this kind. Outwardly, there may have been little in common
between New Year parties and hagiological tributes to polar heroes, but the grouping
together of these phenomena does convey the synthesizing ambitions and eccentric
paradoxicality of Stalinist national populism (narodnost’), its attempts to fuse together
solemnity and entertainment, moral indoctrination and tutelage in consumerist aspiration. The book’s title is technically a mistranslation of Stalin’s famous dictum (the
leader in fact said not “Life has become more joyful” [radostnee], but “Life has become
jollier” [veselee]), but the mapping of “joy” on to “jollity” was in fact one of the most
characteristic aspects of high-Stalinist celebrations and ceremonial occasions, and Petrone has captured something very important about 1930s popular culture in highlighting this point.
Petrone’s main interest is in celebrations as discourse, and her book is essentially a
semiotic study, an exegesis of both overt and buried meanings in the celebrations that
she analyzes. The introduction, “Interpreting Soviet Celebrations,” emphasizes the author’s intention of illustrating how official rituals and ceremonies could be manipulated
and appropriated by the ordinary people whom Soviet leaders aimed to transform into
a sort of secular laity (“Soviet citizens may have willingly participated in the celebration
of the anniversary and reveled in their ‘holiday escapades’, but they may not have
imbibed all of the ‘culture’ and political knowledge which government officials intended,” p. 20). However, the body of the book is little concerned with this issue (apart
from a brief discussion of how the Pushkin jubilee allowed Soviet intellectuals to
address politically tricky areas such as resistance to authoritarian political systems). It
might have been interesting to compare official celebrations of polar heroes with the
popular cult of zakal (self-tempering via exposure to extreme cold, as manifested most
notoriously by the practice of taking January dips in frozen rivers), or to consider how
the license extended to New Year parties allowed some leeway for Soviet citizens to
hold private celebrations, whether group banquets in communal flats or—for the privileged few in individual apartments—parties for family and close friends. Despite Petrone’s recognition that “three distinct groups” were involved in creating celebrations—
“the central government that set official policies on celebration, the Soviet cadres who
controlled celebrations at the local level, and the people who participated in them” (p.
20)—the book does not reveal much about the participants, or about the mediation of
top-level directives on their way to becoming practice. There is some evidence indicating that the process of rehearsing parades could be laborious: documents housed in
the archive of the Komsomol Central Committee indicate that rehearsals for the 1939
Physical Culture parade in Moscow turned into a shambles because large numbers of
students from the Joseph Stalin All-Soviet Institute of Physical Culture failed to show
up regularly or at all, sometimes wangling sick notes in order to provide a thin justi-

This content downloaded on Mon, 4 Feb 2013 09:37:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

923

fication for their absence. One suspects that this kind of organizational nightmare was
not uncommon, and some consideration of the practical difficulties behind making the
kind of triumphant celebrations demanded by the regime run smoothly might have been
useful.
One of the strengths of Mally’s book, in contrast, is its meticulous dissection of the
institutional background and day-to-day practical stresses behind the organization of
one particular type of early Soviet ritual performance: the drama shows staged by
amateur theatrical groups. The book is immensely informative about every area of its
chosen theme: the expression of standpoints with regard to the traditional “entertainment/instruction” dichotomy; the careers of the activists involved (several of whom,
including Nikolai Ekk, went on to become film directors); the nature of the repertoire
involved; production techniques and performance spaces. Sometimes, to be sure, I
wished Mally had been a little more expansive about the precise content of the shows
these groups put on: for instance, it would have been useful to know more about the
immensely popular plays of Sofiia Belaia than simply that they were “potboiling melodramas” (p. 36), and interesting to have had more information about the scenarios
published by the agitbrigade journal Club Stage than that “these outlines suggested
places where local material could be inserted, leaving relatively little to the imagination” (p. 155). Concrete citations showing exactly how much cultural activists working
in the center were prepared to leave to the “imagination” (or more likely, the political
discretion) of local kul’torgi, and also of what issues they felt must be disseminated to
mass audiences across the Soviet Union, would have been an illuminating contribution
to the understanding of top-down cultural control.
This is not to say that Mally’s study lacks interpretive depth. On the contrary, it is
a fascinating and intricate examination of shifts in the ambitions, and in the official
standing, of amateur troupes. To simplify, three phases of development are identifiable.
The early to mid-1920s was dominated by improvisatory and participatory performances, such as those staged by the “Blue Blouse” movement, with emphasis on “small
forms” and tight links with traditional popular-cultural genres, such as the circus—
among the characters employed in sketches staged by TRAM (the Theater of Worker
Youth) was a foul-mouthed slob by the name of Sasha Chumovoi, exactly the kind of
comic social deviant familiar in prerevolutionary street theater, such as the puppet show
Petrushka. During the period of the First Five Year Plan, however, the most characteristic type of group was the “agitbrigade,” who staged much more explicitly didactic
playlets before “captive audiences” (p. 152) whom they sought to browbeat by the
recitation of political slogans and by hortatory rituals, such as compulsory votes on
issues of the day. Finally, in the early 1930s, top-down pressures brought amateur
theaters closely into line with professional theaters of the day: from now on, the expectation was that they would perform standards of the mainstream repertoire in permanent performance spaces and would model techniques of acting and production on
those of the theatrical professionals who were often employed as consultants to amateur
troupes.
Much of the discussion contributes not only to an understanding of Soviet theatrical
life but also to a grasp of broader patterns of transformation in Soviet society. For
instance, the history of the centralization of cultural production is enriched by Mally’s
account of the amateur theaters’ fate in the 1930s. It is no coincidence that 1932, the
year when “informal” literary groupings were finally wound up and the Union of Soviet
Writers instituted, also saw an all-out assault on the technical inadequacies of amateur
dramatists and directors, as expressed in critical responses to the all-Soviet amateur
theater Olympiad of 1932. Here as elsewhere, the misleadingly neutral term “profes-
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sionalization” concealed a high degree of intolerance for spontaneous and unsanctioned
artistic endeavor. The book also does much to illuminate the history of early Soviet
activism, whose self-deludingly arrogant character is all too clear from the description
here of agitbrigades performing “lightning raids” on villages and congratulating themselves on effecting once-and-for-all social change in the course of a single afternoon:
“As a result [of our performance], the village voted unanimously to rid itself of kulaks,”
one actor involved in such a brigade boasted proudly in 1931 (p. 159). Extrapolating
from examples such as this, which point to the highly authoritarian character of many
low-level activists, Mally calls into question the conventional understanding of the
“cultural revolution” of 1928–31 as a phase of “assaults on established authority” (p.
179). Equally, she argues cogently that the repudiation of avant-garde practices in the
mid-1930s should not be seen simply as a reversion to the ideals of the prerevolutionary
“theater for the people” (even if the term narodnyi teatr came into favor once more at
this point). The Soviet government’s “commitment to nurturing and training amateurs”
marked a fundamental distinction between the practices of the 1930s and those of the
1900s or 1910s (pp. 218–19).
Read together, these two books are complementary in a whole range of stimulating
ways. On the one hand, Mally’s attention to the complex patterns by which central
directives were interpreted at the grassroots, and her sense of evolutionary drive, help
to orchestrate the rather static and particularist account of Soviet culture given by
Petrone’s book (which pays little attention to the question of the relationship between
“celebrations in the time of Stalin” and those at other times and in other places, or to
the question of how celebrations actually functioned on the ground). On the other hand,
the character of Soviet “acts” as propaganda artifacts emerges more clearly from Petrone’s book, whose strength is its imaginative attention to symbolic meaning. Mally’s
book is an excellent way into the minds of rank-and-file Soviet subjects such as amateur
actors; for anyone interested in the ambitions of those who aimed to direct the lives
and aspirations of such individuals, there could be no better introduction than Petrone’s
study of “celebrations in the time of Stalin.”
CATRIONA KELLY
New College, University of Oxford

Village Mothers: Three Generations of Change in Russia and Tataria. By David
L. Ransel. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Edited
by Alexander Rabinowitch and William G. Rosenberg.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. ixⳭ314. $39.95.
The book under review resulted from the new conditions for research created by the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990, on the eve of the collapse, David Ransel went
to Russia to work in libraries and archives to investigate the differing rates of infant
and childhood mortality between ethnic groups, principally Russians and Tatars, in
rural areas. As a result of the collapse, he was able instead to begin an oral history
project interviewing village women about their experiences. Over the next few years,
with the assistance of Russian and Tatar colleagues, more than a hundred women were
interviewed in different regions of European Russia. (The questionnaire used and a list
of the interviewees are included as appendices.) The project evolved into a broader
study of women’s experiences of courtship and marriage, fertility choices (including
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abortion—legalized in 1920), giving birth, Christian baptism and Moslem rites, coping
with infant death, and looking after the children who survived.
One of the main features of the book is a comparison over three generations. The
first generation of interviewees comprised women born around 1912, who grew up,
married, and started families in the early years of Soviet power, before and during the
destruction of customary family structures and culture by the collectivization of agriculture and “dekulakization” that began in earnest in 1930. The second generation was
born between 1912 and 1930. They married and had their children in the new, collectivized villages, at a time when the Soviet authorities were starting to spread their
modernizing values and culture to rural Russia. The extension of modern medical care
and welfare for mothers and children took rather longer. The lives of these women, at
the very time they were building their families, were disrupted by World War II. Some
of the women lived in occupied territory. All experienced the drain of their menfolk to
the army, many of whom were never to return. The third generation was born after
1930. They married and had children in the postwar period, when effective medical
care and support became available in rural Russia for the first time.
Ransel states at the outset that the book has two purposes. The first—the result of
the new opportunities for research—is “to introduce into the history of twentiethcentury Russia voices of ordinary women in the villages.” This aim is realized in the
heart of the book, chapters 3 through 8, which are based on the interviews. The second
purpose, closer to the original aim of the project, is to trace the spread of modern
Western medical discourse on reproduction and child care into rural Russia from its
very tentative beginnings in the eighteenth century to its arrival in the 1950s and 1960s.
This is the main subject of the first two chapters, which are based on written sources,
but it is also addressed in the rest of the book. It is the former aim that predominates,
however, and a harsh critic might consider the discontinuity between the two parts of
the book a weakness. The long concluding chapter, “Life and Loyalty in Hard Times,”
which summarizes and compares the experiences of women of the different generations,
regions, and ethnicities, strongly suggests where the main interest and, indeed, sympathies of the author came to lie.
It is, of course, impossible in a review to do justice to the richness of the book. The
experiences of women of the middle generation compared with their mothers and
daughters can serve as an example. They fell between the two worlds: the old “patriarchal” world and the new, modern world of Soviet collective farms in the latter part
of the twentieth century. Neither are in any way idealized in the book, but nostalgia
for the old world crept into the testimonies of some of the women. In the old world,
rural women were valued by their families as workers on the family farm first and as
mothers second. Pregnant women continued to work until the onset of labor and resumed work shortly after giving birth. They left their infants in the care of older women
and children, who persisted in customary child-care and feeding practices, such as tight
swaddling and early introduction of solid food, which medical professionals (who lived
and worked mostly in urban areas) had been concerned about for generations. The
results were appallingly high rates of infant and childhood mortality and very high
rates of fertility to replace them. However, the customary village and religious cultures
did provide some emotional support for women. These women’s suspicions of the early
attempts by the Soviet authorities to “emancipate” them are testament both to the
resilience of the customary ways and to the fear rural women felt about what might
replace them. Women of the youngest generation were largely freed from the control
of customary family structures and had finally abandoned most of the harmful older
practices. They were still expected to work on the collective farms, but they had ma-
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ternity leave and benefits as well as modern medical care and advice to lighten slightly
the “double burden” of full-time work outside the home and full-time motherhood and
household tasks inside. Women of the middle generation, however, were expected to
work on the land and raise families, but they had neither the support of the fastdisappearing customary family structures and culture of their mothers nor the modern
medical care and welfare of their daughters. Moreover, from the early 1930s, the Soviet
government impressed on them the duty of rearing large numbers of workers for the
construction of socialism and soldiers to defend it. Until the 1950s, the government’s
pronatal policies consisted largely of negative measures, in particular the ban on legal
abortions from 1936 to 1955. In practice, abortion was virtually the only way open to
women to limit the numbers of children they had, and many resorted to dangerous
illegal terminations in their struggle to “survive and endure” in the lost world of midcentury rural Russia. Very few had the ten children needed to qualify for the “heroine
mother” awards established in 1944. The anger and bitterness, but also the dignity, of
this generation of women, who are now facing old age in the uncertain environment
of post-Soviet Russia, is one of the lasting images of this compelling book.
DAVID MOON
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
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